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1. Introduction
The concept empathy has had a difficult history, marked by
disagreement and discrepancy. Although it has been stud-
ied for hundreds of years, with contributions from philoso-
phy, theology, developmental psychology, social and per-
sonality psychology, ethology, and neuroscience, the field
suffers from a lack of consensus regarding the nature of the
phenomenon. Despite this disagreement, the empirical
data on empathy are very consistent, across a wide range of
species. Consider the following examples:
An albino rat sees a distressed conspecific suspended in
the air by a harness; he presses a bar to lower the rat back
to safe ground, staying close to and oriented toward him
(Rice & Gainer 1962). Another rat sees a distressed con-
specific receiving electric shocks and does not press the bar
to terminate the shock, he instead “retreat[s] to the cor-
ner . . . farthest from the distressed, squeaking, and danc-
ing animal and crouch[es] there, motionless” (Rice 1964,
p. 167). The response of a rat to shock of a conspecific oc-
curs without any prior experience with shock, is stronger af-
ter prior experience with shock, and strongest when prior
shock occurred at the same time as to the conspecific
(Church 1959).
In an experiment with rhesus monkeys, subjects were
trained to pull two chains that delivered different amounts
of food. The experimenters then altered the situation so
that pulling the chain with the larger reward caused a mon-
key in sight of the subject to be shocked. After the subjects
witnessed the shock of the conspecific, two-thirds pre-
ferred the nonshock chain even though it resulted in half as
many rewards. Of the remaining third, one stopped pulling
the chains altogether for 5 days and another for 12 days af-
ter witnessing the shock of the object. These monkeys were
literally starving themselves to prevent the shock to the con-
specific. Starvation was induced more by visual than audi-
tory cues, was more likely in animals that had experienced
shock themselves, and was enhanced by familiarity with the
shocked individual (Masserman et al. 1964).
Human infants orient to the distress of others, often re-
sponding with their own distress cries from infancy to 14
months (e.g., Sagi & Hoffman 1976; Ungerer 1990; Zahn-
Waxler & Radke-Yarrow 1982). After the first year, children
start to show helping behaviors, even when they have be-
come distressed. They also imitate the distress behaviors of
the other, possibly “trying on” the expressions to better un-
derstand them (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1977, in Thompson
1987). With age, the level of personal distress decreases
while appropriateness of helping behaviors increases (e.g.,
Zahn-Waxler et al. 1983).
These examples, all from empirical reports, show that in-
dividuals of many species are distressed by the distress of a
conspecific and will act to terminate the object’s distress,
even incurring risk to themselves. Humans and other ani-
mals exhibit the same robust effects of familiarity, past ex-
perience, and cue salience (Table 1), and parallels exist be-
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tween the development of empathy in young humans and
the phylogenetic emergence of empathy (de Waal 1996;
Hoffman 1990, respectively). These facts suggest that em-
pathy is a phylogenetically continuous phenomenon, as
suggested by Charles Darwin more than a century ago
(1871/1982).
The goal of this theoretical review is to present data
across disciplines so that the continuity is apparent. More-
over, this paper aims to show that consistencies exist be-
cause all empathic processes rely on a general perception-
action design of the nervous system that has been postulated
for over a century, is adaptive for myriad reasons, and exists
across species. Recent advances in interdisciplinary re-
search and tools for understanding the brain provide strong
support for the Perception-Action Model (PAM), warrant-
ing its application to emotional domains. This Perception-
Action Model also sheds light on the ultimate level de-
scription, placing the emphasis on direct effects on
reproductive success from the general design of the ner-
vous system, rather than on indirect effects from helping
behaviors. Thus, by fleshing out the phenomenon along
both proximate and ultimate levels, and by combining data
across fields, a unified story emerges.
1.1. Terminology
1.1.1. Proximate versus ultimate. Ernst Mayr first created
the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes of
behavior. According to Mayr, “proximate causes govern the
responses of the individual (and his organs) to immediate
factors of the environment while ultimate causes are re-
sponsible for the evolution of the particular DNA code of
information with which every individual of every species is
endowed” (Mayr 1961, p. 1503). Causes exist at each of
these levels; therefore, theories that refer to different lev-
els are not in conflict. For example, when you help your dis-
tressed neighbor, is it because you “feel their pain,” or be-
cause you will eventually need them to reciprocate? Given
Mayr’s levels of causality, these hypotheses are not in con-
flict; the former is a proximate explanation, the latter an ul-
timate one.
1.1.2. Definitional distinctions. Much of the empathy lit-
erature focuses on whether empathy is an emotional or cog-
nitive process and distinguishes empathy from emotional
contagion, sympathy, and perspective taking (e.g., Eisen-
berg 1986; Feshbach 1975; Hoffman 1978a; 1982a; Horn-
blow 1980; Omdahl 1995; Shantz 1975; Wispé 1986). These
distinctions are empirically based and help to categorize be-
havior (Batson et al. 1987; Doherty 1997; Eisenberg et al.
1994; 1998; Eisenberg & Okun 1996; Rice 1964; distinc-
tions summarized in Table 2), but they have been overem-
phasized to the point of distraction. This overemphasis on
definition reflects the deeper problem that empathy lacks
a proximate mechanism. Abstract and elusive definitions
like “putting oneself in the place of another” or “imagina-
tively projecting oneself into the situation of another” (All-
port 1937; Buchheimer 1963; Demos 1984; Goldie 1999;
Smith 1989) indicate an insufficient understanding of the
way the nervous system instantiates empathy. Thirty years
ago G. W. Allport said it best when he concluded, “the
process of empathy remains a riddle in social psychol-
ogy . . . The nature of the mechanism is not yet understood”
(Allport 1968, p. 30 from Wispé 1987, original emphasis).
The original German word Einfühlung, of which the Eng-
lish “empathy” is Titchener’s translation (1909; Wispé 1991,
p. 78), literally means “feeling into” (Wispé 1986). Einfüh-
lung was thought to result from a process where observers
project themselves into the objects they perceive (Lipps
1903; McDougall 1908/1923; Titchener 1909). Theodore
Lipps first put forth a mechanistic account of Einfühlung,
where the perception of an emotional gesture in another di-
rectly activates the same emotion in the perceiver, without
any intervening labeling, associative, or cognitive perspec-
tive-taking processes (Lipps 1903). Two paths have since di-
verged from the original Einfühlung.
Some theories focused on the direct perception aspect,
and on the basis of empathy in emotional contagion or im-
itation (e.g., Brothers 1990; Hatfield et al. 1993; Hume 1888/
1990; Levenson 1996; Levenson & Reuf 1992; Nietzsche
1895/1920; Smith 1759/1976; Wermlund 1949). McDou-
gall observes in his Introduction to Social Psychology (1908/
1923, p. 93) “that the behavior of one animal, upon the ex-
citement of an instinct, immediately evokes similar behav-
ior in those of his fellows who perceive his expressions of
excitement.” McDougall includes imitation of facial ex-
pressions from mother to infant, feelings of tenderness
evoked in observers of mother-infant interactions, and the
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contagious distress evoked in chimpanzees by the distress
of a conspecific.
Other theories make use of Lipps’ projection, imitation,
and imagination, without the direct perception. This makes
empathy a high-level, cognitive phenomenon, reserved for
humans (e.g., Allport 1961; Deutsch & Maddle 1975;
Freud 1922/1945; Mead 1934; Titchener 1915). Even in
comparative frameworks, empathy can be synonymous with
“perspective taking.” In one cooperation paradigm, animals
are considered to have empathy if they can perform the task
of their human partner after only having observed it during
training. The transfer task is successfully done by apes but
not monkeys and is interpreted as evidence that only the
former have empathy (Povinelli et al. 1992a; 1992c, respec-
tively). The task is not performed between conspecifics,
and does not include an emotional component.
Still other theories reject both the direct perception ap-
proach and the cognitive approach and suggest that empa-
thy is the result of conditioning (e.g., Allport 1924; Becker
1931; Church 1959; Scheler 1923/1954). In the condition-
ing view, the distress of another is the Conditioned Stimu-
lus (CS), and the distressor itself is the Unconditioned
Stimulus (US). The subject learns that the CS predicts the
US, and eventually responds to the distress of the other
with distress. Supporting this view, rats pre-trained with a
shock paired to the shock of a conspecific significantly de-
crease bar pressing for the remainder of the experiment (in-
terpreted as anxiety). However, as mentioned above, rats
that experience an unpaired shock also decrease bar press-
ing, just to a lesser degree. Even subjects that never ex-
perienced shock decreased bar pressing, but the response
habituates quickly (Church 1959). These results were repli-
cated with pigeons (Watanabe & Ono 1986).
Developmental research has incorporated different lev-
els of empathy by tracking changes in the life span (e.g.,
Eisenberg et al. 1983; Hoffman 1978; Ungerer 1990; Zahn-
Waxler & Radke-Yarrow 1982; Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992a).
Hoffman (1982a; 2000) outlines a variety of emotional and
cognitive processes that are involved in empathy, but a great
deal of work needs to be done to clarify why these transi-
tions take place, and how these levels interact.
These different views of empathy can be cohered into a
unified whole if a broad view of the perception-action
model is taken. The perception-action model is supported
when existing behavioral data on empathy is combined with
recent data from physiology and functional neuroanatomy.
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Table 1. Cross-species references for five main empathy literature findings. Empathy increases with Familiarity (subject’s previous 
experience with object), Similarity (perceived overlap between subject and object, e.g., species, personality, age, gender), Learning 
(explicit or implicit teaching), Past experience (with situation of distress), and Salience (strength of perceptual signal, 
e.g., louder, closer, more realistic, etc.)
Past
Familiarity Similarity Learning experience Salience
Rats Church 1959; Lavery & Foley 1963;
Watanabe & Ono 1986 Rice & Gainer 1962
Monkeys Aureli et al. 1989; Miller et al. 1966; de Waal 1996; Masserman et al. 1964; Miller et al. 1959a;
Aureli et al. 1997; Miller et al. 1967; de Waal et al. 1996 Miller et al. 1967 Miller & Deets 1976
Cords & Thurnheer Miller et al. 1959a
1993; Demaria &
Thierry 2001; 
Masserman et al.
1964; Miller et al.
1959a
Apes O’Connell 1995 Yerkes & Yerkes 1929 Povinelli et al. 1992a O’Connell, 1995
Human Zahn-Waxler & Martin & Clark Capps & Sigman Lamb & Zakhireh 1997;
infants Radke-Yarrow  1982; Simner 1996; Thompson Sagi & Hoffman
1982 1971 1987 1976; Simner 1971
Human Zahn-Waxler Feshbach & Krebs 1970; Murphy 1937 Eisenberg et al. 1990;
children 1982; Zahn- Roe 1968; Eisenberg et al. Eisenberg et al. 1993
Waxler et al. Rosekrans 1967; 1983; Radke-Yarrow
1984; Farver Shantz 1975; 1983; Trivers 1974;
& Branstetter Smith 1988 Ungerer 1990;
1994; Howes Zahn-Waxler et al.
& Farver 1987 1979; Zahn-Waxler 
1984
Human Cialdini et al. Batson et al. Aronfreed 1968; Aronfreed 1965;
adults 1997; Sawyer 1981; Krebs Gruen & Eisenberg et al.
1966; Stinson 1975; Toi & Mendelsohn 1991; Eisen-
& Ickes 1992 Batson 1982; 1986; Stinson berg et al. 1994;
Gruen & & Ickes 1992 Gouldner 1960
Mendelson
1986
Applying the perception-action mechanism broadly re-
coheres the discrepant views into a unified whole, and
changes the ultimate model.
1.1.3. An overview of the model. Throughout, the object is
referred to as the primary individual who experienced the
emotion or state. The subject is the individual that secon-
darily experienced or understood the emotion/state of the
object, through empathy. The authors view the term empa-
thy broadly, similar to Hoffman (2000), as: any process
where the attended perception of the object’s state generates
a state in the subject that is more applicable to the object’s
state or situation than to the subject’s own prior state or sit-
uation.
While Hoffman’s (2000) definition of empathy, and that
of many others focuses on the response of the subject, our
definition focuses on the process. A process model makes
empathy a superordinate category that includes all sub-
classes of phenomena that share the same mechanism. This
includes emotional contagion, sympathy, cognitive empa-
thy, helping behavior, and so on (Fig. 1). These phenomena
all share aspects of their underlying process and cannot be
totally disentangled (as also suggested by Thompson 1987).
All forms of empathy involve some level of emotional con-
tagion and personal distress (if only at the representational
level), and helping is never entirely for the sake of the ob-
ject (if only at the ultimate level). This process model also
links empathy to all facilitation behaviors that rely on per-
ception-action (e.g., ideomotor actions, imitation, the yawn
reflex, automaticity, priming; see Fig. 1).
A Perception-Action Model of empathy specifically
states that attended perception of the object’s state auto-
matically activates the subject’s representations of the state,
situation, and object, and that activation of these represen-
tations automatically primes or generates the associated au-
tonomic and somatic responses, unless inhibited (see Table
3 for clarification on the terms).
With the Perception-Action Model, whether or not a
subject perceives the state of the object depends crucially
Preston & de Waal: Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases
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Figure 1. In order to unify the various perspectives, empathy
needs to be construed broadly to include all processes that rely on
the perception-action mechanism. Thus, perception-action is a
superordinate class, which includes two basic level categories,
motor behavior and emotional behavior. Both of these basic level
categories include subordinate categories of phenomena. Thus,
according to the model, various phenomena like emotional conta-
gion, cognitive empathy, guilt, and helping are similar in that they
rely on the perception-action mechanism.
Table 2. Usage of terminology by most current researchers divided into main variables of classification updated for a 
perception-action view of the phenomena
Self-other State
Term Definition distinction? matching? Helping? Synonyms
Emotional Subject’s state No Yes None personal distress,
contagion results from the vicarious emotion,
perception of object’s emotional transfer
state
Sympathy Subject feels “sorry for” Yes No Depends
the object. Focused
more on object’s 
situation than physical
state.
Empathy Subject’s state results Yes At representation Increasing with 
from the attended level, not familiarity,
perception of the object’s necessarily similarity,
state. visible. salience.
Cognitive Subject represents Yes No Depends true empathy,
empathy state of object perspective-
through top-down taking
processes.
Prosocial Actions taken to reduce Usually Not Yes helping, succorance
behaviors the object’s distress. necessarily
on their interdependence or interrelationship. Interdepen-
dence can be temporary and superficial, like when the sub-
ject and object must cooperate for a local goal or when the
object’s distress blocks the goal of the subject. Interdepen-
dence can also be long lasting and deep, like the interde-
pendence of family members or spouses that must cooper-
ate for long-term goals spanning a lifetime. The more
interrelated the subject and object, the more the subject
will attend to the event, the more their similar representa-
tions will be activated, and the more likely a response. The
more similar the representations of the subject and object,
the easier it is to process the state of the object and gener-
ate an appropriate response.
There are broadly two types of response: response with
the object (matching responses as with distress to distress
or joy to joy), and response to the object (instrumental re-
sponses as with consolation to distress or fear to anger). Ex-
emplifying responses with the object, human and nonhu-
man subjects that correctly identify the emotion of an
object have a physiological response that is correlated with
the object’s state (Levenson & Ruef 1992; Miller et al. 1967,
respectively). Exemplifying responses to the object, human
subjects that are empathically concerned show a decelera-
tory heart-rate response to the object of distress (Eisenberg
et al. 1990; 1991; 1994) and rhesus macaque subjects show
increased heart rate to the approach of a dominant animal
(controlling for posture and activity) (Aureli et al. 1999).
Since imitation emerges much earlier than prosocial re-
sponse, and people learn to inhibit and control emotional
contagion and imitation, responses with the object should
emerge earlier, and with less learning. But, data in the ulti-
mate section attest to the need for experience to fine-tune
the circuits for responding with the object as well; thus, a
strict division along “nature versus nurture” is not war-
ranted.
The automaticity of overt responses with the object de-
crease with age and experience, due to many factors, dis-
cussed below. These include increased prefrontal function-
ing, increased segregation of self and other representations,
and learned display rules – all of which inhibit the auto-
matic response. In addition, attention can be preemptively
allocated when an automatic response is undesirable (de-
termined by current goals and the ability to help). However,
covert responses may still occur, even outside of awareness.
In orienting studies with infants, even though overt distress
can be decreased by distracting or re-orienting attention,
distress returns to almost equal levels when the distraction
stimulus is removed, and the hormonal stress response may
remain throughout (Gunnar et al. 1984; Harman 1994; re-
viewed in Rothbart et al. 1994). This internal “distress
keeper” (Rothbart et al. 1994) may be the mechanism for
negative feelings like guilt and remorse that pervade even
when attention is shifted. As evidence, trait sympathy is cor-
related with the probability for entering situations of dis-
tress and the susceptibility for guilt and shame after refus-
ing to help (reviewed by Smith 1992).
These processes do not require conscious awareness, but
they can be augmented by cognitive capacities in evolution
and development so that empathy is possible in the absence
of the object of distress, from imagination or effortful pro-
cessing. For example, if a subject witnesses the distressed
state of an object that has been robbed, the subject may feel
distressed, and may think about the object, robbery, and
feelings of vulnerability and fear. Alternatively, the subject
may think of the object or hear of the object’s loss, which in
turn activates associated thoughts related to the object –
robbery and vulnerability – and produces feelings of dis-
tress.
The arguments for adaptation and evolution of percep-
tion-action processes are presented in the next section “The
ultimate bases of empathy.” The proximate model follows,
with a review of the literature on perception-action in mo-
tor behavior, and in emotional behavior (including adult hu-
mans, nonhuman animals, human children, and individuals
with empathy disorders). Finally, there is a detailed de-
scription of the role that representation plays in a percep-
tion-action model, explaining the pervasive effects of learn-
ing and experience on empathic processes. Cognitive
empathy is addressed in the final section as a phenomenon
based on the perception-action mechanism, but requiring
additional cognitive capacities that develop with the pre-
frontal cortex.
2.The ultimate bases of empathy
Ultimate accounts are notorious for being cursory and spec-
ulative. Moreover, previous evolutionary models of empa-
thy did not reference important empirical research avail-
able in animals and humans, and dealt only with one aspect
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Table 3. Clarification of terms from the summary of the model that are used throughout
Term Meaning
Perception- From the Perception-Action Hypothesis of motor behavior (Prinz 1987; 1992; 1997). Term “response” used in text 
action to refer to a more general class of phenomena.
Attended Refers to the fact that strong empathic responses require that the subject is attending to the state of the object.
Differences in empathy across individuals, age groups, and situations are predictable from levels of attention.
Perception Flexible definition that includes direct activation from the object in the external world, indirect activation from 
associations with external events or objects, and indirect activation through imagination.
Automatically As a matter of course, unless controlled or inhibited. Does not require conscious and effortful processing.
Representation Parallel distributed patterns of activation that reliably fire in response to a given stimulus. Formed by the combina-
tion of developmental tuning biases and connectivity of neurons as well as alterations due to experience.
Unless Imitative actions are inhibited during observation of action, centrally (from prefrontal inhibition), peripherally 
inhibited (with spinal cord inhibition blocking the motorneurons that execute the action), or both.
or one level of the phenomenon. For example, many have
proposed that emotional contagion exists to facilitate the
mother-infant bond (Darwin 1998/1872; McDougall 1908/
1923; Plutchik 1987). Because emotional contagion is con-
sidered related to empathy, the mother-infant bond is tran-
sitively used as an evolutionary explanation for empathy.
While the mother-infant bond is surely important for de-
veloping empathy, this does not allow automatic forms of
empathy to be linked with cognitive forms, or explain why
we experience empathy for nonoffspring.
Many have proposed that inclusive fitness and reciprocal
altruism explain altruism (Axelrod 1984; Hamilton 1964;
Maynard Smith 1964; Trivers 1971). Because altruism and
empathy are considered related, inclusive fitness and recip-
rocal altruism are expected to explain empathy. However,
inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism were developed to
explain how behaviors that appear “altruistic” could have
evolved (like taking care of someone else’s offspring or
alerting your neighbors to the presence of a predator).
Inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, and group esteem
are all complementary factors that additively increase the
likelihood of helping behaviors. Indeed, empathy, helping,
and degree of closeness are correlated with decreasing ten-
dencies from kin to close friends, acquaintances, and
strangers (Cialdini et al. 1997), and altruistic behavior in 
experimental situations is directed at friends more than
neutral individuals (Sawyer 1966). But with our model, in-
clusive fitness and reciprocal altruism did not drive the se-
lection for empathy; they are additional benefits to a highly
adaptive nervous system organization.
Perception-action mechanisms emphasize that percep-
tion selects elements in the environment that require or
suggest a response by the subject. In group-living species,
objects that require a response are those that the subject re-
lies upon to attain personal goals; these are usually friends
and relatives. Thus, nervous systems that respond automat-
ically with empathy to situations where they must respond,
create the appearance of reciprocity, and maximize inclu-
sive fitness. Evidence for the effect of interdependence on
empathy, human children are more motivated to help in ex-
periments when there is a responsibility for the object’s dis-
tress (Chapman et al. 1987). In the primate literature, rec-
onciliations between former opponents are much more
likely between kin and friends (de Waal & Yoshihara 1983;
reviewed by Kappeler 1992). Species with cooperative kin
relationships show higher levels of reconciliation between
related individuals than nonrelated individuals (Aureli et al.
1989; 1997; Demaria & Thierry 2001). In chimpanzees,
where male alliances are very important for intra and inter-
group conflicts, reconciliation is higher among males than
females (de Waal 1986a; Goodall 1986b; but see Baker &
Smuts 1994). In an experimental situation, macaque pairs
trained to cooperate for food dramatically increase their
conciliatory tendency (Cords & Thurnheer 1993).
The literature suggests that empathy and helping are de-
termined by the subject’s ability to help. Human subjects
are more likely to help when the level of need or potential
benefit to the object is higher (Aronfreed 1968; note that
this is also when the probability of reciprocation by the ob-
ject is highest, Gouldner 1960). Adult human subjects that
are trait sympathetic volunteer to help a distressed object
when they expect to have control over the procedure or ex-
pect to be able to help the object (Smith 1992). Thus, it may
be more accurate to consider helping behavior as the result
of a complex cost/benefit analysis on the perceived effec-
tiveness of helping and the effect of helping on short and
long-term goals. If the cost is greater than the benefit, at-
tention can be directed away from the distress to control or
subvert empathic processing altogether, making the desire
to help less likely.
According to a perception-action model, the evolution of
a perception-action organization of the nervous system was
the precursor to empathy; this organization is adaptive for
much more basic reasons than helping behavior. This orga-
nization adaptively generates responses from perception,
using the same representations to code objects and their as-
sociated actions. This is computationally more efficient in
terms of the way the information is processed and the stor-
age space it requires. It also facilitates appropriate re-
sponses to the environment (like ducking away from a pro-
jectile or attacker). Such behavioral tendencies are the
keystone of reproductive success.
The general benefit of a response-oriented nervous sys-
tem laid the groundwork for a perception-action organiza-
tion. This organization was further refined in group-living
animals, because social animals have as much a need to re-
spond with another individual with a matching response as
they do to respond to another individual with an instru-
mental response. This change to the perception-action or-
ganization made possible all phenomena that rely on state-
matching or social facilitation, including empathy. Thus,
affective resonance, state matching, emotional or affective
empathy all rely on this transition. Basic information pro-
cessing components of empathy (such as effects of famil-
iarity, similarity, and experience) were possible as long as
there were networks of neurons that changed from experi-
ence. But later increases to the prefrontal cortex also aug-
mented these processes to allow empathy to take place in a
top-down manner, with more control, and in a broader
range of situations. Subsequent sections examine the extent
to which perception-action processes exist across species
and why these processes are adaptive.
2.1. Perception-action processes facilitate group living
McDougall noted that empathy appears to exist in group-
living animals, or those with the “gregariousness instinct,”
because these animals are innately affected by the emotions
of others (McDougall 1908/1923). According to McDou-
gall’s theory, sympathy “is the cement that binds all animal
societies together, renders the actions of all members of a
group harmonious, and allows them to reap some of the
prime advantages of social life” (McDougall 1908/1923,
p. 93).
If one group member sees something dangerous, usually
a predator, an alarm call is given and in most cases the group
moves away from the source of danger en masse. Thus, the
alarm of one individual alarms others. This phenomenon is
empirically documented for many species, including ground
squirrels (e.g., Sherman 1977), birds (e.g., Powell 1974), and
monkeys (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth 1985). Given this behav-
ior, danger is more likely to be detected even though each
individual spends less time on vigilance (Kenward 1978;
Powell 1974). The “more eyes” phenomenon allows indi-
viduals to spend more time on other activities that promote
reproductive success such as feeding and finding mates. The
evolutionary importance of detecting and responding to
danger is evident in the general design of the nervous sys-
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tem. Response circuits dedicated to the perception of neg-
ative emotions, especially fear, have been easy to locate rel-
ative to positive ones (e.g., Adolphs et al. 1994; 1995; Ekman
et al. 1983; Miller et al. 1966; Scott et al. 1997).
The social facilitation of behavior also relies on the per-
ception-action mechanism, and is evident across group-liv-
ing animals. For example, hyenas live in tightly bound
groups that live, forage, eat, and move together. In social fa-
cilitation experiments with hyenas in captivity, when one in-
dividual drinks, the probability that an observing individual
will drink in the next few minutes is 70%. Even a subject
that was not actively attending is 20% more likely to drink
than in baseline conditions (Glickman et al. 1997, Fig. 2).
Similarly, hyena subjects successfully conditioned to avoid
a food resume eating it when placed with other group mem-
bers that eat the food (Yoerg 1991). The perception-action
mechanism explains such examples of social facilitation.
The vicariousness of activity, often seen in group-living
animals, is also symptomatic of the innate response to emo-
tion in others. Anecdotally, wild dogs are described as nos-
ing, licking, squeaking, and jumping at each other before
the onset of a hunting expedition (van Lawick-Goodall &
van Lawick-Goodall 1971). Similarly, anecdotal accounts of
rhesus macaques report that a severely distressed infant will
often cause other infants to approach, embrace, mount, or
even pile on top of the victim; the distress seems to spread
to the other infants who then seek contact to soothe their
own arousal (de Waal 1996). This type of emotional conta-
gion is also the first stage of empathic responding in hu-
mans, exemplified in experiments where infants in a nurs-
ery cry in response to other infants’ cries (Sagi & Hoffman
1976; Simner 1971) and year-old children seek comfort af-
ter witnessing the injury of another (Hoffman 1990; Zahn-
Waxler et al. 1992a).
There are a few main reasons not to reject the continuity
of these phenomena. First, the behavioral repertoires of
mammals are superficially very similar. However, behaviors
of different species may appear similar, or achieve the same
function, but may not share the same mechanism (“anal-
ogy” in evolutionary biology). This is especially likely for
species that diverged hundreds of millions of years ago,
such as vertebrates and invertebrates. Cases that rely on in-
nate releasing stimuli, or rule-based behavior would not be
related to empathy, while those that share the perception-
action mechanism would. For example, fish schools could
rely on a general rule where each individual maintains an
equal distance to all neighboring individuals. If one indi-
vidual detects a predator and tries to move quickly away, it
would create mass violations to the rule and adjustments.
This would have the overall appearance of group alarm, but
would not be an example of empathic processing. This ex-
emplifies the need to understand mechanism in order to
categorize behavior.
Should we expect the mechanisms to be the same? In-
formation processing, brain structure, and brain design are
greatly conserved across species (Finlay & Darlington
1995; Krubitzer 1995). Moreover, there is direct behavioral,
physiological, and neurological evidence for perception-ac-
tion processes in monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans (re-
viewed in sect. 3). Finally, although there are surely differ-
ences in the cognitive capabilities across species (discussed
in sect. 3), or in the phenomenology of empathy, percep-
tion-action processes are not generally accessible to con-
scious awareness. Therefore, the basic structures, mecha-
nism, and application to social behavior are likely to be
shared at least across group-living mammals.
2.2. Perception-action processes facilitate the mother-
offspring bond
The parent-child relationship both relies upon and is nec-
essary to develop the ability of individuals to be affected by
the emotional state of others (as noted by others, including
Darwin 1998/1872; McDougall 1908/1923; Plutchik 1987).
Infants are emotionally affected by the state of their moth-
ers and mothers are emotionally affected by the state of
their offspring.
2.2.1. Effects of the mother on the infant. Continuous and
coordinated emotional and physical contact between the
mother and infant are thought to organize the emotion reg-
ulation abilities of the infant, which determine the emo-
tional competence of the individual (e.g., Brazelton et al.
1974; Deboer & Boxer 1979; Gable & Isabella 1992; Levine
1990; Stern 1974; 1977).
On a neurophysiological level, maternally-separated rat
pups show reduced levels of growth hormone (GH) and a
peripheral biochemical block between GH and the enzy-
matic activity required for cell protein synthesis. This can
be reversed with appropriate stimulation. After 24 hours of
separation, the sleep of these rat pups is also disturbed, due
to the lack of entraining interactions with the mother
(Hofer 1995; 1999). Separation causes arousal and the re-
lease of stress hormones in attached primate infants and
mothers (Levine 1990). Rhesus macaques raised without
their mother lack the normal, adaptive relationship be-
tween behavior and neurochemistry in response to stress
(Kraemer & Clarke 1996). In humans, infants of depressed
mothers have reduced left hemisphere activation (Jones et
al. 1998) and lack the normal increase in vagal tone between
3 and 6 months that is correlated with vocalizations and op-
timal neurological functioning (Field et al. 1995).
Behavioral development has also been shown to rely on
the mother-infant relationship. Isolate monkeys are im-
paired at sending and receiving emotional expressions to
typically-developing conspecifics (Miller et al. 1967), a task
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Figure 2. Social facilitation of drinking in captive hyenas (adapted
from Glickman et al. 1997).
easily done by normally-developing individuals (Miller et
al. 1962; 1963). The expressive impairments of the isolate
animals has been compared to that of humans with autism,
who are also impaired at the communication of affect (e.g.,
Bemporad 1987; Harlow & Harlow 1966; Miller et al.
1967). Infants of depressed mothers are impaired at match-
ing happy facial and vocal expressions (Lundy et al. 1997)
and show less orientation and fewer facial expressions in re-
sponse to modeled happy and surprise expressions (Lundy
et al. 1996).
We argue that the PAM subserves the ability of infants to
perceive and learn from the expressions of the caregiver.
The actions and expressions of the mother are mapped onto
existing representations of the infant and generate actions
and expressions in response. This facilitates not only the in-
fant’s ability to understand the behavior of the mother, but
also facilitates coordinated activity in the dyad, necessary
for the development of emotion regulation.
Infants and their caretakers are thought to use their emo-
tional expressions to reinforce positive affect, transform
negative affect, and provide breaks when arousal becomes
too high (Malatesta & Haviland 1982; Tronick 1989). Such
responsiveness is thought to organize behavior (Campos et
al. 1983) and create a sense of security and efficacy (e.g.,
Bell & Ainsworth 1972). The coordinated activity between
caregiver and infant seems required for emotional regula-
tion and control (Field 1994), which are in turn required for
empathic competence throughout life (Ungerer 1990). A
lack of coordinated activity may contribute to behavioral
problems associated with an inability to assess and control
emotions, such as tantrums, poor impulse control, and risk-
taking (Tronick 1989).
In humans, fear and personal distress lead to self-
directed efforts and, thus, are prohibitive of empathy, sym-
pathy, and perspective taking (Eisenberg et al. 1994). Emo-
tion regulation problems are correlated with personal
distress and a lack of helping in preschoolers, older chil-
dren, college undergraduates, and the elderly (Doherty
1997; Eisenberg et al. 1994; 1996; Eisenberg & Okun 1996,
respectively). Similarly, although albino rats press a bar to
eliminate the distress of a hoisted animal, they do not press
a bar to eliminate the distress of a conspecific being
shocked. The latter situation is interpreted as being too
stressful for the subjects, precluding an empathic response
(Rice 1964). Thus, without emotional linkage, or the inter-
actions necessary to develop its capacities, infants cannot
learn to regulate their emotions and the development of
more advanced forms of empathy are compromised.
Emotional linkage can also teach offspring about their
environment. If an infant is aroused by the display of emo-
tion in the parent (especially fear or distress), then the in-
fant can use the mother’s reaction as an unconditioned stim-
ulus to learn about danger. For example, if an infant
monkey is aroused by the arousal of a parent in the pres-
ence of a snake, it can learn to fear snakes without the need
for a more costly direct experience (Mineka & Cook 1988;
1993; Mineka et al. 1984). Typically-developing 12-month-
old children socially reference the mother in the face of am-
biguity (Feinman 1982; Klinnert et al. 1983). When pre-
sented with a loud toy in the lab, children this age approach
the toy if the mother smiles but approach the mother if she
expresses fear. When infants approach a visual cliff, social
referencing to the mother determines whether or not the
infant will cross (Sorce et al. 1985). These infants display
negative affect after referencing a mother with a fearful ex-
pression (Klinnert et al. 1983; Sorce et al. 1985). The
mother’s emotion is adaptively perceived and incorporated
into the offspring’s actions without necessitating the same
level of response (as in alarm) or direct experience (as re-
quired by conditioning). Social referencing studies have
found negative emotions to affect the behavior of infants
much more than positive ones. This is in accordance with
findings from other fields, and with the importance of alarm
and distress contagion on reproductive success.
2.2.2. Effects of the infant on the mother. It is also adap-
tive for the parent to be affected by the emotional state of
the infant. In the ethological literature, Eibl-Eibesfeldt
(1971/1974) postulates that the evolution of parental care
in birds and mammals created not only actions by the par-
ent to care for offspring, but also concurrent actions by the
offspring to request care. Interactional views of develop-
ment similarly postulate that the infant directs the mother’s
behavior as much as the mother directs the infant’s (Bell
1968; 1971; Brazelton et al. 1974; Osofsky 1971; Wiesen-
feld & Klorman 1978; Yarrow et al. 1971). Smiling and cry-
ing by the infant are thought to modify the affective and be-
havioral responses of their caregivers. Such behaviors signal
the infant’s state, providing the impetus for attention and
action (Acebo & Thoman 1995; Bowlby 1958; 1969). Illus-
trating the importance of infant-to-mother communication,
a deaf female chimpanzee at a zoo lost a succession of in-
fants despite intense positive interest because she did not
correct positional problems (such as sitting on the infant, or
holding it the wrong way) in response to soft distress calls
(de Waal 1982). What is the mechanism for such interper-
sonal communication?
Crying and smiling can induce autonomic arousal in the
caregiver that simultaneously acts as an unconditioned
stimulus to motivate a response and as the precursor stim-
ulation for the response (Wiesenfeld & Klorman 1978).
When rat pups are separated, they produce ultrasonic vo-
calizations that instigate the mother to search for, retrieve,
and return the pups to the nest (Smotherman et al. 1978).
Crying in human infants elicits high levels of maternal at-
tention in postnatal weeks with high, continued levels of
maternal stimulation (Acebo & Thoman 1992). High levels
of crying associated with colic cause distress in parents (e.g.,
Liebman 1981; Meyer & Thaler 1971; Rowell 1978). Moth-
ers are physiologically aroused when witnessing their own
infant crying; they show an increase in heart rate and large
skin conductance responses. The crying of a strange infant
elicits the standard orienting response (Wiesenfeld & Klor-
man 1978).
Emotional contagion proximately guides the parent-off-
spring relationship, increasing the success of both individ-
uals. If a similar emotion is elicited in the subject as in the
object, then tailored care is much more likely. Proper care
increases viability of the offspring and, thus, the reproduc-
tive success of the parent. Fulfilling the needs of the off-
spring also assuages the arousal of the caregiver and offsets
the unwanted attention from group members and preda-
tors caused by an individual displaying distress.
Although emotional displays can coordinate, regulate,
and guide the parent-child relationship, care is often pro-
vided in the absence of such releasers. What is the mecha-
nism for these acts of helping? The association between a
context and its outcome is facilitated by emotional arousal
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(e.g., Corodimas & LeDoux 1995). Therefore, contagious
distress from offspring to parent can act as an uncondi-
tioned stimulus, motivating the parent to act before a stress-
ful display erupts. For example, captive and wild ungulate
species approach their calves for nursing before a request
is emitted (Murdock et al. 1983). Through empathy, the
parent can also provide care when conditioned associations
to personal experience dictate it necessary. The parents (in-
directly) and the offspring (directly) benefit because the
offspring’s needs are satisfied without the cost of unwanted
attention and a stressful display.
Emotional displays can continue to indicate the needs of
altricial offspring into adolescence. Distress vocalizations
that include sounds of crying and whining may signal ap-
peasement and recruit help. Temper tantrums, an extreme
example, are used by offspring to direct the behavior of the
caregiver after their needs diverge (Einon & Potegal 1994;
Trivers 1974). Tantrums that include “screaming, crouch-
ing, hurling self on ground, running and occasionally at-
tacking the mother” are common in young humans and
chimpanzees (Einon & Potegal 1994). The temper tantrum
endangers reproductive success by causing respiratory dis-
tress, damage to the vocal folds, and involving self-inflicted
injury (Einon & Potegal 1994; Potegal & Davidson 1997),
but it can be a successful technique because the parent is
averse to the loud display of anger (Potegal & Davidson
1997).
The preceding evidence suggests that the emotional link-
age between parent and offspring has a profound effect on
reproductive success. It provides an unconditioned access
to the infant’s emotional state, and thus the need as well as
the motivation to help. It conditions offspring to know
when and how to request care and conditions parents to
know when and how to provide care. Thus, the direct emo-
tional link between individuals is highly adaptive for group-
living individuals, especially those that provide extended
care. This direct link also provides the basis for empathy
and helping outside of these contexts.
Phenomena that increase the reproductive success of rel-
atives are the purview of inclusive fitness. However, in-
clusive fitness models would argue that the PAM evolved to
indirectly increase the reproductive success of mothers
through offspring. According to our model, the PAM evolved
because it is adaptive for basic responses to the environ-
ment, and for group living. Subsequently, the mechanism
was exapted in altricial species to improve care of offspring,
and to develop emotion regulation and synchrony; which in
turn are necessary for the proper development of empathy,
cognitive empathy, and helping behavior.
2.3. Perception-action effects outside the mother-
offspring bond
Empathy may have a phylogenetic and ontogenetic basis in
the emotional linkage between parent and offspring, but
empathy is exercised across the lifespan in many mammals.
How is empathy extended from these rudimentary forms of
emotional linkage?
Empathy in alarm and parent-offspring situations was
described as resulting from innate releasing stimuli. High
pitched sounds that resemble alarm calls or screams induce
fast action in situations of immediate physical danger, while
sounds that resemble crying induce action for less immedi-
ate needs like food, comfort, and warmth. These same stim-
uli can be used to elicit empathy and help from nonoff-
spring. A distressed chimpanzee, for example, who has just
lost a major battle will “pout, whimper, yelp, beg with out-
stretched hand, or impatiently shake both hands” in order
to solicit the consolatory contact of others (de Waal & Au-
reli 1996). Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1971/1974) argues that the in-
fantile releasers of caregiving are used throughout adult
life, such as the use of a high-pitched voice or “baby names”
between lovers.
Why is it beneficial to extend innate releasing mecha-
nisms and care-giving beyond the parent-child relation-
ship? Because releasers elicit distress in the receiver
through the PAM, they can initiate the actions of potential
allies and terminate the actions of predators and conspecific
attackers. It is mistaken to argue whether help is given for
the benefit of the object or to terminate the object’s aver-
sive distress signal or the subject’s personal distress. Aver-
sive signals evolved because, by definition, others want
them terminated. The comparative evidence below attests
to the success of these signals in soliciting help from con-
specifics (for a detailed review of the comparative data, see
Preston & de Waal 2002).
Given a perception-action view of empathy, these pro-
cesses extend to the prediction and response to allies as well
as competitors. The PAM can produce appropriate helping
behaviors, as well as effective punishments. In both cases,
the subject accesses the object’s state and generates an ap-
propriate response. Associated representations of the ob-
ject and situation will determine whether the desired out-
come is to produce or alleviate distress. The generation of
the state in the subject can be bottom-up or top-down. And
both could occur simply with learned, conditioned re-
sponses that prove effective in producing the desired out-
come. However, there is a difference between the normal
phenomenon where the subject creates distress in the ob-
ject for self-defense, or to secure resources (like Machiavel-
lian intelligence; Byrne & Whiten 1988), and the abnormal
phenomenon where the subject seeks to produce or witness
high levels of distress in noninterrelated objects (like psy-
chopathy). The latter case is an impairment in the percep-
tion-action circuit for emotional states, addressed in section
3.4.5, “Evidence from disorders of empathy.”
In summary, combining an ultimate and a proximate de-
scription of empathy greatly changes the argument for
adaptation, allows one to link different levels of empathy,
and exhibits the inherent relationship among these levels.
Data is presented in the following section to support the
proximate model.
3. The proximate bases of empathy
The fact was overlooked that, in order to express it, the body
must in the last analysis become the thought or intention that it
signifies for us.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (1962/1970,
p. 197).
The “Perception-Action Hypothesis” (a term from motor
behavior) is grounded in the theoretical idea, adopted by
many fields over time, that perception and action share a
common code of representation in the brain (reviewed by
Allport 1987; Prinz 1987; 1992; 1997; Rizzolatti & Arbib
1998). According to the perception-action hypothesis, per-
ception of a behavior in another automatically activates
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one’s own representations for the behavior, and output from
this shared representation automatically proceeds to motor
areas of the brain where responses are prepared and exe-
cuted. This organization makes sense if perceptual systems
evolved to provide accurate information about the environ-
ment to appropriately plan and guide movements (Prinz
1992). These common codes are not restricted to physical
movements, they include abstract, symbolic representa-
tions (Decety et al. 1997; Jeannerod 1994; Prinz 1997).
3.1. Existing theories
Previous theoretical accounts of empathy have implicated
a perception-action model to varying degrees (Adolphs
1999; Boodin 1921; Brothers 1990; Levenson & Reuf 1992;
Lipps 1903; McDougall 1908/1923; Meltzoff & Moore
1997). Lipps’ (1903) theory was an early proponent of 
the perception-action model in motor behavior and he ex-
plicitly applied the theory to empathic processes. Similarly,
McDougall stated, “sympathy is founded upon a special
adaptation of the receptive side of each of the principal in-
stinctive dispositions, an adaptation that renders each in-
stinct capable of being excited on the perception of the bod-
ily expressions of the excitement of the same instinct in
other persons” (1908/1923, p. 95).
In more recent history, Brothers (1990) suggested that
understanding the emotion of others entails to some degree
experiencing the emotion observed. This hypothesis was
certainly correct, though it was not linked to the experi-
mental empathy literature, and at the time had little back-
ing from physiological and neurological evidence. Gallup
also suggested that information about the self is used to
model the states of others. His “introspective” model seems
implicitly more cognitive than the PAM since he did not see
the object’s state as being mapped automatically onto the
subject’s representations, and reserved the process for the
few species that exhibit theory of mind (Gallup 1998b).
Less directly implicating perception-action processes, Lev-
enson and Reuf (1992) suggested that the heart-rate con-
cordance between subjects in affect communication para-
digms could be the basis for empathy. This agrees with the
PAM since similar states are induced in the subject and ob-
ject, but does not include central nervous system compo-
nents.
Based on extensive research, Meltzoff and colleagues
propose the Active Intermodal Mapping Hypothesis (AIM).
The AIM is proposed to explain early facial imitation, and
lay the groundwork for empathy (Meltzoff & Moore 1977;
1983; 1994). According to the AIM, the object’s expression
is perceived and compared to the subject’s own current ex-
pression (from proprioceptive feedback) in a supramodal
representational space. The subject’s efferent copy is com-
pared to the object’s afferent copy in this space, equiva-
lences are detected and reduced, and imitation results
(Meltzoff & Moore 1997). According to a perception-action
view the perception of the object’s expression automatically
activates a similar motor expression in the subject (in con-
trast to AIM), but through a representation (in agreement
with AIM). This expression could in turn be compared
through feedback to the representation, and the difference
between copies could be detected and reduced (in agree-
ment with AIM).
Simulation theory has also been proposed to be a mech-
anism for empathy, where the subject understands the
mental and emotional state of the object by simulating the
object’s state internally (Carruthers & Smith 1996; Davies
& Stone 1995a; 1995b). Generally, the perception-action
mechanism and simulation theory are not in conflict. Some
descriptions of the simulation process seem more explicit
and cognitive than a perception-action model would sug-
gest, but most postulate implicit as well as explicit processes.
In the literature, simulation theory stands in contradis-
tinction to the theory-theory, which postulates that individ-
uals understand the world through theories that they de-
velop (Gopnik 1993; Gopnik & Wellman 1992). With the
PAM, the two theories are compatible; simulation theory is
a description at a level between metaphor and mechanism
that is interested in how the state of the object is imparted
to the subject while theory-theory is a description at the
level of metaphor that is interested in the ways that these
perceptions change during development (see Schulkin
2000, for a comparison of the two theories with respect to
mirror neurons).
The discovery of mirror neurons (di Pelligrino et al.
1992) prompted a series of papers extending the possible
function of these cells from the coding of simple motor acts,
to the coding of other’s mental states and these cells were
suggested to provide evidence for the simulation theory of
empathy (Adolphs 1999; Adolphs et al. 2000; Gallese &
Goldman 1998; Iacoboni et al. 1999; Ruby & Decety 2001;
Williams et al., 2001; Wolf et al. 2001; literature reviewed
by Motluck 2001). While mirror neurons alone cannot pro-
duce empathy at any level, they do provide concrete cellu-
lar evidence for the shared representations of perception
and action that were postulated by Lipps (1903) and Mer-
leau-Ponty (1962/1970) and behaviorally demonstrated by
Prinz and colleagues (Prinz 1997).
Given the history of a perception-action theory of empa-
thy that extends back at least to the beginning of the last
century, with small upsurgences along the way, the model
seems to have had intuitive appeal to researchers looking
for simple, mechanistic ways to instantiate empathy. The
theory has not yet enjoyed mass acceptance, however, for
many reasons. The behaviorist and cognitive revolutions di-
rected theory away from the level of mechanism. In addi-
tion, folk psychology generally regards empathy as a phe-
nomenon reserved for humans. Given a lack of knowledge
of the mechanism, these approaches are appropriate. Now,
data in humans, nonhuman primates, and rodents support
the perception-action model for motor and emotional be-
havior, and suggest that at least across these species, the
mechanisms for processing emotional stimuli are similar.
These data are reviewed in section 3.4.
3.2. Motor evidence for the PAM
Many experiments in cognitive psychology support the di-
rect link between perception and action. The development
of cognitive neuroscience tools including brain imaging,
single cell recording, electroencephalograms (EEG), tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and patient studies,
generated a spate of experiments testing the Perception-
Action Model (PAM).
Evidence suggests that sensory inputs are automatically
processed to a response phase. In a response-competition
paradigm where human subjects have to choose an action
based on the features of the stimulus on each trial, event-
related potentials (ERP) measures suggest that partially an-
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alyzed sensory information is passed to the response phase
even though the perceptual analysis is not complete (e.g.,
Hommel 1997; reviewed in Hillyard 1993). The results
were replicated using single-unit recordings in the ma-
caque monkey (Miller et al. 1992). Reaction-time (RT) data
with a similar paradigm confirm the covert preparation of
responses (Craighero et al. 1998). Similarly, when subjects
have to perform two stimulus-response tasks simultane-
ously, the response to the second stimulus seems to be pre-
pared before the response to the first is completed (Hom-
mel 1998).
Premotor neurons are thought to retrieve the appropri-
ate motor acts in response to sensory stimuli. Particular
neurons in the rostral-most part of the premotor area (F5)
are active during goal-directed hand movements such as
reaching and grasping. A class of these cells fire when a
monkey observes others making these actions (di Pellegrino
et al. 1992; Jeannerod et al. 1995). These “mirror neurons”
are thought to represent goal-directed actions, allowing in-
dividuals to understand and imitate the actions of others
(Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998). In a brain-imaging study using
Positron Emission Tomography (PET), observing an action
with the intent to imitate it activated the areas used in plan-
ning and performing the actions (bilateral dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex and pre-supplementary motor area) (Decety
et al. 1997). In an fMRI study, the left inferior frontal cor-
tex and the rostral-most part of the right superior parietal
lobule were activated when subjects observed a finger
movement and when initiating the same movement under
different conditions. Further, activation was highest when
the subject made the movement in response to observing
the movement in another (i.e., the area was activated by the
observation in addition to the movement). The results are
interpreted by Iacobani and colleagues as support for the
common code or “direct matching” hypotheses of percep-
tion and action. Taken with the F5 data (above), they sug-
gest that the left frontal areas code the goal of movements
and are necessary to understand the meaning of one’s ac-
tion. The right parietal area would then code the precise
movements involved and would be necessary for memoriz-
ing or repeating actions (Iacoboni et al. 1999).
These shared representations for perception and action
are also activated when a movement is imagined (Jean-
nerod 1995; 1996; Jeannerod & Frak 1999). Response
times (RTs) for imagining walking in a three-dimensional
environment follow Fitts’ Law, increasing with increasing
distances and difficulty (Decety & Jeannerod 1995). In ad-
dition, much evidence supports a common representation
for mental and manual rotation. RTs for imagining and per-
forming a rotation movement are virtually identical
(Wohlschläger & Wohlschläger 1998). Further, task inter-
ference and facilitation in the rotation task occur only at a
high level of motor processing (increasingly involving
planned execution of action) (Wohlschläger & Wohlschlä-
ger 1998). When given the choice of two stimuli to rotate,
the majority of subjects choose the object corresponding to
their preferred hand (Cook et al. 1994). RTs for a left-right
hand orientation judgment are similar for doing and imag-
ining the movement (Parsons 1994). Further, in a PET
brain-imaging study, premotor, somatosensory, and cere-
bellar regions were activated when subjects imagined mov-
ing their hands (Parsons et al. 1995).
There are differences in the activation between observa-
tion and imagination. In one experiment that used grasping
movements as stimuli, observation of grasping movements
activated the superior temporal sulcus, the inferior parietal
lobule, and the inferior frontal gyrus, while grasp imagina-
tion activated Broca’s area (area 44), caudal inferior parietal
cortex (area 40), rostral SMA proper, and dorsal PMC (all
in the left hemisphere only), and the middle frontal cortex.
Cerebellum was also differentially activated by the two con-
ditions (Grafton et al. 1996). The researchers concluded
that grasp observation areas contribute to the recognition
of movements while the grasp imagination areas contribute
to the actual production of grasping movements (Grafton et
al. 1996).
Beyond perception or imagination of the action per se,
these motor representations seem to be activated when
people perceive or think about objects that have move-
ments associated with them. For example, naming and ob-
serving common tools activates the left premotor cortex
(Grafton et al. 1997), an area involved with the planning of
movements in response to stimuli, where learned motor se-
quences might be stored. Therefore, even relatively ab-
stract cognitive affordances of objects may be partially
coded with respect to their appropriate motor acts, or at
least activate the representation of the appropriate motor
responses.
Taken together, actions that are self-generated, per-
ceived in another, imagined, or even suggested by an object
seem to activate shared representations. These shared rep-
resentations may be at the abstract level of meaning, but
they are linked downstream with areas responsible for the
performance of the action. Activation is thought to spread
from the representation of the meaning to that of the per-
formance if there is no inhibition, but the extent to which
motor sequences are activated depends on the mode of in-
put, salience of and attention to the stimulus, and extent of
inhibitory control (addressed further below).
The following section will address the extent to which
this data can be applied to a proximate mechanism of em-
pathy. The major findings in the empathy literature are re-
contextualized in light of the PAM so that a coherent model
can be created that incorporates prior theories and empir-
ical findings with the ultimate model and this emerging
Zeitgeist in cognitive neuroscience.
3.3. The neuroanatomy of empathy
Based on the literature reviewed in the mechanism section,
one might conclude that mirror neurons in premotor or
parietal areas are where shared representations are stored,
regardless of the type of stimuli. However, natural complex
emotional situations require the activation of many com-
plex factors, including episodic memories, autonomic sen-
sation, and emotional valence. Because shared representa-
tions are networks of neurons that are interconnected,
there is no one place in the brain where they exist. Below,
a sketch is provided of some of the neural structures re-
quired for complex empathic processes (see Adolphs 1999,
Schulkin 2000 for detailed reviews on the functional neu-
roanatomy of social cognition).
Premotor areas are necessary for planning, sequencing,
and executing motor acts. As described above, the left
frontal operculum of the premotor cortex (Broca’s area 44)
and the right anterior parietal cortex (PE/PC) contain mir-
ror neurons activated by self and other movements, which
are thought necessary to understand and imitate the actions
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of others. The right parietal operculum contains cells that
receive direct kinesthetic, sensory feedback; thus, it is likely
that this area codes for the precise movements involved in
an action (Iacoboni et al. 1999), which can also be used as
a template of the outcome of a motor act during active im-
itation. Since movements include emotional body postures
and facial expressions, these cells would be activated by the
perception of the object’s emotional state. Generation of fa-
cial expressions occurs from brain stem nuclei projections
to the facial nerve. Insular cortex (especially the dysgranu-
lar intermediate zone) is also situated between the premo-
tor cortex and the limbic system. So, if the mirror neurons
represent emotional behavior, then the insula may relay in-
formation from the premotor mirror neurons to the amyg-
dala (see Augustine 1996).
Long-term memories of objects, places, and people are
stored in the temporal lobe. The fusiform “face” area of the
temporal lobe seems particularly specialized for processing
face and eye gaze information. Somatosensory-related ar-
eas are activated for sensations in the self and when ob-
serving another’s state. These “representations” of informa-
tion change with experience, accounting for the major
effects on past experience, similarity, and familiarity in the
empathy literature (see sect. 4).
The amygdala helps to potentiate memory consolidation
processes in the hippocampus (McGaugh & Cahill 1997),
and may directly mediate memories of some fear-related
stimuli (LeDoux 1993). There are direct connections from
the amygdala to the brain stem areas that control autonomic
states and indirect connections through the hypothalamus.
The former connections are more likely to be involved with
the perception of emotional information, especially for fear
and distress, because they code for learned emotional asso-
ciations, while the latter maintain homeostasis on a moment-
to-moment basis. Cortical projections are also thought to be
able to affect autonomic states, but these pathways are not
well known (Burt 1993).
Similar to LeDoux’s two systems for processing emo-
tional stimuli (LeDoux 1996/1998), empathy processes
likely contain fast reflexive sub-cortical processes (directly
from sensory cortices to thalamus to amygdala to response)
and slower cortical processes (from thalamus to cortex to
amygdala to response). These roughly map onto contagious
and cognitive forms of empathy, respectively.
The limbic circuit projects primarily to the cingulate and
orbitofrontal cortices, which are known to be involved with
the perception and regulation of emotion. Prefrontal size
correlates with emotional regulation skills in development
and phylogeny, thus, the prefrontal cortex is thought neces-
sary for the ability to control the extent of personal distress
and remain focused on the object. Dorsolateral and ventro-
medial prefrontal regions are necessary for the maintenance
of information in working memory, the former even more for
the manipulation of this information. They are thus impli-
cated in cognitive empathy processes where the state of the
object must be held in mind and alternative interpretations
considered by activating somatosensory, limbic, and re-
sponse areas. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is addi-
tionally thought to be necessary for combining immediate
goals with long-term goals to determine an adaptive re-
sponse, thus it is likely involved in cost/benefit analyses for
when to engage the empathy system and when to help.
The cerebellum (which is necessary for the prediction
and planning of attentional shifts) feeds heavily to the
frontal lobes, where the frontal eye fields control eye move-
ments. The cerebellum is important for learning and exe-
cuting attentional shifts that maximize the amount of infor-
mation obtained from a given scene (e.g., the object’s state),
as well as for learning how to avoid attending to emotional
stimuli that would be unnecessarily arousing.
The fact that the left hemisphere is most often affected
in the former motor studies while the right hemisphere is
selectively implicated in emotion processing is not prob-
lematic for the PAM. If it is a general principle of the ner-
vous system that perception activates response, then the
particular hemisphere involved depends on the stimuli.
Broadly speaking, the left hemisphere (in right-lateralized
subjects) processes detailed information while the right
hemisphere is selective for more holistic information (re-
viewed by Liotti & Tucker 1995). Related to the PAM, the
left prefrontal area is more active in response to semantic
cues, the right when responses must be generated from
memory, and both when the task requires generating vol-
untary or imagined actions (e.g., Adolphs et al. 2000; De-
cety et al. 1997). Related to emotional processing, the right
hemisphere may process all emotional stimuli (Gur et al.
1994; Lane et al. 1999; Schwartz et al. 1975), or the right
hemisphere may subserve fearful or negative emotions
while the left subserves positive (e.g., Canli et al. 1998;
Davidson & Ehrlichman 1980). Supporting the lateraliza-
tion of emotions in our closest relative, chimpanzees shown
positive, negative, and neutral videos, showed increased
brain temperatures in the right hemisphere to the negative
videos depicting severe aggression (Parr & Hopkins 2000).
Future research specifically aimed at delineating the per-
ception-action circuit for empathy and emotion processing
can confirm hemispheric specializations.
Data suggest that all of these areas are activated when ob-
serving or experiencing an emotional state, as well as when
imagining such a state; damage to any of them will impair
some aspect of the phenomenon. The effects of the dam-
age will crucially depend on the interaction of the time the
damage was incurred and the location. Damage to areas
necessary for the learning of information are more devas-
tating early on, while damage to areas where the memories
are stored are more devastating later.
3.4. Emotional evidence for the PAM
3.4.1. Animal behavioral evidence. As discussed in the in-
troduction, albino rats pressed a bar to terminate the dis-
tress of an object suspended by a hoist (Rice & Gainer
1962). This “altruism effect” could not be replicated with a
paradigm that used looped recordings of rat squeaks as the
stimulus (Lavery & Foley 1963). Alternatively, rats de-
crease bar pressing for an object that is being shocked
(Church 1959; Rice 1964). A decrease in bar pressing by the
subject is an indication of fear (cf. Estes & Skinner 1941).
According to a perception-action theory of empathy, the
subject is distressed because the state of the object is im-
parted to him directly. Consistent with Church’s condition-
ing model, prior experience with shock facilitates and aug-
ments the natural distress response. These effects were
replicated with pigeons (Watanabe & Ono 1986).
In experimental paradigms, rhesus monkey subjects also
pressed a bar to avoid witnessing the shock of a conspecific
object. Subject-object pairs were conditioned to expect a
shock to the object after illumination of the compartment.
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In these cases, the object “leap[t] and [ran] around when-
ever its compartment was illuminated.” Seventy-three per-
cent of the time, the subject pressed the bar to this agita-
tion alone, displaying “piloerection, urination, defecation
and excited behavior” (Mirsky et al. 1958, p. 437). After the
subjects’ response was extinguished, it could be reinstated
using pictures of monkeys, but not using the shock of a live
albino rat or the thrashing of a monkey-like puppet (Miller
et al. 1959a). The response to pictures was less strong and
clear than to the live animals, but the response was stronger
to pictures of familiar monkeys than unfamiliar ones (Miller
et al. 1959a). These results replicate those from rats and pi-
geons. After learning the consequences of shock, the mon-
keys were aroused by the sight of a conspecific in distress,
acted to eliminate the suffering of the stimulus animal, but
were not responsive to artificial or unfamiliar stimuli.
The chain-pulling experiment in the introduction more
directly indicates an “altruistic” effect, as monkeys re-
frained from rewarded actions, even starving themselves,
when it caused another monkey to receive a shock
(Wechkin et al. 1964). Again, subjects who had previously
experienced shock or were familiar with the object were
more likely to sacrifice food rewards (Masserman et al.
1964). Chimpanzees also show emotional contagion-like re-
sponses to the displays of conspecifics. In one experiment,
subjects were shown three types of videos, depicting posi-
tive, negative, and neutral stimuli (play, severe aggression,
and scenery, respectively). The subjects responded to the
aggression tapes with “piloerection, pant-hoots, and bluff-
displays,” to the positive play videos with “play faces, body
gestures and solicitations to the video monitor that indi-
cated an initiation of play,” and to the control tapes with
“strong visual orientation . . . but no indication of social
arousal.” (Parr & Hopkins 2000). In a similar experiment,
peripheral skin temperature decreased (indicating greater
negative arousal) when subjects viewed videos of con-
specifics injected with needles or videos of needles them-
selves, but not videos of a conspecific chasing the veteri-
narian (Parr 2001). These subjects correctly matched the
video with a picture of an emotional expression in a chim-
panzee that had the same valence (Fig. 3).
3.4.2. Human developmental evidence. Infant nonhuman
and human primates are known to respond to the distress
of others with distress (e.g., de Waal 1989; Sagi & Hoffman
1976). Further, newborn human infants are predisposed to
mimic the facial expressions of others (Field et al. 1982;
1985; Meltzoff & Moore 1977; Stern 1977). Human new-
borns can imitate fear, sadness, and surprise (Field et al.
1982), again indicating the importance of communicating
distress.
In preschool observations of 25–41 month-olds, sus-
tained play occurred when the bout was initiated with imi-
tation. In a study with toddlers (21–30 months) and
preschoolers (31–64 months), toddlers that were friends
(as compared to acquaintances) had greater concordance in
the amount of time spent in directing and following/imitat-
ing behaviors, parallel play, and requesting. Connecting be-
havior to physiology, the friend dyads also had a greater
concordance in baseline heart rate and cortisol measures.
Therefore, similarity even on a physiological level seems to
predict friendships characterized by imitative or reciprocal
behavior (Goldstein et al. 1989).
The infant data suggests that the link between percep-
tion and action is strongest initially, and refined through ex-
perience. Thus, while perception automatically proceeds to
action in infants, this progression weakens with age and ex-
perience. In an imitation task with human infants of differ-
ent ages, there was an overall decrease from two to three
and from four to six months in perception-action processes,
assessed through multiple measures such as: attention of
the infants to the object, general expressiveness of the in-
fants, correspondence between the infants’ expression and
the object’s expression, ability to predict the object’s ex-
pression from that of the subject (Field et al. 1986). Indi-
cating that imitation is still prominent in subsequent
months, children 10- to 14-months old respond to the dis-
tress of others with distress expressions that imitate the ob-
ject (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1977 in Thompson 1987). The re-
searchers suggested that these children were “trying on”
the expressions to understand them. Einon and Potegal
(1994) note that the open display of emotions in 2-year-olds
“would be considered pathological in an adult” (p. 189).
They cannot explain in principle why the intensity of emo-
tions should be so strong in children, especially with family
members, but postulate that tantrums play a role in learn-
ing to control and confine expressions.
The perception-action link can explain the strength of ex-
pression and imitation in children if, initially, processing au-
tomatically proceeds from perception to activation of the
representation to response. In development and phylogeny,
tonic inhibition of activated motor representations can pre-
vent perceived actions from generating overt responses.
Thus, while the cries of an infant object cause an infant sub-
ject to cry (Sagi & Hoffman 1976), the same is not neces-
sarily true even in early childhood. Patients with prefrontal
lesions exhibit compulsive imitation of gestures and com-
plex actions in the laboratory (L’hermitte et al. 1986), sup-
porting the idea that responses are always prepared or
primed, but prefrontal cortex inhibits the response. Display
rules may also play a role in learned inhibition of expres-
sions (Cole 1986; Ekman et al. 1969).
The ability to distinguish self from other would also ex-
plain a developmental decrease in expression and imitation.
The proliferation of experience with self-generated motion
and causal agency (e.g., Johnson 1987) creates response 
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Figure 3. Mean performance on matching-to-meaning trials on
the first and second testing sessions (Parr, in press).
circuits that are dedicated to, or primed for self-action. For
example, activity in the right parietal lobule seems to rep-
resent reafferent activation from motor action. Thus, ac-
tivity in this area could distinguish activity from observing
an act in another from self-generated activity. This mecha-
nism is suggested for distinguishing self from other in imi-
tation (Georgieff & Jeannerod 1998; Iacoboni et al. 1999).
Applied to empathy, with an understanding of the way 
representations change with experience, this mechanism
parsimoniously explains differences between and within in-
dividuals in the level of empathy expressed, since develop-
ment of self-other differentiation is highly correlated with
the development of empathy (see Hoffman 1978a; Meltzoff
1993; Meltzoff & Moore 1993), and both are correlated
with development of the prefrontal cortex.
3.4.3. Human behavioral evidence. Most behavioral re-
search with humans focuses on the way that representations
change with experience. These data are addressed below in
section 4 – “Representation and cognition.” Data in hu-
mans also implicate a “direct matching” between subject
and object. In a six-condition experiment, subjects attend
either to an object in need or the potential helper, when
help is given or not, and appreciation is shown or not. The
subjects felt the emotion they imagined the attended char-
acter to be feeling, and the quality of the emotion deter-
mined the likelihood of helping. For example, if help is not
given in the scenario and subjects were attending to the ob-
ject, they report sadness and anger. If help is given, subjects
attending to the object or the helper report elation (Ader-
man & Berkowitz 1969). In another study, 2-year-olds are
more aggressive towards peers after observing a simulated
conflict between adults (Cummings et al. 1985). The per-
ceptions and responses of the subjects were primed by the
observation of aggressive encounters. Such responses can
be inhibited or overridden by prosocial responses towards
others, but this requires learning.
These effects have profound practical importance, since
the spread of emotion from one individual to another may
be a source of error in social interactions. When the subject
perceives the negative state of the object, it primes the sub-
ject’s own negative state, which is often falsely appraised as
“the object is mad at me” or “I am mad at the object.” The
subject is then negative towards the object and vice versa,
resulting in an unpleasant interaction or a fight even though
the object’s original state was unrelated to the subject. Sim-
ilarly, in parent-child interactions, the distress of the child
may distress the parents, causing inappropriate parenting
and possibly physical abuse. These effects underscore the
fact that the outcome of empathic processes is not always
positive.
3.4.4. Physiological and neurological evidence. Humans
experience the same physiological changes participating in
a conversation and watching it later from video (Gottman
& Levenson 1985). Macaques have the same heart rate re-
sponse experiencing distress or perceiving expressions of
distress in others (Miller et al. 1966). The successful com-
munication of affect in monkey and human subjects re-
quires an equivalent heart rate in receiver and sender
(Miller et al. 1967; Levenson & Reuf 1992, respectively).
This “physiological linkage” has been speculated to be the
physiological substrate for empathy (Levenson & Reuf
1992).
People exposed to pictures of emotional facial expres-
sions spontaneously activate the valence-appropriate mus-
cles, measured with EMG (Dimberg 1982; 1990). Pictures
of happy faces elicit zygomatic major muscle activity and
angry faces elicit corrugator supercilii activity (Dimberg &
Thunberg 1998), even when the pictures are processed out-
side of awareness (Dimberg et al. 2000). Moreover, subjects
in a similar experiment reported feeling an emotional reac-
tion, consistent with the emotion displayed and the muscles
activated (Lundqvist & Dimberg 1995).
Damage to the right somatosensory-related cortices (S-
I, S-II, anterior supramarginal gyrus, insula) impairs the
ability to recognize basic emotions and make intensity judg-
ments from photographs (Adolphs et al. 1997; 2000). In ad-
dition, damage to the somatosensory-related cortices im-
pairs emotional concept retrieval. Adolphs and colleagues
interpret these results as evidence for a cortical role in emo-
tion recognition. Upon perceiving the facial expression of
the object, the subject automatically retrieves visual and so-
matic information that can be used to understand the state
of the other, or constructs a somatosensory representation
on-line to simulate the state of the target (Gallese & Gold-
man 1998; Goldman 1992; Rizzolatti et al. 1996).
Evidence for perception-action processes also exists at
the cellular level. During a single-cell recording experiment
in the anterior cingulate cortex, a variety of painful and 
innocuous stimuli were administered to awake human 
patients. One neuron responded selectively to the an-
ticipation and delivery of noxious mechanical stimulation
(pinching, pinpricks), as well as to observation of the ex-
perimenter receiving pinpricks. In general, cells in this area
code selectively for stimulus recognition properties as well
as affective properties of certain painful stimuli (Hutchison
et al. 1999).
3.4.5. Evidence from disorders of empathy. A general
“empathy disorder” has been suggested to be a characteris-
tic component of many other disorders including autism,
sociopathy, prefrontal damage, fronto-temporal dementia,
and even anorexia nervosa. Empathy disorders are charac-
terized by impairments in the conception of mental states,
expression of emotions, and verbalization of feeling states
due to dysfunction in the brain areas that subserve empa-
thy (see Gillberg 1992). The diffuse nature of the PAM cir-
cuit explains how many different disorders can result in em-
pathy impairments. Extensive reviews of empathy disorders
already exist (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al. 1994; Cohen & Volk-
mar 1997; Gillberg 1992; 1999; Prior 1988; Sigman &
Ruskin 1999); thus, only data that shed particular light on
the mechanism of empathy are addressed.
Supporting the importance of the mother-infant re-
lationship for perception-action processes, dyads of de-
pressed mothers and their infants spend a smaller propor-
tion of time matching behavior states than nondepressed
dyads (Field et al. 1990). The behavior states and heart
rates of the depressed mothers and their infants also cohere
less (Field et al. 1989). The fact that depressed dyads match
negative behavior states more often than positive (Field et
al. 1990) reveals that they are capable of matching behav-
ioral states through the PAM. However, the depressed
mothers seem to model positive expressions less; this would
impair the ability of the infants to represent positive states,
which in turn accounts for impairments in attention, recog-
nition, and imitation of such states. Further, the depressed
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mothers may spend less time imitating the expressions of
the child, which would impair modeling, imitation, and
general emotion regulation abilities of the child.
By contrast, a disruption in the perception-action link in
psychopathic or sociopathic individuals (the terms have
been used interchangeably) would account for the charac-
teristic lack of normal autonomic responses to the distress
cues of another, the social isolation, and the apparent dis-
regard for the emotional and physical state of others
(Aniskiewicz 1979; Blair et al. 1997; House & Milligan
1976). Moral reasoning is also impaired in sociopathic chil-
dren, even controlling for cognitive development, IQ, or so-
cial class (Blair 1995; 1997; Blair et al. 1997; Campagna &
Harter 1975). Without the ability to be aroused by the dis-
tress of others, these individuals cannot understand and
learn about the state of others through their own substrates.
Providing a sense of continuity, psychopathy also appears to
be a relevant dimension for personality in animals, namely,
chimpanzees and dogs (Lilienfeld et al. 1999).
Focal prefrontal cortex damage and closed-head injury in
adults result in changes in empathy (reviewed by Eslinger
1998). Patients with early-onset damage to the prefrontal
cortex have a syndrome resembling psychopathy, with little
or no empathy or remorse, a paucity of lasting social rela-
tionships, significant impairments on moral reasoning de-
spite normal performance on intellectual tasks, and a defi-
cient increase skin conductance response to risk in a
gambling task (Anderson et al. 1999). One of the two sub-
jects with early prefrontal damage was a mother marked by
“dangerous insensitivity to the infants needs” (Anderson et
al. 1999, p. 1032). The authors propose a mechanism for the
disorder whereby brain damage prevents patients from de-
veloping knowledge of the emotional aspects required for
navigating and understanding social situations.
Empathy impairments in sociopathy and autism are also
thought to be partially due to a disruption in the prefrontal
system because both involve deficiencies on tasks requiring
inhibition, planning, and attention (Campagna & Harter
1975; Dawson 1996; Gillberg 1999). However, because ex-
pression, imitation, and recognition of expressions and ges-
tures are impaired in individuals with autism, it is likely that
the disorder is characterized by an impairment early on in
the perception-action pathway (see also Williams et al.
2001).
Deficits in autism exist on the same processes required
for development of empathy in typically-developing indi-
viduals. Infants with autism lack the coordination of activ-
ity with their caregiver suggested to regulate and organize
emotions (e.g., Brazelton et al. 1974; Deboer 1979; Gable
& Isabella 1992; Levine 1990; Stern 1974; 1977). They are
less likely than normal children to smile in response to
smiles from their mother and less likely to combine eye con-
tact with smiles (Dawson et al. 1990; Kasari et al. 1990).
Twenty-month-old infants do not attempt to engage the at-
tention of an adult in response to an ambiguous object or
situation, do not respond with affect and attention to the
live distress of an adult, and are impaired at imitation
(Charman et al. 1997). Later in childhood, similar tasks also
show a diminished response to the object’s distress (Daw-
son et al. 1990; Kasari et al. 1990; Loveland & Tunali 1991;
Sigman et al. 1992). Older children with autism do not use
joint attention or gestures to share mental experiences with
others (Baron-Cohen 1989; 1995; Kasari et al. 1990; Mundy
et al. 1986; Sigman et al. 1986), though they can direct their
own and the attention of others to obtain and convey infor-
mation (Charman et al. 1997; for a review see Mundy et al.
1994). Children with autism do not report feeling the same
emotion as a protagonist on a videotape (Yirmiya et al.
1992). Skin conductance measures of autistic and normal
children show higher responses to color slides of distress
and threatening objects than to neutral stimuli, and some
autistic subjects spontaneously report an aversive response
to distress slides, but the autistic children had significantly
lower responses to threatening objects than normals (Blair
1999).
The spontaneous expressions of individuals with autism
are more neutral and idiosyncratic than comparison sub-
jects, described as including “bizarre,” “mechanical,” or “in-
congruous” aspects (Loveland et al. 1994; Ricks 1979; Yir-
miya et al. 1989). They display less positive affect than
comparison individuals, especially the vicarious form
(Dawson et al. 1990). They have difficulty recognizing emo-
tional expression in the body (Hobson 1993; Hobson et al.
1989), and the face (Bormann-Kischkel et al. 1995; Capps
et al. 1992; Hobson et al. 1989; Macdonald et al. 1989; Tan-
tam 1989, but see Ozonoff et al. 1990 and Prior et al. 1990).
There are also impairments on matching different but cor-
responding aspects of emotional expression such as facial
expression and vocal affect (Hobson 1986a; 1986b; Hobson
et al. 1988; 1989; Loveland et al. 1995). Some believe, how-
ever, that their deficit is restricted to complex emotions
such as surprise and embarrassment (Baron-Cohen 1994;
Bormann-Kischkel et al. 1995; Capps et al. 1992). Children
with autism also show impairments imitating body move-
ments (particularly unfamiliar ones), actions on objects, and
gestures (particularly facial) (Curcio 1978; DeMyer et al.
1972; Jones & Prior 1985; Ohta 1987). However, basic-level
gestural and procedural imitation may be intact in school-
age children with autism (Charman & Baron-Cohen 1994;
Morgan et al. 1989).
A high-functioning autistic adult reports that although he
has difficulty understanding or participating in social inter-
actions, he puts great effort towards such interactions and
as a result has formed meaningful relationships (Cesaroni
& Garber 1991). Indeed, the data suggest that individuals
with autism have emotional reactions to their environment
and the people in them, but the quality of their experience
is different. Individuals with autism have been responsive
and playful in some laboratory interactions, show positive
and negative emotions like comparison groups, and form at-
tachment relationships (for a review see Capps & Sigman
1996). They show autonomic reactions to the distress of
others, but may be less likely to attend to this distress and/
or have a matching physiological response, reducing the
possibility of an accurate behavioral response.
Theories about the neurological nature of the disorder
implicate the cerebello-frontal pathway. Twelve out of
twelve cerebellum samples from individuals with autism
showed decreased Purkinje cell counts in the vermis and
hemispheres of the cerebellum. On average, cells in the
cerebellum were reduced by 30–50%, in one case 95%.
Imaging data shows that individuals with autism have
smaller cerebellums than typically-developing individuals,
evident from before the first year and persisting through-
out life. As further evidence, this decrease in cerebellar size
from MRI analysis is correlated with the degree of slowed
orienting in children with autism (Harris et al. 1999).
The cerebellum is thought to be important in motor and
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cognitive tasks that require subjects to coordinate physical
and mental activities with external stimuli, including social
and emotional processes (see Courchesne 1997). It is re-
quired for stimulus-driven motor behavior and feeds heav-
ily to the frontal cortex. Thus, autism may result from an ab-
normality that precludes forming the normal links between
perception and action, perhaps at the level of orienting at-
tention to the relevant stimuli. Given the importance of ori-
enting and joint attention processes in emotional develop-
ment, individuals with autism are doubly impaired because
the inability to gather information from the environment
compromises their ability to learn shared affect and to de-
velop emotion regulation, both of which are necessary for
empathy and theory of mind.
The role of attention in empathy is supported by behav-
ioral data from individuals with autism. These subjects 
perform better on tasks in the laboratory than in more nat-
uralistic settings, possibly because there are fewer distrac-
tions in the laboratory and response time is not limited
(Capps & Sigman 1996; Gillberg 1999). Children with
autism are only impaired on social perception tasks when
there is more than one cue, suggesting that their impair-
ment on orienting, disengaging, and selecting targets for at-
tention underlies the general social deficits (Gillberg 1999).
In cognitive tasks, children with autism tend to focus on lo-
cal-level, isolated stimuli, rather than global-level, contex-
tualized stimuli; normally developing children and devel-
opmentally-delayed children without autism tend towards
the reverse (Frith 1989).
In conclusion, the varied types of empathy disorders sup-
port the idea that empathy is a neurologically-distributed
process. Empathy disorders are most severe in individuals
who have problems from infancy. The specific impairments
of individuals with empathy disorders support the need for
an innate orientation towards socio-emotional stimuli.
Without that, emotional development in general will be im-
paired, precluding empathy. For proper development, so-
cial-emotion interest must also be met with behavioral re-
sponsiveness and coordination by the caregiver. Many
PAM-related processes seem to rely on this unfolding of
events, including lower level behavioral processes like imi-
tation, expression production, and expression recognition.
4. Representation and cognition
4.1. Representation as a common denominator
As mentioned in the introduction, the most robust effects
in empathy experiments can broadly be categorized as ef-
fects of familiarity/similarity, past experience, learning (ex-
plicit and implicit), and cue salience. The former three ef-
fects can be explained by the PAM because they inherently
rely on representations; the last because it differentially ac-
tivates representations.
4.1.1. Representations change with experience. The ef-
fects of familiarity, similarity, past experience, and learning
are often addressed as separate variables due to the slightly
different emphasis of each discipline. Learning, for exam-
ple, is more relevant to developmental studies, because
these studies focus on the role of rearing on individual dif-
ferences. Past experience is more applicable to animal stud-
ies because of its role in determining a subject’s response to
an unconditioned stimulus. However, all of these effects re-
sult from the ability of the nervous system to create and re-
fine representations through experience.
In his famous essay, “What is it like to be a bat?”, Nagel
postulates that the “objective ascription of experience is
possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object
of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view . . . the
more different from oneself the other experiencer is, the
less success one can expect with this enterprise” (Nagel
1974, p. 442). Similarly, Titchener thought that through
empathy, one could understand individuals of intellectual
and moral similarity (Titchener 1915, in Wispé 1987).
Hume (1888/1990) noted that it is easier to sympathize
with someone if you have something in common with that
person. According to Freud, “everything that establishes
significant points in common between people arouses such
fellow feelings, such identifications” (Freud 1950, p. 83).
These theorists all touch on the extent to which familiarity
and similarity facilitate empathy and perspective taking.
The greater the familiarity or similarity, the richer the
subject’s representation of the object. A rich representation
involves more associations, and thus, creates a more com-
plex, elaborated, and accurate pattern of activity in the sub-
ject; this pattern is encoded with reference both to personal
experience and experience with the object. For example,
when one perceives the distress of a loved one, the subject’s
own representation of distress will be activated by the fa-
cial, body, and vocal expressions of distress in the object.
Importantly, the representation of the loved one will also be
activated. These representations have been created over
many, many interactions, across many situations, and thus,
include associations to previous instances of distress in the
object, the object’s attitude towards the situation, the long-
term consequences the distress will have on the object, and
so on. Thus, the distress of the subject will be greater upon
perceiving distress in a familiar or similar individual be-
cause the ability to elaborate on the distress is greater.
The most robust findings across all species studied are for
familiarity or similarity of the subject with the object and
previous experience with the distress situation (Table 1).
For example, from 9–12 months, children prefer to play
with children of the same age and sex (Smith 1988). In an
experiment with preadolescent boys, subjects imitated the
actions of a model when playing a war strategy game more
when manipulated to feel similar to the model (Rosekrans
1967). Experiments with 6- and 7-year-old children show
that there is more empathy for an object that is the same
sex of the subject (Feshbach & Roe 1968). In experiments
with adults, human subjects who witness the shock of a con-
specific offer to take the shocks for the object if their simi-
larity is manipulated with demographic descriptions. If they
do not feel similar, they only offer to take the shocks if they
have to watch the object receive the remaining shocks (e.g.,
Batson et al. 1981; Toi & Batson 1982). The same interac-
tion occurred with an attribution paradigm (Batson et al.
1981). In another paradigm, male subjects presented with
an object that won money or was shocked showed more of
a physiological response, identified with the object more,
reported more distress to the shock and helped more when
they were made to feel similar (Krebs 1975). In addition,
because of the perception-action link, familiarity will cause
the emotional expressions of the subject and object to con-
verge (Anderson, 2001). This results in a more ready map-
ping of perception to action, and better understanding.
The richness of the representation also entails that the
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subject’s ability to perceive the state of the object will be
less affected by noise in the signal. The subject will recog-
nize the object from further away, in less clear conditions,
and with a shorter exposure time than an acquaintance. Ap-
plied to empathy, the subject will perceive the state of the
object more quickly, from more subtle cues, and in more
ambiguous situations. Although, given longer to decide, a
subject can apply conscious cognitive processes to interpret
the state of an unfamiliar object.
At the most basic level, the PAM requires the subject and
object be at least familiar or similar enough to allow for di-
rect perception. The prototype theory of categorization
(e.g., Rosch 1973; 1988; Rosch & Mervis 1975) predicts that
the strength of the activation of a representation is propor-
tional to the degree of overlap between the input and the
representation (McClelland & Rumelhart 1985). Thus, the
sight of a primate moving a forelimb would more strongly
activate a human’s representation than the sight of a rodent.
In turn, a rodent would activate the representation more
than a reptile. The morphology and biomechanics of the
movement overlap more in the former cases and thus acti-
vate the representation more strongly.
The extent to which animals empathize with members of
their own and other species can be attributed to such dif-
ferences in morphology and biomechanics (as also noted by
Hume 1888/1990). The pervasive tendency for humans to
anthropomorphize and personify exemplifies the percep-
tion-action process, but the extent to which one identifies
with these objects is proportional to the extent of overlap.
Monkeys experimentally conditioned to react to an object’s
distress did not respond to the shock of an albino rat or to
the simulated distress of a monkey-like puppet (Miller et al.
1959a). Much comparative data notes the need for stimuli
to be naturalistic or multi-modal to evoke a response (e.g.,
Lavery & Foley 1963; Miller et al. 1959; Partan & Marler
1999; Preston & Jacobs, 2001). Similarly, increased experi-
ence is thought necessary for empathy towards differently-
abled objects. For example, through learning, nonhuman
primates show increased tolerance toward handicapped in-
dividuals. Two chimpanzee juveniles housed with an in-
jured female were anecdotally described as they “scrupu-
lously avoid disturbing [the female] . . . now and then one
or the other would go to her and touch her gently or caress
her” (Yerkes & Yerkes 1929, p. 297). Even aggressive ma-
caque species treat handicapped individuals with more tol-
erance than typically-developing individuals (de Waal et al.
1996). Experience can refine the subject’s representation,
promoting tolerance and help that is tailored to the object’s
needs.
Familiarity can supplant absolute similarity, perhaps es-
pecially when emotional attachment is involved (which is
also when a response is more necessary). In home tests of
empathy with children, the family pet often responded with
consolation to the adult feigning distress (Zahn-Waxler et
al. 1984). Lucy, a chimpanzee raised by a human family is
anecdotally described as exhibiting efforts to break up con-
flicts, running to comfort the wife when ill, exhibiting “pro-
tectiveness toward her, bringing her food, sharing her own
food, or . . . attempting to comfort by stroking and groom-
ing her” (Temerlin 1975, p. 165). There are also anecdotal
reports of apes helping unfamiliar birds and humans, some-
times even incurring great risk to do so (e.g., de Waal 1997b;
O’Connell 1995).
Effects of similarity and familiarity explain why empathy
in some models requires state matching (e.g., Feshbach &
Roe 1968) or accuracy (e.g., Levenson & Reuf 1992). The
more similar or familiar the subject and object, the more
their representations will be similar, which in turn produces
more state-matching, better accuracy, and less “projection.”
Although state matching is correlated with accuracy and ap-
propriate helping behaviors, a strict requirement is not war-
ranted. There is never absolute state matching, some fac-
tors prevent accuracy and helping even when there is state
matching, and one can be accurate or helpful without state
matching through purely cognitive processes.
The role of representations can also eliminate the need
to distinguish empathy from “projection.” In the former
case the subject feels the state of the object, in the latter the
subject assumes that his or her own state is that of the ob-
ject. Existing representations shape the subject’s percep-
tion as much as perceptions shape representations. Thus,
Hume (1888/1990) noted, “There is a very remarkable in-
clination in human nature, to bestow on external objects the
same emotions, which it observes in itself; and to find every
where those ideas, which are most present to it” (p. 224).
Similarly, a high-functioning autistic adult challenged cur-
rent theories of empathy, concluding that empathy is only
less likely between himself and others because his projec-
tions do not match their perceptions and vice versa (Cesa-
roni & Garber 1991). According to this man with autism: “It
is . . . much easier to empathize with someone whose ways
of experiencing the world are similar to one’s own than to
understand someone whose perceptions are very different”
(p. 311). Human interpretations of animal behavior are also
criticized for resulting from projection more than percep-
tion (see Mitchell et al. 1997). Projection is thought to be
inconsistent with empathy, because the mapping goes from
subject to object rather than object to subject (Eisenberg &
Strayer 1987).
With a perception-action model of empathy, there is no
empathy that is not projection, since you always use your
own representations to understand the state of another. The
degree to which it is empathy rather than projection de-
pends purely on the extent to which the subject’s represen-
tations are similar to those of the object, or include infor-
mation about the object, which in turn determine accuracy.
Past experience effects can also be explained by the same
principles as familiarity/similarity. If a subject needs to ac-
cess representations of a particular internal state to under-
stand the object’s situation, then one would expect more
empathizing for situations or states that the subject has ex-
perienced. For example, in the comparative empathy ex-
periments, previous experience with shock greatly facili-
tated empathic responding. Subjects who were shocked
previously would have mapped the perception of a conspe-
cific in a familiar situation onto their own representation of
pain reactions, activating the associated distress. After ex-
periencing shock, subjects had richer representations of
this event and their representations were directly associ-
ated with autonomic consequences. These mechanisms
would hold throughout the life span. Thus, a correlation
should exist between the scope of the subject’s life experi-
ence and the scope of situations in which the subject re-
sponds appropriately (as in Hoffman 1990). Beyond effects
of experience, advanced cognitive capabilities of adult hu-
mans would facilitate cognitive perspective taking that is
not stimulus driven.
The “affective congruency effect” indicates that being in
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a similar state to another facilitates attention, processing,
and memory. Subjects respond more quickly to targets that
are affectively congruent with the priming stimuli. Con-
gruous states may be more easily processed due to priming
and spread of activation (e.g., see Bower et al. 1981; Singer
& Salovey 1988; Spizzichino & Bonaiuto 1990) or due to the
response interference that primes create for distractors
(Wentura 1999). Either way, affective congruence predicts
that individuals who are primed for the situation or emo-
tion of the object will be more aroused, will engage in more
perspective taking, and will exhibit more empathy than a
nonprimed subject.
4.1.2. Representations and cue salience. The refinement
of representations through experience was able to parsi-
moniously explain three of the four major effects in the em-
pathy literature. The final effect, cue salience, is related be-
cause of its ability to increase the likelihood and extent to
which a representation is activated. The more salient an
event, the more likely it will be attended to (Colby & Gold-
berg 1999; Taylor & Stein 1999), providing the opportunity
for empathy. Generally, stimuli that are perceptually loud
or include releasing stimuli (like crying or screaming) will
be most salient, but the perception-action model predicts
that attention is focused towards features that require re-
sponse and prediction.
Attention and imitation are also correlated because the
former activates perception-action circuits more. In in-
fants, attention towards and imitation of a model both de-
crease between 2 and 6 months (Field et al. 1986). When
observed actions are particularly salient, a brief, truncated
version of the movement is produced (personal communi-
cation from L. Fadiga, in Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998), called
an “ideo-motor action” (cf. Carpenter 1874; Eisenberg &
Strayer 1987; James 1890; Lotze 1852; Prinz 1987). Thus,
attention may reduce learned inhibition, allowing a re-
duced version of the movement to “leak out.” In this way,
the PAM can replace cognitive perspective-taking explana-
tions for such effects, parsimoniously linking the mecha-
nism for these effects with infant imitation, emotional con-
tagion, empathy, and helping.
The mediating role of attention on empathy could be
tested with negative priming paradigms whereby reaction
times assay the extent of inhibition (response times to pre-
viously-inhibited locations are much longer) (Tipper 1985;
Tipper & Cranston 1985). It should take longer to identify
previously seen items that inhibit empathic attention (like
a homeless beggar), than neutral stimuli or releasing stim-
uli (like a child or a puppy).
4.1.3. Representation and other theories. A behaviorist or
a purely perception-action perspective might not want to
include representations in the description. But, the clarifi-
cation of the term “representation” in Table 3 should largely
assuage this disagreement. Our use of representations does
not eliminate the importance of conditioned associations or
responses for empathy. Firstly, individuals can be “em-
pathic” in the folk psychological sense by learning how to
associate certain behavioral cues with the correct response
for the situation. Objects that are sufficiently different from
the subject would require this type of processing in order
to be accurate. Data also suggest that individuals with
autism or psychopathy may use such alternative strategies
to compensate for an impairment in empathy. More im-
portantly, to the extent that conditioned and unconditioned
stimuli can be seen as dynamic and multi-dimensional,
rather than fixed and singular, a conditioning view is com-
pletely compatible with a perception-action view.
Because of the importance of representations in a PAM
of empathy, there is a strong overlap with the Somatic
Marker Hypothesis of emotion (Damasio 1994) and with
Damasio’s views on the neurobiology of emotion and feel-
ing (Damasio 1999; Damasio et al. 2000). Both models pos-
tulate that perception activates one’s stored representations
and that these representations are linked to one’s associated
feeling states (Damasio calls these re-activated representa-
tions “images”).
The importance of representations also makes our the-
ory similar to appraisal models of emotion processing (see
Omdahl 1995). In appraisal models of emotion, emotions
are generated when the subject consciously or uncon-
sciously evaluates or appraises the event. According to
Roseman and Smith (2001), “the different emotions mani-
fest in characteristic facial expressions and action tenden-
cies are produced by differing evaluations of events.” Fur-
ther, “each distinct emotion is elicited by a distinctive
pattern of appraisal” (their emphasis). If one assumes that
the manifest responses to emotions are produced as in the
Perception-Action Model, and if one assumes that a “pat-
tern of appraisal” is equivalent to patterns of activation in
the network, then there is no conflict between appraisal
model of emotion, and the Perception-Action model of
empathy.
4.2. Incorporating cognitive empathy into the model
Some theories or forms of empathy are more actively cog-
nitive, or more controlled processes than the ones discussed
thus far. With cognitive empathy, the subject is thought to
use perspective-taking processes to imagine or project into
the place of the object. Cognitive empathy appears to
emerge developmentally and phylogenetically with other
“markers of mind” (Gallup 1979; 1992; Povinelli et al. 1994;
Premack & Woodruff 1978), including perspective taking
(PT), mirror self-recognition (MSR), deception, and tool-
use. The behavioral complexity and flexibility of these be-
haviors is greatly increased in humans and apes relative to
other primates and most mammals. Only humans after cer-
tain ages and the great apes have been cited as passing tests
for the markers of mind and evincing higher than first or-
der intentionality (cf. Dennett 1988; for a review see Byrne
& Whiten 1988; O’Connell 1995; Tomasello & Call 1997).
In addition, there is anecdotal evidence of helping behav-
ior in dolphins (de Waal 1996), the only nonprimate mam-
mal that passes MSR tests (Reiss & Marino 2001).
Comparative evidence of cognitive empathy per se fo-
cuses on apes, using extensive data on consolation behavior.
Consolation involves contact initiation by a previously un-
involved bystander who is assumed to be less distressed,
and directs consolatory efforts to the victim (first defined as
such by de Waal & van Roosmalen 1979). It has not been
found in monkey species despite intensive efforts to find it
(de Waal & Aureli 1996). Far from anecdotal reports, con-
clusions are based on analyses of hundreds of post-conflict
observations that compare third-party contact tendencies
with baseline rates (de Waal & van Roosmalen 1979; de
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Waal & Aureli 1996; Fig. 4). One can postulate that the con-
soling individual has become distressed from the sight of
the victim and seeks comfort for his or her own feelings.
While some level of distress in the subject is inherent in our
model, the consoler often does not show overt signs of dis-
tress, and may wait until after the most intense display to
approach (de Waal & Aureli 1996; Fig. 5).
An anecdotal report of cognitive empathy: Kuni, a
bonobo female at the Twycross Zoo in England, once cap-
tured a starling. She took the bird outside and set it onto its
feet, the right way up, where it stayed shaking. When the
bird didn’t move, Kuni threw it a little, but it just fluttered.
Kuni then picked up the starling, climbed to the highest
point of the highest tree, and carefully unfolded the bird’s
wings, one wing in each hand, before throwing it into the
air. When the bird still remained in the enclosure, Kuni
guarded it for a long time against a curious juvenile (de
Waal 1997b, p. 156).
The tailored helping of Kuni or of Binti Jua, an 8-year-
old female western lowland gorilla who rescued a 3-year-
old boy at the Brookfield Zoo (de Waal 1997a), are also 
well-known examples of tailored helping that indicate cog-
nitive empathy in apes. Anecdotal accounts are subject to
bias, but a metaanalysis of over 2,000 anecdotal reports of
nonhuman primate empathy revealed three types of empa-
thy in chimpanzees: emotional, concordance (like cognitive
empathy), and extended (tailored helping) (O’Connell
1995). Understanding excitement, grief/sadness/frustra-
tion, and fear of the subject were extremely common, with
most outcomes resulting in the subject comforting the ob-
ject of distress. Chimpanzees comprehend the emotions,
attitude, and situation of another and even endangered
their lives to save others in danger. An adult male chim-
panzee died trying to rescue an infant who had fallen over
the electric fence into a moat. Monkey displays of empathy,
by contrast, were restricted to mediation of fights, adoption
of orphans, and reactions to illness and wounding.
Thus, cognitive empathy appears to be differentially
available across species and partially distinct from the more
automatic and emotional forms of empathy discussed
above. Heretofore, it has been unclear how exactly more
cognitive forms of empathy are related to more automatic
forms. Some have argued that these processes are linked to
automatic and emotional forms of empathy because they
are themselves the products of simple social facilitation
and/or conditioning (Galef 1992; Heyes 1993a; 1993b;
Tomasello & Call 1997). According to the PAM, these
processes were augmented by prefrontal capacities to in-
crease the flexibility and control. “Markers of mind” and
cognitive empathy are associated with a larger proportional
prefrontal region. The protracted development of Homi-
noid species increases the extent of learning before adult-
hood and is speculated to result in the disproportionate in-
crease in the prefrontal cortex (Finlay & Darlington 1995;
Finlay et al. 1998). Prefrontal functions facilitate cognitive
empathy through increased inhibition, increased working
memory, and an increased ability to assess short- and long-
term goals before responding (for reviews see Fuster 1997;
Shiamamura 1996; Thierry et al. 1994).
The following developmental and phylogenetic se-
quence is proposed. Early on, automatic processes cause
the state of the object to elicit a similar or relevant state in
the subject. This limits empathic processes to ones like so-
cial facilitation, alarm, and emotional contagion because
the subject cannot distinguish personal distress from the
object’s distress, and has less control over emotional reac-
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Figure 5. A juvenile chimpanzee comforts a distressed adult.
tivity. Longer life spans increase the base of knowledge of
individuals and situations, allowing individuals to better
predict and understand the situations that cause distress in
particular people, and what helps to assuage the distress.
Altricial development increases the period of dependence,
giving individuals more time to learn (neuronally and sub-
jectively) how to distinguish distress directly caused by per-
sonal insult from distress caused indirectly by insult to the
object. Activation patterns in response to perception of the
object’s state differ in some respects from those arising from
one’s own state. Perception of the object’s movements may
activate the subject’s premotor areas, but without periph-
eral somatosensory cues and efferent motor feedback.
Even shared representations are more intensely activated
in self-experience than in observation or imagination. Over-
all, the pattern of activation is different for experiences that
originated in the object from ones that originated in the
subject.
Extended prenatal and perinatal development dispro-
portionately expands prefrontal cortex, increasing working
memory, planning, and inhibition. With working memory,
individuals can hold information in mind and manipulate
this information to predict, compare possible outcomes,
and decide on an appropriate course of action. Working
memory also increases imaginative processes that allow in-
dividuals to evoke empathic processes in the absence of the
object. With increased inhibition, the subject can avoid be-
coming contagiously distressed from the object. The sub-
ject can inhibit the processes that normally augment per-
sonal distress such as attention to the distress, expression of
the distress, and elaboration on the distress.
Higher cognitive faculties can also augment helping be-
haviors through explicit teaching. In human children, direct
instruction, reasoning, discipline, and reinforcement of
helping are necessary for prosocial competence (Eisenberg
et al. 1983; Radke-Yarrow 1983; Ungerer 1990; Zahn-
Waxler et al. 1979; 1984). These explicit factors can either
push a below-threshold state of empathy into an act of help-
ing or subvert empathy altogether when it is required by so-
cial rules, but not naturally evoked.
Taken together, an extended life history, altricial devel-
opment, and the increase in prefrontal functions can ac-
count for increases in the effectiveness of empathy by help-
ing the subject to focus on the object, even in it’s absence,
remain emotionally distinct from the object, and determine
the best course of action for the object’s needs.
5. Final comments
The complex social world of primates requires the central
nervous system to perceive the facial expressions, body pos-
tures, gestures, and voices of conspecifics accurately and
quickly in order to generate a response (Brothers 1990;
Byrne & Whiten 1988). Parsimoniously, the same nervous
system link between perception and action that helps us to
navigate the physical environment helps us navigate the so-
cial environment. The perception-action link allows for
facile motor skill acquisition as well as facile social interac-
tion, as we perceive external conditions and incorporate
them into our current plan of action. In this way, the prox-
imate model is intricately linked with the ultimate model.
While natural selection acts on phenotypes, these pheno-
types reflect the underlying physiology. Thus, the general
design of the nervous system, created through millions of
years of evolution, should be considered a factor in the evo-
lution of emotional processes like empathy and overt be-
haviors like helping. In this way, the proximate and ultimate
levels of analysis are intimately related.
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Abstract: The Perception-Action Model (PAM) is a cogent theory of how
organisms get information about others’ experiences. However, such a
stimulus-driven mechanism does not handle well the complex choices that
humans face about how to respond to this information. Hyperbolic reward
discounting permits a reward-driven mechanism for both how aversive
empathic experiences can compete for attention and how pleasurable em-
pathic experiences are constrained.
Preston & de Waal (P&deW) present a plausible case that empa-
thy entails modeling of an object’s experience, that this modeling
is highly prepared by mirror neurons and distributed networks
subtending perception and action, and that empathic skills are se-
lected for in a species because of their social consequences. Less
adequate is the proximate mechanism they propose: that “at-
tended perception of the object’s state automatically activates”
representations, and that this activation “automatically primes or
generates the associated autonomic and somatic responses, unless
inhibited” (target article, sect. 1.1.3, emphasis in the original). In
this account, empathy is not a motivated process, but the reflex-
ive consequence of perception. Reward-based processes weigh in
only in modifying what the individual attends to, and which em-
pathic reflexes she will attempt to inhibit.
But reflexive empathy does not account for the range of em-
pathic experience. Accepting for the moment that the empathic re-
sponse is controlled by attention, “whether or not a subject per-
ceives the state of the object” does not depend “crucially on their
interdependence or interrelationship” (sect. 1.1.3). A person may
relate only superficially to family members while empathizing in-
tensely with pets, chance acquaintances, people in the news, and
wholly fictional characters. Empathic experience is not just aver-
sive (“All forms of empathy involve some level of . . . personal dis-
tress,” target article, sect. 1.1.3) and thus subject only to variable
inhibition; it may be satisfying and subject to cultivation. Further-
more, people cultivate not only pleasant relationships but also
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those that provoke anger and even terror (with characters in hor-
ror films) and grief (in tear-jerkers). Finally, appreciation of an ob-
ject’s state may occasion not just a copy of that state, but a wholly
different state that nevertheless depends on that appreciation. The
authors note but do not deal with the case where a “subject seeks
to produce or witness high levels of distress” (sect. 1.3). They call
this case abnormal, but an empathic appreciation of an object’s dis-
tress is the point not only of sadism but also of minor forms of gloat-
ing and retribution in everyday life. The relatives of murder victims
who are regularly reported as saying that painless execution is “too
good” for the murderer are not necessarily psychopaths. Taken as
a whole, empathic experience presents a complex menu of choices;
the many opportunities to seek or avoid empathic experiences are
probably the greatest incentives that influence any nonautistic peo-
ple who are not on the edge of starvation.
In a cosmopolitan society suitable objects of empathy are avail-
able ad lib. The selection of what kind of empathy, if any, actually
occurs will depend not on what objects are perceived, but on what
obliges a subject to tolerate aversive empathy and what constrains
a subject’s generation of pleasurable empathy. Commonsense an-
swers are ready at hand: Duty aside, people are drawn into getting
involved, even with strangers, when their plight makes too vivid a
story to ignore. Conversely, people cannot share the joys of an end-
less succession of objects because that very freedom would reduce
the experience to the level of daydreams. The PAM does not ex-
actly contradict these intuitions – it contemplates a decrease in the
“automaticity” of the empathic process with frontal lobe develop-
ment and experience – but its stimulus-driven structure keeps
motivation at the periphery of any discussion of mechanisms.
Since empathy has both plasticity and the stimulus-driven qual-
ity described in the PAM, it is natural to ask whether empathically
based emotions are emitted as motivated behaviors or elicited as
unmotivated responses to perceptions. The demonstration that
reward value is inversely proportional to reward delay (Kirby
1997; Mazur 2001; Myerson & Green 1995) provides a means of
accounting for both properties within the framework of motivated
behavior. Hyperbolic discounting predicts that many smaller, or
briefer, but earlier rewards will be temporarily preferred to larger
but later ones when they are imminent, and that long range sta-
bility of choice is not spontaneous but depends on making choices
in whole categories rather than singly; both effects have been ob-
served (Ainslie & Herrnstein 1981; Ainslie & Monterosso, in
press; Kirby & Guastello 2001). The temporary preference phe-
nomenon suggests a way that aversive empathic experiences (as
well as aversive emotions generally) can compete with pleasurable
experiences in an open market, thus eliminating the necessity for
considering them reflexive. The irresistible quality of aversive ex-
periences may be produced by intense but brief reward that lures
freely directed attention, but is followed, possibly cyclically, by
much longer periods of blocked reward, for a net loss (Ainslie
2001, pp. 51–61, 173). This is to hypothesize that aversive emo-
tions follow the same pattern as addictive binges – strong attrac-
tion that is hard to resist up close, but avoided at a distance – only
with a much shorter time course. Such a dissociation of immedi-
ate and overall values could produce not only strong negative and
strong positive emotions, but also those like anger and nostalgia,
which can be compelling but are sometimes experienced as posi-
tive and sometimes as negative, depending on context. The initial
excitation of mirror neurons would thus generate an offer that
would be acted on in an individual’s marketplace of motivations,
rather than being just a step in a stimulus-reflex arc.
Hyperbolic discounting also provides an explanation for why
positive empathy produced ad lib. will lose its value. If a process
rewards increasingly as consumption is delayed – for instance, if
an emotion is more intense insofar as its realization is preceded by
a period of suspense – then an individual will prefer a smaller yet
immediate satisfaction to greater, deferred satisfaction when the
smaller satisfaction is imminently available, but not at some re-
move (Ainslie 2001, pp. 164–71). That is, an organism that emits
emotions ad lib. will tend to waste its appetite for them. Such
spontaneous emotional behavior will tend to be replaced by emo-
tions cued by adequately rare, externally determined occasions.
Since the behavior of another individual is varied and not entirely
predictable, an empathic attachment entails limitations on occa-
sions for positive empathy, thereby providing a means for emo-
tional pacing and, thus, richer rewards. The prepared mechanism
of the PAM model suggests why the particular targets chosen for
such attachments will tend to be those in close proximity. How-
ever, other solutions such as those discussed above (e.g., pets and
fictional characters) are not uncommon; empathic attachments to
more distant objects can be selected if these attachments pace re-
ward effectively.
The predictions of hyperbolic discounting theory strongly sup-
port the PAM’s conclusions that “there is no empathy that is not
projection,” but suggest that this projection is a reward-dependent
process constrained by the properties of temporary preferences
(see Ainslie 2001, pp. 181–89).
The role of empathy in the formation and
maintenance of social bonds
Cameron Andersona and Dacher Keltnerb
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Abstract: A primary function of empathy is to help individuals form and
maintain social bonds. Empathy should thus occur only when individuals
seek to solidify social bonds, and not in response to any opportunity to
process others’ emotions. Empathy should also involve only certain types
of emotion – specifically, emotions that facilitate social bonds – and not
any and all types of emotion.
Empathy has long mystified social theorists, resisting simple de-
scription and explanation. In the target article, Preston & de Waal
(P&deW) take on a difficult task – to provide structure and orga-
nization to the empathy literature, a literature rife with contra-
dicting terms, definitions, theoretical accounts, and levels of 
explanation. Perhaps more impressive, their account of the per-
ception-action mechanism is parsimonious yet powerful, provid-
ing a compelling explanation of the evolutionary origins of empa-
thy, and its more rudimentary and complex forms.
However, while arguing that empathy meets certain demands
of group living, the authors are relatively vague in discussing ex-
actly what empathy does for social relationships, in particular re-
lationships outside the mother-infant bond. Perhaps more impor-
tant, the authors say little about the boundary conditions in which
empathy will occur and when it will not. In a more general sense,
the target article seemed to address the bases of perception-action
processes rather than the bases of empathy.
The functions of empathy. Social animals achieve the goals of
survival and reproduction in the context of relationships. Thus,
forming and maintaining strong social bonds throughout the life-
span is critical to attaining these fundamental goals. The primary
function of empathy is to help individuals form and maintain last-
ing social bonds. While the authors recognize the role of empathy
in the mother-infant bond, they fail to address the importance of
empathy in building relationships throughout life.
Empathy strengthens social bonds in at least three ways. First,
empathy coordinates the actions of individuals in rapid, automatic
fashion, which allows them to respond more effectively as a col-
lective to potential opportunities or threats (Anderson et al. 2001;
Hatfield et al. 1994; Keltner & Haidt 2001).
Second, empathy helps solve the problem of understanding
others’ thoughts and intentions. When two individuals feel similar
emotions they are better able to understand each other, to take
each other’s perspective, and thus are more likely to accurately
perceive each other’s perceptions, intentions, and motivations
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(Keltner & Kring 1999; Levenson & Ruef 1994). This increases
the predictability of others’ behavior, a foundation of cooperative
bonds (Anderson et al. 2001; Axelrod 1985; Frank 1988).
Finally, empathy signals solidarity. When individuals feel simi-
lar emotions, they communicate to each other that they share a
common stance and shared interests (LaFrance & Ickes 1981).
Because it is more difficult to feign emotions than it is to deceive
with words (Ekman 1993), empathy can be construed as a “true
test” of individuals’ solidarity with each other. Individuals can be
more confident of their bond when others share their emotions
than when others communicate their solidarity verbally.
The moderators of empathy. We have reasoned that empathy
promotes the formation and maintenance of social bonds. This ar-
gument implies that empathy should occur only when individuals
want to have a social bond with another individual. In contrast,
P&deW assert that empathy is likely to occur when individuals
have a rich enough representation of another individual to feel
empathic (i.e., when the emotion is salient, when they are famil-
iar with the target, or when they have personal experience with
the situation). Therefore, their argument implies that empathy oc-
curs at any and all times individuals are able to be empathic. We
argue empathy is more likely to occur when individuals are moti-
vated to be empathic.
Thus, asymmetries in the inclination to connect with another
should predict asymmetries in empathic response. Individuals
should be more likely to be empathic toward friends than ene-
mies, even if they have rich representations of both targets. Also,
as individuals are typically more motivated to connect with pow-
erful others, we expect individuals to be empathic toward power-
ful individuals more than powerless individuals, even if they are
equally able to be empathic toward both (Anderson et al. 2001).
The forms of empathy. The emotions of others do not always
evoke an empathic response. Sometimes they elicit a comple-
mentary response, as when anger evokes fear. Even the same emo-
tion can produce different reactions at different times. For exam-
ple, embarrassment sometimes evokes empathic embarrassment,
and other times it evokes forgiveness (Keltner et al. 1997).
P&deW recognize the distinction between empathic and comple-
mentary reactions, yet they do not explain when each type of re-
action is more likely.
Consistent with our assertion that the primary function of em-
pathy is to strengthen social bonds, we expect empathic responses
to be more likely when they would help individuals solidify social
bonds. For example, if feeling a similar emotion would communi-
cate solidarity (as when individuals empathically feel sadness),
then empathy should be likely to occur. However, if feeling a sim-
ilar emotion would not necessarily communicate solidarity (if an
individual were to feel similarly guilty), empathy should be less
likely. On a related note, the likelihood of empathy can sometimes
depend on the target of the emotion. Individuals should be more
likely to empathically feel anger if anger is directed at a third party,
for example, than if anger is directed at them. Why? Mutual anger
felt toward a third person strengthens their bond, in that it syn-
chronizes their thoughts and actions against the third party.
Differentiating perception-action processes from empathy. It
is important to emphasize the distinction between perception-ac-
tion processes and empathic processes. Although the perception-
action mechanism might be an evolutionary and ontogenetic pre-
cursor to empathy, the two processes are not isomorphic. Thus,
while the ultimate bases of perception-action are relatively basic
as the authors claim, the ultimate bases of empathy are not. Sim-
ilarly, while the proximal bases of perception-action seem simple
enough, the proximal bases of empathy are likely more complex
and nuanced.
Emotion-specific clues to the neural
substrate of empathy
Anthony P. Atkinson
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Abstract: Research only alluded to by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) indi-
cates the disproportionate involvement of some brain regions in the per-
ception and experience of certain emotions. This suggests that the neural
substrate of primitive emotional contagion has some emotion-specific as-
pects, even if cognitively sophisticated forms of empathy do not. Goals for
future research include determining the ways in which empathy is emo-
tion-specific and dependent on overt or covert perception.
What role do the emotion perception mechanisms play in emotion
induction and experience? While a detailed picture has yet to
emerge, some significant signposts can be seen. Here are four of
them. (1) The neural substrates of emotion perception and emo-
tional experience are not highly localized. Each of these capacities
involves complex patterns of activation and deactivation across a
number of different cortical and subcortical regions (e.g., Adolphs
2002; Damasio et al. 2000; Davidson & Irwin 1999; Panksepp
1998). (2) Specific regions often contribute both to the perception
and to the experience of emotions, such as the somatosensory cor-
tices (Adolphs et al. 2000; Damasio et al. 2000). (3) There is some
degree of emotion specificity in the neural substrates of these ca-
pacities: the patterns of activation and deactivation vary with each
emotion, and certain regions contribute more to the perception
and experience of particular emotions or classes of emotion than
to others. (4) In addition to more cognitively sophisticated routes
to empathy, there is a process of “primitive emotional contagion,”
as suggested by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) and others (e.g.,
Hatfield et al. 1992; Wild et al. 2001). This is a means by which
one can catch the emotion of another by virtue of one’s perception
of that person’s expression, and is likely to be biologically “hard-
wired.”
Point (3) highlights a lacuna in P&deW’s otherwise compre-
hensive survey of the literature relevant to the proximate basis of
empathy. My task here is to help fill that gap.
Our capacity for perceiving distinct types of emotional expres-
sion in the face was, until recently, assumed by many investigators
to be subserved by a unitary set of processes, instantiated by a uni-
tary set of neural structures (e.g., Bruce & Young 1986; Young et
al. 1993). Recent neuropsychological and neurophysiological
studies have overturned this assumption. The relevant findings
show that distinct neural structures are disproportionately in-
volved in the perception of fear and anger, on the one hand, and
the perception of disgust, on the other (see Calder et al. 2001, for
a review). Patients with bilateral amygdala damage have particu-
lar difficulty recognizing fearful and sometimes angry facial ex-
pressions, but have little difficulty recognizing other emotions ex-
pressed in the face, including disgust, happiness, sadness, and
surprise (e.g., Adolphs et al. 1999; Broks et al. 1998; Calder et al.
1996). People with damage in the region of the basal ganglia and
insula, in contrast, have difficulty recognizing facial expressions of
disgust, but are not nearly so impaired at recognizing other facial
expressions, including fear and anger (e.g., Calder et al. 2000;
Sprengelmeyer et al. 1996; 1997). This double dissociation is sup-
ported by neurophysiological evidence, mostly from functional
brain imaging. The amygdala is the most active structure when
normal subjects view expressions of fear, but when they view ex-
pressions of disgust, structures in the area of the basal ganglia and
anterior insula are more active (e.g., Morris et al. 1996; Phillips et
al. 1997; Sprengelmeyer et al. 1997). There are also indications
that the scope of these emotion perception mechanisms is not re-
stricted to facial expressions – vocal and body posture expressions
are also implicated (e.g., Calder et al. 2000; Scott et al. 1997;
Sprengelmeyer et al. 1996; 1999). But it is still an open question
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as to how multimodal these systems are (e.g., Adolphs & Tranel
1999).
Testing using self-assessed emotion questionnaires (e.g., Calder
et al. 2000; Sprengelmeyer et al. 1997) reveals that patients with
emotion-specific recognition deficits also appear to have a corre-
sponding circumscribed deficit in their phenomenal experience of
the same emotions they have great trouble recognizing in others.
(Yet their verbal understanding of what it means, or used to mean,
to be frightened or disgusted seems relatively unimpaired.) This
is not surprising, given that other work has shown how the amyg-
dala, basal ganglia, and insula are heavily implicated in the expe-
rience of various emotions, including fear, anger, and disgust (see
Damasio et al. 2000; Davidson & Irwin 1999; Panksepp 1998, for
reviews). So these structures do not relay perceptual information
to separate mechanisms underlying emotional experience; like the
somatosensory cortices, they are directly involved in both our per-
ceiving and experiencing emotions. But if Adolphs (1999) is right,
then the role of the somatosensory cortices in empathy is more
cognitively sophisticated than the role of these other structures.
Adolphs’ suggestion is that somatosensory cortices are directly in-
volved in our capacity to understand the perceived emotional
states of others by mentally simulating those states. One need not
actually experience the emotion one is simulating, however, for
simulation can be taken off-line, thus allowing room for different
emotional responses. So it makes sense that the empathy functions
of somatosensory cortices appear not to be emotion-specific. But
there is another, simpler form of empathy that involves experi-
encing only the perceived emotion. It is at least plausible that the
neural substrate of this primitive emotional contagion has emo-
tion-specific aspects, and the research reviewed above provides
some motivation for examining this possibility in more detail.
Suppose you were to lose the ability to perceive a certain prim-
itively contagious emotion. Presumably, you would as a conse-
quence become immune to experiencing that emotion by virtue
of perceiving it. But what if you could still recognize that emotion
covertly, despite your loss of overt recognition? While we do not
yet know for sure whether covert recognition of a particular emo-
tion in the absence of its overt recognition is possible, there are
nevertheless some tantalizing pointers worthy of further investi-
gation. Covert recognition of facial identity has been demon-
strated in prosopagnosia, that is, in the absence of overt face
recognition, using various behavioral and physiological techniques
(see Young 1998, for a review). One of these measures is the skin
conductance response (SCR), and aversively conditioned masked
facial expressions can elicit changes in SCR without being con-
sciously perceived (e.g., Esteves et al. 1994). It is also possible to
measure neural responses to subliminal presentations of emo-
tional expressions: for example, masked fearful and angry expres-
sions increase, and happy expressions decrease, amygdalar activ-
ity (Morris et al. 1998; Whalen et al. 1998). Moreover, merely
viewing images of facial expressions elicits emotion-specific facial
EMG responses (Dimberg 1982; Lundqvist & Dimberg 1995),
even when the faces are presented subliminally (Dimberg et al.
2000), and voluntary facial action generates emotion-specific au-
tonomic activity, including changes in SCR (Levenson et al. 1990).
Might, then, patients who are impaired in recognizing particular
emotions nevertheless show the signature patterns of facial EMG
and autonomic responses to those emotions, thus indicating a de-
gree of both covert recognition and covert contagion?
Empathy as a special case of emotional
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Abstract: Empathy can be viewed as an intervening variable to explain
complex webs of causation between multiple factors and the resulting re-
sponses. The mediating role of emotion, implicit in the concept of an in-
tervening variable, can be at the basis of the flexibility of empathic re-
sponses. Knowledge of the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms is
needed for empathy to be considered as a biologically functional inter-
vening variable.
Preston & de Waal (P&deW) present a great example of how prox-
imate and ultimate explanations can be combined for better un-
derstanding of phenomena that have, thus far, been tackled from
many different perspectives with much disagreement. Although
we may not agree on all the issues raised in the target article (see
below), we praise the authors for the successful enterprise, espe-
cially for elucidating the neurophysiological mechanisms for em-
pathy.
P&deW present empathy as a process linking the perception of
the object’s emotional state with the subject’s somatic and auto-
nomic responses via the activation of the subject’s corresponding
representations. In this respect, empathy can be viewed as an in-
tervening variable. An intervening variable is a construct used to
explain complex webs of causation. The causal linkage between a
multiplicity of independent variables and the many dependent
variables they may influence can be explained most economically
by positing a central intervening variable. For example, many as-
pects of drinking behavior (e.g., effort to obtain drink, amount
drunk, tolerance of impurities) can be caused by many factors
(e.g., time since last drink, salt load); in this case “thirst” can be
used as the intervening variable (Miller 1959). The usefulness of
the construct is that we can infer an individual’s state of thirst from
observable features and, having done so, we can predict how the
individual will behave in a variety of contexts. This approach to
identifying phenomena, which are not directly observable, has
been used to explain phenomena ranging from thirst (Miller 1959)
and dominance (Hinde & Datta 1981), to mental states (Call 2001;
Whiten 1996) and emotions (Aureli & Smucny 2000; Aureli &
Whiten, in press; Hinde 1972).
Economical explanations of events, although elegant, may not
reflect reality if they are too simplistic. Biological solutions do not
emerge exnovo as the most parsimonious possibilities, but develop
from preexisting structures and therefore are constrained by their
evolutionary past. We have recently argued that biologically rele-
vant explanations of emotions as intervening variables should aim
to incorporate information about the underlying neurophysiolog-
ical processes (Aureli & Schaffner 2002; Aureli & Whiten, in
press; cf. Zupanc & Lamprecht 2000). We suggested an integrated
view of emotion as a biologically functional intervening variable
based on a neurophysiological foundation. P&deW presented an
excellent example by providing plenty of evidence for the neuro-
physiological basis of empathy.
One of the main functions of emotions is the modulation of the
motivation to act (LeDoux 1996/1998; Rolls 1990). The intrinsic
plasticity makes emotions suitable candidates to mediate the be-
havioral flexibility typical of humans and other animals. This can
be achieved by considering the mediating role of emotion implicit
in the concept of intervening variable. There has been growing at-
tention to the mediating role of emotions in the human literature
(Frijda 1994; Panksepp 1989; Rolls 1995), which is paralleled by
similar perspectives in animal research (Aureli & Smucny 2000;
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Crook 1989; Lott 1991; Owren & Rendall 1997). The emotional
experience of an individual is certainly affected by the frequency
and quality of previous experiences with the physical and social
environment. Emotional states may express a critical integration
of the information contained in previous experiences, so that emo-
tional differences can be at the core of the observed variation in
behavioral responses. Emotion leads the individual to take a par-
ticular motivational stance, which channels its further behavior. In
other words, a certain emotional state constrains decision making
for an appropriate period of time (Aureli & Whiten, in press). Em-
pathy can be considered as a special case of emotional mediation
because the emotional change guiding the subject’s behavioral re-
sponse is triggered by the perception of the object’s emotional
state.
P&deW emphasized that the Perception-Action Model pre-
dicts that the more interrelated the subject and the object, the
more their similar representations will be activated, and the eas-
ier the subject will produce appropriate responses. This view ex-
plains how the degree of familiarity between individuals influ-
ences empathic responses in humans and other animals. We
believe that this effect is similar to the proposed role of emotion
in mediating differential interaction between individuals depend-
ing on the quality of their social relationships, of which familiarity
is an aspect (Aureli & Schaffner 2002). We argued that for the vari-
ation in relationship quality to lead to flexibility in the frequency
and quality of interaction with different group members and with
the same individual over time, individuals need to be able to as-
sess relationship quality. Such an assessment requires bookkeep-
ing of the various interactions, computation of their relative 
frequencies, and conversion of their quality and information as-
sociated with them into common currencies. Emotional media-
tion is a possible mechanism for such an assessment because emo-
tion elicited when interacting with a partner would be based on
the emotional experience related to previous interactions with the
same partner (similar to P&deW’s stored representations and
Damasio’s [1994; 1996] somatic markers). Emotion would then of-
fer an integrated summary of previous interactions, and emotional
mediation could therefore fulfil the requirements and provide the
individual with a timely assessment to guide his or her social de-
cision (Aureli & Schaffner, 2002).
Familiarity, and more in general relationship quality, is certainly
an independent variable that would affect empathy viewed as an
intervening variable. Similarly, factors, such as age, sex, personal-
ity, experience, strength of the perceptual signal, and distraction,
can all play a role in affecting empathy and the subsequent re-
sponses (as reported by P&deW). Their relative roles, as inde-
pendent variables, can be easily integrated if empathy is viewed as
a biologically functional intervening variable (cf. Aureli & Whiten,
in press). The Perception-Action Model provides the neurophys-
iological basis for how such integration can be achieved.
While we are impressed about the range of studies reviewed in
the article, we are puzzled about the inclusion of a couple of ex-
amples. The increase in heart rate of rhesus macaques when ap-
proached by dominant individuals is difficult to interpret as evi-
dence for empathy; it likely reflects an emotional response to
prepare the individual for action in a potentially risky situation
(Aureli et al. 1999). Similarly, it is unlikely that reconciliation be-
tween former opponents is an empathic response to the distress
of the partner; rather, it is an act to restore social relationships
based on anxiety experienced by the actor (Aureli 1997). There is
also a suggestion that behaviors to warn group members of dan-
ger have an empathic component. Emotion can mediate the warn-
ing behavior, but it is unclear how it is a case of empathy.
Apart from these small problems of interpretation, the article
by P&deW shows an important direction for research on empathy
in humans and other animals. It should stimulate work on various
empathic behaviors, combining ultimate and proximate explana-
tions.
Reflexive empathy: On predicting more than
has ever been observed
Albert Bandura
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305.
Bandura@p1sych.stanford.edu
Abstract: A model positing that perception of another’s affective state au-
tomatically generates matching emotional and instrumental responses
predicts more than has ever been observed. Reflexive empathicness would
produce emotional exhaustion, inhibitory strain, and debilitate everyday
functioning. Self-regulation of empathic responses involves, not only re-
active inhibition, but agentic proactive control. Pervasive inhumanities in-
volve selective disengagement of empathic restraints through dissociative
psychosocial mechanisms.
The article by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) is an ambitious feat of
synthesis encompassing diverse theories of empathy and manifes-
tations of empathicness across individuals, species, stages of de-
velopment, and situational circumstances. In their view, their per-
ception-action model can fully integrate this entire theoretical and
empirical diversity. As the authors amply document, organisms
have the capacity to react to another’s emotional state. However,
they do not come equipped with ready-made emotional and in-
strumental responses activated reflexively by evolved brain de-
sign. This capacity must be cultivated experientially. Once devel-
oped, empathic proneness remains subject to modification by
experience. Moreover, in the case of humans, empathic respon-
siveness is extensively under cognitive control.
The capacity for vicarious arousal plays a vital role in empathic
responsiveness. Learning experiences largely determine whether
observers will be roused or unmoved by the emotional expressions
of others. The research by Church (1959) underscores the impor-
tance of correlative experiences in vicarious arousal. Cries of pain
by a conspecific evoke strong emotional arousal in animals who
had suffered pain together; weak arousal in animals who had un-
dergone equally painful experiences but never correlatively; and
leave unmoved animals who had never been subjected to painful
treatment. Monkeys reared in total isolation during their infancy
remain unresponsive, behaviorally and physiologically, to the fa-
cial expressions of emotion by other monkeys (Miller et al. 1967).
There is little in the preceding findings to support the view that
perception of the emotional state of another automatically acti-
vates a shared emotional state in observers.
Correlative experience plays a central role in creating not only
empathetic responsiveness, but counter-empathy as well (Englis
et al. 1982). Past conjoint experiences in which modeled pleasure
signaled reward for oneself and modeled distress signaled per-
sonal pain heighten observers’ empathetic reactions to the model’s
emotional expression alone. Observers who had undergone dis-
crepant experiences (e.g., when a model’s joy brings suffering to
oneself) respond indifferently or counter-empathetically to the
model’s joy and suffering (Englis et al. 1982). Vicarious activation
relies heavily on a cognitive conveyance. Thus, when observers are
merely led to expect cooperative interactions, the joy and distress
of a cooperative model elicit similar reactions from observers. By
contrast, displays of joy by an alleged competitive model distress
observers and displays of distress calm them (Lanzetta & Englis
1989).
Similarly, observers respond empathetically to the emotional
experiences of models simply depicted as in-group members, and
counter-empathetically to those portrayed as out-group members,
in the absence of having shared any experiences with them
(McHugo et al. 1982). If a sense of mutuality has been created, so
that the joys and distresses of an outgroup member foretell simi-
lar experiences for the observers, correlative outcomes transforms
disempathy to empathy.
To underscore the continuity of empathy across species,
P&deW minimize the power of the human advanced capacity for
symbolization in the regulation of empathicness. Because a func-
tional consciousness is not a hallmark of lower species, it too gets
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short shrift in the perception-action model of empathy. According
to P&deW, cognitive capacities may augment empathicness but
the governing processes do not require conscious awareness. As
already noted, thought processes play a regulatory role in both em-
pathic and counter-empathic reactions to the emotional states of
others. In social cognitive theory (Bandura 1986; 1992) vicarious
arousal operates mainly through an intervening self-arousal
process. Because of their capacity for emotional self-arousal, peo-
ple can cognitively generate emotional reactions to cues that are
only suggestive of a model’s emotional arousal; their emotional re-
actions to the same expressive cues can vary markedly depending
on what they believe about the situational causes of the model’s
reactions; and they can neutralize the impact of human distress by
mobilizing calming trains of thought.
Cognitive self-arousal can take two forms: personalizing the ex-
periences of another or taking the perspective of another. Evi-
dence suggests that personalizing modeled experiences is more vi-
cariously arousing than perspective-taking. Observers react more
emotionally to the sight of a person in pain if, at the time, they
imagine how they themselves would feel than if they imagine how
the other person feels (Stotland 1969). Studies of the devel-
opment of empathetic understanding in young children corrobo-
rate the importance of personalization over perspective taking
(Hughes et al. 1981).
A major problem with an automatically activating empathic
mechanism of the sort proposed in the perception-action model is
that it predicts vastly more than has ever been observed. More-
over, it would exact too heavy an emotional toll to be adaptive. In
their daily transactions, people are repeatedly exposed to others
in distress, pain, apprehension, frustration, anger, and despon-
dency. If perception of the affective states of others automatically
generated matching emotions in observers, they would not only
be continually burdened with emotional exhaustion but unable to
conduct their daily affairs. Indeed, in many service professions,
where each day brings endless lines of distressed people, if service
providers fully experienced the agonies suffered by their clients,
their viscera could not withstand the wear and tear for long. Those
who cannot regulate their empathic arousal fall victim to emo-
tional burnout (Bandura 1997; Maslach & Jackson 1982). Adap-
tive functioning requires effective self-regulation of empathic re-
activity. Even informal observation of human transactions would
reveal that people are hardly consumed by empathicness. All too
often they act indifferently or callously to the suffering of others.
P&deW include an inhibitory function in their model. How-
ever, describing the neural mechanics of inhibition at the pre-
frontal and spinal cord locus does not explain how people come to
regulate their empathicness. There is a difference between reac-
tive inhibition at the neuronal level and proactive control at the
psychosocial level.
In the conceptual scheme proposed by P&deW, empathy does
not involve a conscious agent. The evolved perception-action
mechanism does the empathic work automatically. In fact, people
regulate their everyday emotional life by developing strategies for
managing vicarious arousers, especially the aversive forms. This is
graphically revealed in microanalysis of coping strategies in vicar-
ious emotional learning through the painful experiences of mod-
els (Bandura & Rosenthal 1966). Observers under high epineph-
rine-induced arousal resorted to a variety of maneuvers to keep
the model’s pain out of sight and out of mind. By these cognitive
and attentional means, they insulated themselves from the mod-
eled distress and learned little from the model’s aversive experi-
ences.
P&deW comment on empathy impairments in sociopathy and
autism in terms of dysfunctions in prefrontal systems. Deficient
empathicness is a pervasive phenomenon rather than confined to
pathologic types, as evident in the widespread inhumanities that
people perpetrate on each other. Otherwise considerate people
selectively disengage empathic restraints and moral self-sanctions
in executing destructive activities in the name of religious doc-
trines, righteous ideologies, and nationalistic imperatives. The
conversion of socialized people into fierce fighters is achieved, not
by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives, moral
standards, or neural structures. Rather, it is accomplished by cog-
nitively reconstruing injurious conduct so that it can be done free
from the restraint of empathy and self-censure. The psychosocial
mechanisms of empathic disengagement enable people to do ex-
traordinarily cruel things (Bandura 1999). The prevalent failures
in empathic control stem from ideology rather than impaired bi-
ology.
Developmental processes in empathy
Kim A. Bard
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Abstract: In recent years, explanations of primate cognition highlighted
clever arguments, rather than different ability. In the target article, defi-
nitions unify, explanations rely on basic nervous system functioning, theory
is built on data that fit, and the emphasis is on evolutionary continuities.
This commentary describes complexities inherent in the development of
empathy that are not accounted for in Preston & de Waal’s theory.
Preston & de Waal (P&deW) have written an important and timely
article proposing mechanisms to explain the evolution of empathy.
It is exciting to have theories put forward that emphasize evolu-
tionary continuity, especially in positive emotions (e.g., Panksepp
2000b). In recent years, explanations of primate abilities have had
a tendency to highlight “clever philosophical arguments” (as noted
by Maestripieri 2001, p. 453) rather than to elucidate the topic of
study. It is refreshing to find the argument that the most basic of
empathetic abilities, such as emotional contagion or neonatal im-
itation, are affordances inherent in nervous system functioning
with no need to add cognitive “frills” to the explanation. However,
the impression should not be created that simple functioning of
the nervous system is sufficient to explain the development of em-
pathy. There are complexities in the developmental process that
are not adequately explained by the theory.
It is vital to acknowledge that developmental changes occur as
an interaction of the influences of biology and environment with
the changing organism. These interactional and developmental
changes begin very early in life. Differences observed when indi-
viduals are raised in different environments (e.g., cultural differ-
ences, ethnic group differences, family differences), are just the
tip of the iceberg. The very early, and subtle, nature of social-emo-
tional learning is exemplified by Coles et al. (1999). Eight-week-
old infants, exposed prenatally to drugs (uniquely accounting for
3% of the variance) and postnatally to parenting instability
(uniquely accounting for 14% of the variance), exhibited heart rate
(HR) acceleration (a stress reaction) in interaction with a social
partner, whereas those not exposed exhibited a HR deceleration
(an alert orientation). These early physiological reactions of stress
and attention were not evident in behaviour and were in response
only to social, not inanimate stimuli. By 4 months, human infants
show preferences for interacting with the imperfect contingencies
of their mother compared with the perfect contingencies of a
trained examiner (Bigelow 1998). The power of these early inter-
active preferences in setting the stage for future social and emo-
tional interactions has not yet been fully explored. The simple as-
sertion by P&deW that empathy is biologically based does not
fully capture the process of development. Moreover, their discus-
sions of maternal influences in infant emotion regulation do not
contribute substantially to a better understanding of the mecha-
nism underlying these developmental processes.
The complexity inherent in developmental processes is not lim-
ited to human infants. Chimpanzees also exhibit clear indications
of changes as a result of interaction with the environment, and this
occurs from very early in life. Some chimpanzee newborns imitate
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facial and vocal actions (Bard & Russell 1999), exhibit different
“temperaments” as a consequence of being raised in differentially
responsive environments (Bard & Gardner 1996), and very young
chimpanzees learn conventionalised communicative signals
through interaction with social partners (Bard 1996). In fact, in the
first month of life, chimpanzees’ ability to regulate their behav-
ioural state is greatly influenced by their social environment.
Counterintuitively, it was chimpanzees raised by their biological
mothers, rather than nursery-reared chimpanzees, that were less
able to maintain a calm behavioural state as measured during a 20-
minute standardized laboratory assessment (albeit there are
demonstrably greater benefits to mother-rearing versus nursery-
rearing in the long term; see Bard et al. 2001).
P&deW broaden the term “empathy” to include a range of be-
haviours from emotional contagion, through cognitive empathy, to
prosocial behaviours. There is a degree of complexity inherent in
the process of learning prosocial communicative signals which is
not adequately addressed in their model. Young chimpanzees
learn comforting behaviours, such as grooming. Additionally, they
learn the behaviours that signal to others that they are willing to
engage in grooming (a concentrated gaze directed toward a par-
ticular patch of skin, with hands ready, whilst emitting grooming
vocalizations). They learn the behaviours that signal that they wish
others to engage in grooming (a body part placed in front of the
groomer-to-be, with loud scratches around the to-be-groomed
spot of skin). Additionally, they learn when to initiate and receive
grooming, and with whom. As a result of a behavioural interven-
tion project, it was clear that this task is not accomplished easily
when chimpanzees were reared in peer (i.e., same-age) groups,
because some rules of grooming require rank-related evaluations,
for instance. In the responsive care nursery, chimpanzees engaged
in grooming behaviours with others when they were approxi-
mately 23 weeks of age (Veira & Bard 1994), earlier than when this
behaviour occurred in mother-raised infants in the lab (Bard
1996) or in the wild (Goodall 1986b). It was important for the
groomer to learn the consequences of grooming, namely, that the
groomed individual typically becomes very relaxed. Chimpanzees,
from 2 through 5 years of age, were still learning when to initiate
grooming and how to use grooming to change the emotional state
of others. During tests of social referencing (Russell et al. 1996),
one young chimpanzee hugged, kissed, and groomed his favourite
caregiver when she displayed fear at a novel toy. This infant chim-
panzee did not exhibit any fear, recognised the fear displayed in
the caregiver, and exhibited an empathetic response, at the age of
17 months. Clearly, the response is a product of this chimpanzee’s
individual temperament and emotional relationship with the care-
giver. Is this instance of empathy dismissable because the care-
giver is human, or empathy a characteristic of the individual
(whether human or chimpanzee)?
P&deW have provided an excellent model that unifies the di-
verse definitions of empathy currently in use, and provides a
mechanism to explain, at the proximate and ultimate evolutionary
levels, why empathy exists. The risk of a unified, simple, and
straightforward theory, however, is that one might interpret all
processes as simple. Prosocial behaviours develop, for example, as
a result of complex biological and psychological processes involv-
ing emotion, emotional regulation, and cognitive abilities that are
continuously interactive between the individual and the social en-
vironment. This article encourages and stimulates thought. Can
definitions of empathy be expanded further? Could empathy en-
compass any manipulations of emotional state, for example, from
being content to angry, or from being nondistressed to happy?
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Abstract: Empathy is likely more widely distributed among animals than
many researchers realize or perhaps are willing to admit. Studies of social
carnivores, other group-living animals, and communication via different
modalities will help us learn more about the evolutionary roots and be-
havioral, sensory, and cognitive underpinnings of empathy, including what
it means to have a sense of self. There are also important implications for
debates about animal well-being.
Preston & de Waal’s (P&deW’s) comprehensive essay is a welcome
addition to the literature for it assumes that at least some nonhu-
man animal beings (hereafter, animals) can be empathic creatures,
whereas many discussions of animal empathy question whether
empathy exists in any animals other than human beings. The PAM
model explains much that has been observed in captive and free-
ranging animals, and is a valuable contribution in and of itself. The
authors’ reliance on both anecdotes and hard data is also refresh-
ing. Studies of animal cognition and animal emotions require us
to use data ranging from single-subject stories to detailed empir-
ical and experimental information and encourage us to reconcile
common sense with science sense. There are many ways of “know-
ing.” These studies also require us to be biocentrically anthropo-
morphic (Bekoff 2000a; 2000c; 2002). Using anthropomorphic
language does not force us to discount the animals’ point of view.
Anthropomorphism allows other animals’ behavior and emotions
to be discussed in a way that is intelligible to humans and it is
highly unlikely that emotions and empathy are merely by-products
of humans’ anthropomorphic tendencies (Bekoff 2002).
Discussions of empathy necessarily include consideration of the
notions of self-awareness (also referred to as self-recognition and
self-consciousness). Mirrors have been used to study these phe-
nomena. While it is not known if animals know who they are, a lim-
ited number of individuals, especially chimpanzees and other
great apes, have been shown to use their mirror image to groom
parts of their bodies that they cannot see – their teeth and their
backs – without a mirror. A few chimpanzees, but surely not all
who have been tested, also look into a mirror and touch a spot that
was placed on their foreheads when they were sedated and un-
aware that the spot was placed there (Shumaker & Swartz 2002).
Some dolphins also respond to a spot on their foreheads as if they
know the spot is on themselves (Reiss & Marino 2001).
The “red spot” technique was first used more than three decades
ago by Gordon Gallup (1970) and widely ever since. Some re-
searchers argue that the self-directed behavior involved in touch-
ing the spot indicates that chimpanzees might not only have a sense
of their own bodies, but also know “this is me”; that is, they are self-
aware and can infer the states of minds of others and model the ex-
perience of others (Gallup 1998). Whether this rich explanation for
self-directed behaviors is warranted remains an open question
(Bekoff 2002). My and others’ caution about what self-directed re-
sponses indicate should not be taken to mean that some animals do
not know who they are. Rather, our hesitancy stresses that we re-
ally do not know very much about animal self-awareness, nor about
its taxonomic distribution. A single technique based solely on vi-
sual cues such as the mirror test is not the only valid test of self-
awareness. If animals fail this test it does not mean that they can-
not have a sense of self (Bekoff 2002; Fox 1982; Mitchell 2002;
Shumaker & Swartz 2002). Likewise, passing this test does not
necessarily mean that an individual knows who she is.
Studies of social carnivores and other group-living animals will be
helpful in investigations of empathy. Fascination with self-con-
sciousness has largely been stimulated by work on mirror self-recog-
nition in primates, but we need more research on other animals for
whom the red spot experiments are not appropriate, for species in
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which touching the forehead is not a natural act and in which other
senses may be involved in differentiating self from others.
As a working hypothesis and to broaden the array of animals in
which self-awareness is investigated, I suggest that self-awareness
might be found in such highly social animals as gray wolves (Canis
lupus), carnivores who live in packs in which coordination and ef-
ficiency in communicating among individuals is essential for activ-
ities such as playing, hunting, rearing young, defending and shar-
ing food, and defending territory boundaries. It would be highly
inefficient for an individual to have to guess all of the time what
others are feeling (or thinking). Understanding the psychological
states of others would allow for accurate and flexible predictions of
their behavior (Tomasello & Call 1997). Empathy could evolve in
wolves and other animals by individuals knowing that they are not
another individual, that their body is not that of another, in the ab-
sence of self-awareness. While individuals surely need to know that
they are not another individual, this does not mean they need to be
self-aware in the rich sense that most humans are self-aware.
Rather, it is necessary and sufficient that they only have a sense of
their own bodies and body-awareness (Bekoff 2002).
Consider gray wolves. For a long time researchers thought pack
size in wolves was regulated by available food resources. However,
long-term research by Mech (1970) showed that pack size in
wolves was regulated by social, not food-related, factors. Mech
discovered that the number of wolves who could live together in
a coordinated pack was governed by the number of wolves with
whom individuals could closely bond (“social attraction factor”)
balanced against the number of individuals from whom an indi-
vidual could tolerate competition (“social competition factor”).
Codes of conduct and packs broke down when there were too
many wolves. Whether or not the dissolution of packs was due to
individuals being unable to empathize with a sufficient number of
other individuals so as to retain necessary reciprocal social bonds
remains unknown, but this would be a valuable topic for future re-
search in wolves and other social animals.
Recent research by Gallese and his colleagues (Gallese et al.
2002) on mirror neurons suggests a neurobiological basis for shar-
ing emotions and empathy. Decety and Ruby, using PET scans
have shown that empathy seems to be hard-wired in the human
brain (see Glausiusz 2001). These data suggest that humans come
to understand other individuals’ behavior by imagining the latter
performing the behavior and then mentally projecting themselves
into the same situation. Whether or not this is the case for animals
remains to be seen. Similar noninvasive and ethically sound tech-
niques will prove useful in learning about the evolution of empa-
thy across different species.
It also is essential to expand studies of empathy to include in-
vestigations of the role of sensory modalities other than vision, and
of how cues from different modalities might interact with one an-
other. Perhaps a sense of self relies on composite signals that re-
sult from an integration of stimuli from different modalities. Suf-
fice it to say, individuals of numerous animals rely more heavily on
auditory and olfactory stimuli than on visual input, and sounds and
odors might also carry much information about one’s self and also
others’ intentions and perhaps feelings. The mirror test concerns
only visual cues, mirror-like images are absent in most field situa-
tions, and out of sight does not necessarily mean out of mind.
If animals, including those that are routinely used for research,
education, amusement, food, and clothing, are aware of the emo-
tional states of others (as suggested by P&deW and others; see
Bekoff 2002), there are serious implications for considerations of
their well-being. An additional dimension of awareness must be
taken into account because individuals not only enjoy and suffer
their own but also others’ feelings (Bekoff 2001; 2002). Consider-
ations of empathy compound an already challenging and con-
tentious debate about the humane treatment of animals, whether
in captivity or in nature (Bekoff 2000b; 2002).
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dissociable neuro-cognitive systems?
R. James R. Blaira and Karina S. Perschardtb
aMood and Anxiety Program, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda,
MD 20892; bInstitute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London,
London, WC1H 3AR, England. blairJ@intra.nimh.nih.gov
Abstract: We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit.
We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural re-
sponses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others’
mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general em-
pathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not
general but specific for each disorder.
The target article is an interesting attempt to develop a unitary
model of empathy, indeed even a unitary model of social cogni-
tion, around mirror neurons and perception action processes. It
joins other unitary accounts of empathy and social cognition such
as those of Adolphs (1999), Brothers (1990), and Feshbach (1975).
However, it goes some way beyond these positions by attempting
to provide explanations at both the cognitive and anatomical lev-
els (as well as providing some evolutionary speculations).
Yet there is a difficulty. The model, following tradition, funda-
mentally assumes that there is a single, unitary empathy system.
However, we would argue that there is a growing body of work
which suggests that there are dissociable neuro-cognitive systems
involved in empathy. To be fair, the authors do assume some dis-
sociable components to their model. Thus, for example, there are
“fast reflexive sub-cortical processes (directly from sensory cor-
tices to thalamus to amygdala to response) and slower cortical
processes (from thalamus to cortex to amygdala to response)”
which “roughly map onto contagious and cognitive forms of em-
pathy, respectively” (target article, sect. 3.3.). However, these are
dissociable systems that operate on a unitary data base of expres-
sions; that is, all expressions are mediated by these sub-cortical
and cortical processes. Yet, the neuro-imaging data on the pro-
cessing of the facial expressions of others challenges this position.
Thus, for example, there have been a series of imaging studies in-
vestigating the neural response to fearful and angry expressions.
Fearful expressions consistently elicit a neural response in the
amygdala and rarely elicit a neural response in the orbitofrontal
cortex (e.g., Morris et al. 1996). In contrast, angry faces do not
elicit a neural response in the amygdala but consistently elicit a
neural response in the orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., Blair et al. 1999).
This may be related to the differential roles of these expressions.
Thus, fearful expressions may act as unconditioned aversive stim-
uli to encourage conspecifics to avoid the object/action that
elicited the expression. In contrast, angry expressions appear to be
social signals to encourage response reversal. In other words, the
“empathic” response can be specific at both the neural and cogni-
tive levels.
Moreover, it is worth considering the considerable neuro-imag-
ing data on Theory of Mind, or “cognitive empathy”; that is, the
ability to represent the mental states of others. A series of studies,
using a wide variety of methodologies, have consistently identified
an integrated set of neural systems including medial frontal cor-
tex, superior temporal sulcus, and temporal pole (see, for a review,
Frith & Frith 1999). Theory of Mind may recruit mirror neurons
but the process leads to a representation of another’s mental state
that can then be used to guide decision-making. This is a qualita-
tively different type of functioning from the basic associations that
are formed as a response to the expressions of other individuals.
The unitary, as opposed to multiple, system’s positions on em-
pathy/social cognition give rise to different interpretations of evi-
dence generated from the disorders of empathy. The unitary po-
sition suggests, as the authors note, that “the diffuse nature of the
PAM circuit explains how many different disorders can result in
empathy impairments” (target article, sect. 3.4.5). Thus, the PAM
circuit position assumes that there are qualitative similarities be-
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tween the different disorders of empathy. In contrast, a multiple
systems viewpoint is likely to assume that there are qualitative dif-
ferences between different disorders of empathy. We argue that
the data support the latter position. To take the data on autism and
psychopathy, the authors suggest that autism is characterized by
an impairment early on in the perception-action pathway. This
should give rise to difficulties in the representation of the mental
states of others as in processing the expressions of others. There
is considerable data suggesting a Theory of Mind impairment in
this population (Frith & Frith 1999).
However, the data indicating impairment in the processing of
others’ expressions in the autistic population is mixed at best. In-
deed, more recent studies that have controlled appropriately for
verbal IQ, have found no evidence of impairment, at least for the
six basic expressions (e.g., Adolphs et al. 2001). In contrast, psy-
chopathic individuals have no difficulty representing the mental
state of others (Blair et al. 1996). Yet they show very great diffi-
culty indeed in processing the emotional signals of others, partic-
ularly fearfulness and sadness (Stevens et al. 2001). It is unclear
how the unitary PAM circuit position would account for these
types of data.
In conclusion, we appreciate the authors’ attempt to develop a
model of empathy at both the cognitive and neural levels. We
would only suggest that perhaps it is now time to consider that
there can be no unitary, single circuit model of empathy. Instead,
dissociable systems for social cognition must be considered.
Peers, cooperative play, and the development
of empathy in children
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Abstract: Cooperative peer play emerges in the second year of life. How
applicable is Preston & de Waal’s (P&deW’s) model to the empathic
processes in cooperative play? Empathic responses during peer play are
more general than they propose, and more dependent on mental state un-
derstanding. Moreover, peer play forces children to reason about others’
feelings, possibly serving as a unique mechanism for empathy develop-
ment.
In the second year of life, human infants become true social part-
ners with one another for the first time. Between 18 and 24
months of age, children begin to engage in unique, nonritualized,
cooperative interactions with peers (agemates), and this develop-
ment appears to be universal (Brownell & Carriger 1990; Ecker-
man et al. 1989; Eckerman & Whitehead 1999). Thenceforth,
peer play and interaction become progressively more central as a
context for socialization. It can be argued, in fact, that children’s
peer play enables and drives enculturation as much as does adult-
child interaction (Tomasello et al. 1993).
Although peer play occurs in many species, among human chil-
dren peers not only accommodate their behavior to one another
dynamically and share emotion expression and behavior during
play, but they also share one another’s goals, desires, and beliefs.
Thus, one characteristic feature of the peer play that emerges in
the second year of life is its fundamentally cooperative nature. Co-
operative play, in turn, is permitted by the child’s emerging ability
to infer others’ intentions, feelings, and thoughts, and to accom-
modate play to a peer’s mental states as well as to a peer’s overt be-
havior (Brownell 1986; Brownell & Carriger 1991; Smiley 2001).
Emotion infuses children’s social play with peers, and empathic
concern for others constitutes “the underpinnings of compassion
and connection in social relations” (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992b,
p. 1083). However, empathy with others’ distress is but one aspect
of this complex socioemotional landscape. A wide variety of emo-
tions are shared in children’s social play with one another. Emo-
tional contagion and vicarious experiences of interest, joy, glee,
pride, shame, guilt, and envy can be observed during dyadic in-
teractions as well as at the group level. Thus, empathic arousal
during young children’s play is more general than Preston & de
Waal (P&deW) propose in their PAM model of empathy, which
focuses largely on contagious processes associated with fear or dis-
tress responses. A model explaining the development of empathy
must account for how children come to experience positive emo-
tions vicariously as well as fear and distress, and secondary emo-
tions such as pride and guilt as well as primary emotions.
At the same time, empathic arousal via vicarious processes is too
narrow a mechanism to encompass and explain the emotional
communication and understanding that underlie the development
of both peer social play and empathy past infancy. Consider the
following scenarios. A preschooler watches her little brother cry-
ing in frustration as he tries repeatedly to set his truck on the shelf
and the truck repeatedly rolls off. Later, she watches the same
younger brother laughing gleefully as his truck rolls off the shelf
each time he sets it there. A toddler in a playgroup watches as a
peer has a temper tantrum after an adult has taken away the peer’s
toy. Later he watches the same peer weeping sadly after another
child has grabbed her toy. In these common, everyday events, chil-
dren must read well beyond other children’s emotion behavior to
understand and respond appropriately both to their intentions or
desires and to the emotions that follow from the other’s success or
failure in fulfilling those desires (Meltzoff et al. 1999). Participa-
tion in cooperative play depends on these abilities, and it is not co-
incidental that the first instances of empathy emerge at the same
age as the first instances of cooperative play (Zahn-Waxler et al.
1982).
These complex emotional scenarios are different from expres-
sions of pain or fear in response to an identifiable object or ob-
servable event in a given setting. One of the hallmarks of human
emotional response is that emotions can be generated by unob-
servable mental states, including beliefs, desires, attitudes, mem-
ories, and their interaction with one another as well as with the ex-
ternal world. Thus, to empathize with and respond appropriately
to others’ emotions requires the child to infer these mental states
based on understanding how they are induced and how they re-
late to one another and to behavior (Eisenberg et al. 1997; Fesh-
bach 1978; Hoffman 1984). And it is precisely these kinds of
events and circumstances that pervade and define the daily social
experiences of young children in play settings with peers.
By the middle of the second year, children respond with sym-
pathetic concern rather than personal distress to simple pain and
distress expressions in others (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992a), and this
occurs in tandem with the initial development of cooperative peer
play (Brownell & Carriger 1990; Eckerman et al. 1989). But not
until 3 years of age or older do children respond appropriately to
more complex emotional events such as those described above,
presumably because it is only then that they understand the in-
tentions or desires that produce emotional responses in others. It
is also during the third year that children first begin to mark lin-
guistically and to take into account behaviorally their peers prior
intentions during play (Smiley 2001).
By the later preschool years, children can infer their peers’
emotional states from knowing about the particular events that an-
other experiences, from the contexts in which the events occur,
and from knowledge of an individual’s history and preferences
(Eisenberg et al. 1997). These inferential abilities become critical
for empathic arousal and empathic responses, including prosocial
behavior, in part because external behavioral cues become less re-
liable as indices of another’s emotional state (Saarni et al. 1998).
Human children learn to blunt, mask, exaggerate, or otherwise al-
ter expressive behavior to coincide with cultural display rules.
Thus, the cognitive contributions to development of empathy in
human children are as important as are the emotional and behav-
ioral components.
As developmental psychologists, we wish to explain the age-re-
lated changes in children’s understanding of and behavioral re-
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sponses to these kinds of emotional events. Although empathic
arousal must enter into peer play, and empathic concern must play
a role in governing children’s responses to one another during play,
such processes must themselves be subordinated to still more
complex processes of interpersonal reasoning that include infer-
ences about the very feelings that define and constitute peer play.
Thus, one key question for understanding the development of
empathy in humans is how the ability to infer emotional states
develops and how children come to discover the causal links
among external events, mental states, and emotion behavior. Can
a perception-action model, even one enriched by recognizing
cortical processes and mechanisms, address the developing so-
cial understanding and reasoning about mental states that ulti-
mately must enter into description and explanation of human
empathy and its development?
Correspondingly, we must ask whether the social mechanisms
residing within mother-child interaction, as proposed by P&deW
to explain the development of empathy, are the same ones that re-
side within peer play. Preschool children talk about shared emo-
tions, intentions, and inner states with friends and peers more
than they do with siblings or parents, and this especially occurs
during cooperative play (Dunn 1999). Similarly, 2-year-olds an-
nounce their own mental states more often to peers during play
than they do when playing with mothers. By the preschool years,
children direct helping and other altruistic behavior more to peers
than to adults (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1982).
Furthermore, peer play forces children to behave altruistically
and to take account of one another’s feelings, whether real or
imagined. Peers share play materials based on inferred emotions
in others and they collaborate in thematic play based on inferred
desires and intentions of others. They also participate in the al-
tered realities of joint pretend play, which includes sharing altered
emotional realities such as pretending to be afraid of the jointly
imagined tiger, to be distressed by the jointly imagined pain of its
teeth, and to be overjoyed by the jointly imagined superhero’s res-
cue. How do the normative changes in peer play, and the unique
demands and collaborations of peer play, contribute to normative
changes in emotion behavior, emotion reasoning, and empathy
past infancy?
One measure of the utility of P&deW’s model is how applicable
it is to the multiple social contexts in which emotion communica-
tion processes are paramount and empathic processes are central.
Cooperative play among young human peers is one such context.
It is the development of children’s emotional responses, including
empathic experiences and behavior, in these complex emotional
ecologies that we seek to understand.
Understanding the imitation deficit in autism
may lead to a more specific model of autism
as an empathy disorder
Tony Charman
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Abstract: Preston & de Waal are understandably cautious in applying
their model to autism. They emphasise multiple cognitive impairments in
autism, including prefrontal-executive, cerebellar-attention, and amygdala-
emotion recognition deficits. Further empirical examination of imita-
tion ability in autism may reveal deficits in the neural and cognitive basis
of perception-action mapping that have a specific relation to the empathic
deficit.
The elegant model that Preston & de Waal (P&deW) develop has
potential to help us understand the empathic deficit that charac-
terises individuals with autism. From early in infancy, individuals
with autism are impaired in their empathic response to signals of
emotional distress (Charman et al. 1997; Sigman et al. 1992). This
impoverished empathic response entails reduced orientation to
(and perhaps recognition of) the distress display, reduced match-
ing of facial affect, and reduced prosocial “empathic” responding
to the model (Bacon et al. 1998; Charman et al. 1997; Sigman et
al. 1992). What remains unclear in terms of P&deW’s account is
at what level the basic impairment lies: at the proximal level of per-
ception-action matching (PAM), or at the ultimate level that is me-
diated by cognitive or representational maturity and by experi-
ence?
P&deW somewhat hedge their bets between these two alter-
natives, developing an account that includes impairments both at
the perception-action pathway and at the cognitive, prefrontally-
mediated level. Such caution is appropriate as autism is a hetero-
geneous, multi-determined neurodevelopmental condition, which
is unlikely to be the result of a single neural deficit, even given the
developmental downstream effects of early damage to the devel-
oping brain (Bishop 1997; Karmiloff-Smith 1997). However, in ex-
ercising such caution in the application of their model to autism,
P&deW may deflect attention from the very promise that their ac-
count holds. Whilst impairments in other neurally-mediated cog-
nitive abilities are present in autism, they are not as pervasive as
P&deW indicate. In terms of prefrontal, or executive, function, in-
hibition processes appear to be relatively intact (at least when not
combined with a prepotent stimulus), in contrast to impairments
in flexibility, set-shifting, and planning (Ozonoff & Jensen 1999).
Similarly, whilst some aspects of cerebellar-attention processing
appear to be impaired (Courchesne 1997), perhaps particularly
when related to social objects (Swettenham et al. 1998), other as-
pects appear to be intact (Minshew et al. 1999). Amygdala dys-
function is also present in autism, although how this relates to the
pattern of intact and impaired face-processing and emotion-
recognition deficits remains to be determined (Baron-Cohen et al.
2000). How each of these cognitive deficits interact with each
other, and with any deficit in PAM, over the course of develop-
ment is unknown. The empirical task of delineating differential
trajectories between related social cognitive abilities that emerge
on-line and appear to be interdependent in development has been
a challenge in the study of typical development, let alone in atyp-
ical populations (Charman et al. 2000).
Further delineation of the imitation deficit in autism may help
reveal the nature of the deficits in affect- and action-mapping in
autism that underlie the ultimate empathic impairments seen in
the disorder. Imitation abilities are impaired in infants and young
children with autism (Charman et al. 1997), although basic imita-
tive abilities emerge with maturation (Charman & Baron-Cohen
1994). What is less clear is at what level this impairment occurs.
There is some evidence that imitation of gestures (and perhaps in
particular gestures with a meaningful communicative content)
may be more impaired than imitation of actions on objects (Smith
& Bryson 1994). Further, imitation of sequences of actions is more
impaired than imitation of single gestures (Rogers et al. 1996), and
even when actions are reproduced, the degree to which the “style”
of the modelled actions are reproduced is diminished (Hobson &
Lee 1999). Matching of emotional expressions is also impaired in
autism (Hobson 1986a; 1986b; Loveland et al. 1995). However, it
cannot yet be determined how these deficits fit into the proximal
PAM account that P&deW outline.
A fundamental deficit in perception of the object-state would
clearly impair imitation, and this may operate at the level of both
the affective state and motor-positional state of the object. How-
ever, so too would an inability to proprioceptively map these onto
one’s own (affect or motor-positional) state. Further, a fundamen-
tal lack of a “like me” identification (Hobson 1993) would impair
both these processes and any hardwired tendency to respond to
the percept and proprioceptive match. Williams et al. (2001) have
raised the intriguing possibility that the function of mirror neu-
rons (Rizzolatti et al. 1996) may be impaired in autism. Future be-
havioural and functional imaging studies will determine whether
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this thesis is correct. The developmental consequences of such a
deficit would be far-reaching. Existing accounts suggest the po-
tential cascade that may follow such a deficit. Some emphasise the
role of affective identification (Hobson 1993), others the role of
physical identification (Meltzoff & Gopnik 1993), and others still
the combined role of physical and affective processes in the de-
velopment of intersubjectivity (Rogers & Pennington 1991; Stern
1985).
One limitation of the study of imitation in autism to date has
been reliance on paradigms that do not allow us to clearly sepa-
rate the role of motor-perceptual influences from affective-inten-
tional influences. Such a “fine cuts” approach has been pursued
more diligently in the comparative literature. In the normative de-
velopmental literature such approaches are now being adopted,
and these may allow us to disentangle the perceptual and repre-
sentational contributions to the imitation of affect, gestures, and
actions on objects (Charman & Huang 2002; Heyes 2001; Want &
Harris 2002). In time, further evidence will emerge that may al-
low a more precise application of the P&deW model to autism. An
impairment very close to the proximal level of PAM might under-
lie the impoverished empathic response of individuals with autism
to distress displays. Alternatively, an impairment further towards
the ultimate level, consequent upon impairments in cognitive and
representational abilities and experience, may emerge from such
studies.
A complete theory of empathy must consider
stage changes
Michael Lamport Commonsa and Chester Arnold Wolfsontb
aDepartment of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Massachusetts Mental
Health Center, Boston, MA 02115; bDepartment of Counseling, Cohoes High
School, Cohoes, NY 12047. Commons@tiac.net
Chetsgym@hotmail.com http://www.tiac.net/~commons/
Abstract: A sequential, hierarchical stage model of empathy can account
for a comprehensive range of empathic behaviors. We provide an illustra-
tive table, “Stages of Empathy,” to demonstrate how increasingly complex
empathic behaviors emerge at each stage, beginning with the infant’s “au-
tomatic empathy” and ending with the advanced adult’s “coconstruction of
empathetic reality.”
The Perception-Action Model (PAM), even with “additional cog-
nitive capacities” to explain empathic behaviors, cannot account
for stages of empathy. The model is useful and necessary but not
sufficient. Although aspects of empathy follow an “automatic”
process, we assert there is a long development of stage-like
changes in empathic action in humans, and perhaps to some ex-
tent in great apes. This development results in the adult’s very
complex empathic stages of action. We argue that the Model of
Hierarchical Complexity (MHC) (Commons et al. 1998) provides
a coherent account of these developmental changes (see Dawson
2002 for a discussion of its validity and reliability). The increases
in the hierarchical complexity of empathic actions are due to a di-
alectical process of transition from one stage to the next (Com-
mons & Richards 2002; Wolfsont 2002).
We have constructed a table of stages of empathy to underscore
the hierarchically sequential stage changes (also see Fischer
1980). The table shows that at each stage there is a new, more ab-
stract “layer” of actions added that organizes the previous compo-
nent actions. Such ordered changes can be described by using the
MHC because of this model’s universality. It posits mathematical
definitions of “ideal” actions that define stages and a dialectical
process of actions that define transitions between stages (Com-
mons & Richards 2002). The model has been applied to a variety
of domains in psychology including attachment (Commons 1991),
social perspective-taking (Commons & Rodriguez 1990; 1993),
and evaluative reasoning (Dawson 1998).
Stages of empathy
Stages Empathetic Affect and Action
Sensory and motor Reflex reactions occur including com-
actions fort to distress and comforting stimuli,
(Simple reflexes and elicited smiles (Field 1989). Reflexive
conditioning) imitative tongue protrusion; mouth
opening (Meltzoff & Moore 1977).
Shows emotional contagion: Cries and
keeps crying when hears other infants’
cries (Hoffman 1978b).
Circular sensori- Coordinates perceiving the parent’s
motor actions emotion cues and its own behavior.
(Instrumental and Behavior is adjusted in situations
social referencing) (e.g., watch for adults’ facial expres-
sions when meeting a stranger [Boccia
& Campos 1989]). Turns away (avoid-
ance), suppresses an ongoing activity,
or gets more involved with an alterna-
tive activity from others’ aversive emo-
tions.
Sensory-motor Couples motor action with emotional
(Physical consoling) action, matching intensity of expres-
sions when imitating. Recognizes dis-
parities in across persons. Displays
consoling type (or empathic) re-
sponses when someone else is upset.
These responses involve only the in-
fant’s own body. Pats another person,
hugs them, or looks concerned. In-
fants compare emotional responses to
caretaker; defer to caretaker’s re-
sponse to determine their response to
stranger.
Nominal Names and associates feelings (e.g.,
(Multireferential or happy, sad) with familiar entities,
Deferred) events, or representations (e.g., pic-
tures). Infant responds with a dis-
tressed look to an adult who looks sad,
then offers the adult infant’s beloved
doll; child runs to fetch his own
mother to comfort a crying friend
(Hoffman 1978b). Emotionally reacts
to the distress and anger of other fam-
ily members (Zahn-Waxler et al.
1979).
Sentential Simple sequences of empathic interac-
(Egocentric helping) tions limited to egocentric helping
(e.g., console crying infant). Talks
about cause and effect, reflects on
cause, actor, action and outcome, hid-
ing, reparation. Guilt is assuaged by
reparations or is evaded (Kuczynski et
al. 1987; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska
1988). There is play-acting or pretense
(e.g., acting hurt).
Pre-operational Empathize with a character in a story.
(Storied empathy) Confuses real and imaginary. May act
on mistaken beliefs. Acculturation de-
termines whether the context requires
empathy (e.g., it is all right to kill fish,
but not dogs). Narrative form inte-
grates situations and context, and less
salient cues, to infer whether an emo-
tion indicates suffering or something
else.
Commentary/Preston & deWaal: Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases
30 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2002) 25:1
Primary Matches feelings towards the sufferer
(Personal empathy) to sufferer’s reality. Feelings belong
more to oneself than to the other per-
son’s feelings aroused in a situation.
Also can empathize with another’s sit-
uation. But cannot coordinate the two.
Projects self into other’s situation if fa-
miliar or perceptible but not into
other’s perspective if it is not familiar.
Empathy consists of “Me too-isms.”
Concrete Describes feelings as inferred directly
(Interpersonal from expressions and linked to a situa-
inclusion) tion. Feelings include understanding
the other’s motives in terms of one’s
own motives in a similar situation.
They include statements of prefer-
ences of others as well as stated values
of things and acts. One not only un-
derstands how the other person feels,
but relates those feelings to the ones
oneself has had during similar experi-
ences. There is coordination between
how they feel now and how they have
felt in the same concrete situation and
what did help them feel better.
Abstract Identifies degrees of feelings and suf-
(Normative personal fering along a continuum as states or
sympathy) moods inside the person and expres-
sions on the outside. Feelings and ex-
pressions may conflict (Selman 1980).
Generalizes feelings and situations but
does not logically link generalizations.
Sees feelings as normative. “This is
how people feel in a situation like
this.” Nonsystematically tries various
things to help.
Formal Links suffering, moods, expressions,
(Ideal sympathy) and situational variables. Asks about
how people feel in a given situation.
Aware that feeling states influence im-
mediate perspectives or perceptions.
Imagines self in other’s position and
situation, when these are unfamiliar or
abstract. May sympathize with abstract
persons and situations (e.g., idealisti-
cally sympathizes with individual for-
eign enemies).
Systematic Organizes feelings and expressions
(Interpersonal into systems in each person. Sees self
reflection) as impartial, though caring, reflector
of other’s states and perspective. Em-
pathic responses moderated by stand-
ing in the hierarchy of the sufferer.
Metasystematic Coordinates and subordinates congru-
(Universal principles) ently expressed emotions, taking into
account that some systems of emo-
tions conflict with other systems (e.g.,
social and individual caring emotions;
personal survival emotions; justice
emotions). Recognizes they could be
anyone else and in their universal situ-
ations. Acts on universal principles of
caring and suffering.
Paradigmatic Sees that caring, justice, and survival
(Collaborative co- systems cannot be integrated entirely.
construction and trans- Sees failure to find universal princi-
formation of reality) ples for empathy. Knowledge about
others as regards preference and feel-
ings needs direct representation by
the person.
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Deconstructing empathy
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Department of Psychiatry, Washington University School of Medicine, St.
Louis, MO 63110. constantino@psychiatry.wustl.edu
Abstract: Under Preston & de Waal’s proposed model, empathy might be
regarded as everything that determines the quality of a social relationship.
Although the authors provide a useful heuristic for understanding rela-
tionships, clinical research efforts with a somewhat narrower focus have
provided some additional insights into this topic, which might lead to
testable hypotheses regarding the neurobiology of empathy.
In Preston & de Waal’s (P&deW’s) model, empathy is viewed as a
hierarchy of capacities that originally evolved from the need for
social animals to respond accurately and quickly to complex stim-
uli. The emergence of perception-action organization – believed
to be a distinguishing characteristic of social animals – was subse-
quently superimposed (evolutionarily) by modulatory mecha-
nisms that incorporated internal representations of prior experi-
ence (which enhanced the computational efficiency of the
system), as well as higher order cognitive processes. At the core of
the authors’ hypotheses, the seemingly divergent entities of em-
pathy (in which the subject feels the state of the object) and pro-
jection (in which the subject assumes that his or her own state is
that of the object) are actually seen as complementary epiphe-
nomena of the mediation of perception-activation processes by in-
ternal representations of prior experience. In elaborating their
model, the term empathy encompasses phenomena as disparate
as the reaction to a gory movie and the reaction to a tragic one, in-
corporates a range of emotional responses from “contagion” to al-
truism, involves unconscious processes, cognition and “meaning”
(in an existential sense), is influenced by genetic and environ-
mental factors, and includes both automatic responses and imag-
inative processes “that allow individuals to evoke empathic pro-
cesses in the absence of the object” (target article, sect. 4.2).
This broad range speaks to the comprehensiveness of their ap-
proach, but also threatens to make empathy so unwieldy a con-
struct that it is difficult to test. Under the proposed model, empa-
thy might be regarded as everything that determines the quality
of a social relationship. Although the authors provide a useful
heuristic for understanding relationships, clinical research efforts
that have had a somewhat narrower focus have provided some ad-
ditional insights into this topic which might lead to testable hy-
potheses regarding the neurobiology of empathy.
The authors’ own examples of autism and antisocial personality
disorder (ASPD) illustrate distinct naturalistic deficits in the ap-
paratus for empathy, but there are obvious differences in the qual-
ity of empathic deficiency between these two conditions which are
not entirely explained by the model. Fully autistic children appear
to lack the neuro-developmental capacity for joint attention, yet
may be exquisitely sensitive to seemingly trivial socio-environ-
mental cues, to which they stereotypically respond. Sociopathic
individuals exhibit low levels of arousal and are unmotivated by in-
terpersonal contingencies, but may become incensed by per-
ceived insults from others. These observations suggest that aware-
ness of social cues, the capacity to appropriately interpret those
cues, the ability to respond competently, and the inherent moti-
vation to respond may represent distinct variables in whatever sys-
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tem or systems contribute to what is subsumed under the term
“empathy.” It is also worth keeping in mind that there are pro-
nounced, universally-observed gender differences in the preva-
lence of both autism and ASPD; such differences suggest sex-spe-
cific pathways that would deserve incorporation into any biologic
model of empathy. Furthermore, recent research has suggested
that both of these disorders have polygenic determinants and may
represent extremes of continua of social deficiency that exist in the
general population (Constantino & Todd 2000; Slutske et al.
1998). If so, it will be important to understand whether milder so-
cial deficits that have been preserved over the course of evolution
might confer specific advantages to some individuals. Any of the
above considerations could lead to revisions to the notion of em-
pathy evolving as a singular, highly adaptive capacity.
ASPD can also be compared with other types of personality dis-
order, all of which are quintessential disorders of human relation-
ship-relevant capacities, and are characterized by varying degrees
of deficiency in empathy. Cloninger and colleagues (Cloninger
1987; Cloninger & Svrakic 1997) have shown that among subjects
with personality disorders (including ASPD), an individual’s spe-
cific diagnosis is best predicted by his or her configuration with re-
spect to three highly heritable stimulus-response tendencies: be-
havioral activation (measured by novelty seeking), behavioral
inhibition (measured by harm avoidance), and reward depen-
dence. These tendencies, which seem highly relevant to the per-
ception-activation model, are not, however, what determines
whether an individual will have a personality disorder; rather, they
predict which of the various personality disorders an affected in-
dividual will have (pronounced variations in these stimulus-re-
sponse characteristics are also observed in normal [empathic] in-
dividuals without personality disorder). Rather, presence or
absence of personality disorder are strongly predicted by indices
of characterologic maturation: self-directedness and cooperative-
ness, both of which depend on self-object differentiation. In other
words, in Cloninger’s empirically-derived model, the proximate
determinants of empathic deficiency are actually higher-order
cognitive functions; variations in stimulus-response characteristics
result only in syndromal variations among these primary disorders
of interpersonal function.
Direct attempts to characterize internal mental representations
of attachment relationships (Main et al. 1985; van Ijzendoorn
1995) have indicated that such representations are measurable
and that in patients with personality disorder, they are generally
disorganized or incoherent. Attachment research has supported
many aspects of P&deW’s model in that, the way in which early at-
tachment relationships are incorporated into an internal working
model predicts important aspects of interpersonal function over
the life course, including child rearing behavior. Further research
specifically exploring the genetic, environmental, and neurobio-
logic determinants of mental representations of attachment may
provide important insights into the biology of empathy.
Finally, Karasu (1992) has contrasted “understanding” with
“empathy” by highlighting the distinction between two ways of re-
sponding to a suffering patient: in the first (understanding), the
therapist states, “You must be feeling sad”; in the second (empa-
thy), the therapist states, “How sad.” The first may constitute what
P&deW refer to as a “cognitive form of empathy.” But it is not
clear that they have left enough room in their model to differ-
entiate the first condition from the second condition, in which em-
pathy seems to transcend cognition, rather than the other way
around. Conscious decisions to engage or disengage the latter (al-
truistic) capacity might constitute an important component of
what is considered to be free will (since doing so ostensibly rep-
resents a departure from what is reflexively self-preserving). The
sense of meaning that an individual derives from making such de-
cisions may, as the authors suggest, in turn exert substantial influ-
ences on subsequent empathic behavior.
Too early for a neuropsychology of empathy
Hank Davis
Psychology Department, University of Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1, Canada.
hdavis@uoguelph.ca
Abstract: To date, a wide range of interdisciplinary scholarship has done
little to clarify either the why or the how of empathy. Preston & de Waal
(P&deW) attempt to remedy this, although it remains unclear whether
empathy consists of two discrete processes, or whether a perceptual and
motor component are joined in some sort of behavioral inevitability. Al-
though it is appealing to offer a neuroanatomy of empathy, the present
level of neuropsychology may not support such reductionism.
It’s hard not to sing the praises of empathy, whatever it is. You don’t
need an iron-clad definition to appreciate empathy. We pretty
much agree that the word denotes a good thing: empathy is the
stuff of group cohesion, and may be the reason we attract, or are
attracted to, one person over another. Unfortunately, you do need
a solid definition if you’re going to study empathy, and it’s here that
the gaps and inconsistencies in our understanding loom large.
Plainly, empathy is relevant to a host of topics studied by psy-
chology; they include observational learning, sociopathy, altruism,
social facilitation, deception, vicarious learning, and autism. In ad-
dition to attracting all kinds of psychologists who rarely speak to
each other professionally, empathy has also been studied by
philosophers, theologians, and ethologists. This alone should tell
you there is trouble brewing.
P&deW readily acknowledge the conceptual mess that swirls
around empathy. It’s probably what drove them to write their ar-
ticle. It is thus fair to ask how so many people with such disparate
interests and training all find this common topic worth their at-
tention? One possibility is that empathy is not a single topic; it is
simply an umbrella term masquerading as a discrete topic. Of
course, it remains possible that empathy really is a single entity
that happens to hold interdisciplinary relevance. But how many
subjects do you know that can be studied equally well using ques-
tionnaires, field studies, and MRIs?
I don’t believe that the “riddle of empathy” (to use Allport’s
phrase) will be solved by some grand interdisciplinary synthesis
and neither, as far as I can tell, do P&deW. What seems more likely
is that empathy has been the beneficiary of some very good press
and some very bad scholarship. The “good press” stems from the
fact that the trait is largely regarded as a good, even ideal thing.
Unlike other aspects of human nature (e.g., jealousy, rage), em-
pathy is almost universally regarded in positive terms. People with
“it” (whatever it is) are viewed as being better human beings: we
aspire to be more like them; we choose them for friends and
lovers. Therapists with “it” are presumed to be better at their craft
than less empathic therapists. Indeed, Rogerian therapists are ex-
plicitly trained to create more of it.
The “bad scholarship” stems from the fact that workers have of-
ten free-associated to “empathy,” seizing on those aspects of the
term that most engaged them, and then bringing the peculiar skills
and vocabularies of their discipline to the task. Good luck inte-
grating that body of literature! A second factor compromising our
ability to investigate empathy is the high regard with which it is
held. It is difficult to be analytical about the roots of any behavior
or phenotype that seems to provide such obvious interpersonal
benefits. Note how few papers there are on why it is better to be
good looking, healthy, and rich.
P&deW have attempted to find a way through this conceptual
quagmire. Their approach offers hope that we may yet understand
the why of empathy (i.e., an evolutionary account) as well as the
how (a physiological mechanism underlying empathy). Regarding
the why, P&deW note that “Ultimate accounts are notorious for
being cursory and speculative” (target article, sect. 2.) They are
right. Certainly, some evolutionary psychologists have had too easy
a time explaining why empathy would fare well under selection
pressure. Glib accounts, often extrapolated from today’s world,
suggest that empathic skills offer an advantage in (1) attracting
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mates (what woman wouldn’t want an empathic man by her side?),
and (2) child rearing (what kid wouldn’t thrive under the auspices
of an empathic parent?). But do these facile judgments tell us any-
thing about the selective advantage empathy provided in the an-
cestral environment? To their credit, P&deW look beyond our
species in attempting to answer the question of why empathy
might offer a reproductive advantage. Fortunately, nobody has yet
suggested an inter-species account of empathy which argues that
empathic men were more successful hunters because they better
listened to their prey, thus increasing their efficiency and provid-
ing more resources for their mates and offspring. Presumably, if
no such evidence exists, one could argue that prey animals used
such empathic listening to avoid detection by human predators.
There is an inconsistency in this target article. On one hand, the
Perception-Action model is essentially a dualist position. The au-
thors do well to remind us that there are two distinct stages to em-
pathy – one perceptual/cognitive, and one behavioral. This is all
the more important because folk psychology does what it can to
blur this distinction. The term “empathy” is used in everyday lan-
guage to describe both the mental side (the theory of mind part of
empathy) as well as the behaviors that follow from such under-
standing. Note that these behaviors are only considered empathic
as long as they are compassionate. If the resultant behavior is
exploitative, the term “deception” is applied. In that sense, de-
ception is the evil twin of empathy – both stem from a sensitive
reading of another person, but differ in the use to which that in-
formation is put.
On the other hand, the physiological account offered by
P&deW – with its emphasis on mirror neurons in the prefrontal
cortex – suggests such a degree of behavioral inevitability that em-
pathy might as well be a single process, embracing both the per-
ception and the action. Once those perceptions occur and the rel-
evant motor centers light up, only a fool would bet against the
appropriate behavioral output. The phrase “automatically primes
and generates” (sect. 1.1.3) embodies this confusion. To prime and
to generate suggest different levels of behavioral determinism.
Using an analogy from Learning Theory, it is the difference be-
tween a Pavlovian CS (which elicits the response) and an operant
SD (which sets the occasion for a response to be emitted). P&deW
need to clarify the degree of behavioral determinism suggested by
their account.
Although it is deeply appealing to refer to “the neuroanatomy
of empathy” as a way to deepen our understanding, it is wise to re-
mind ourselves that the comforts of reductionism come at a price.
Neuropsychology is in its relative infancy. It is quite possible that
our present level of sophistication may represent as big a jungle as
the confusion surrounding empathy.
Distinctions among various modes of
empathy-related reactions: A matter of
importance in humans
Nancy Eisenberg
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-1104.
nancy.eisenberg@asu.edu
Abstract: Preston & de Waal minimized differences among constructs
such as empathy, sympathy, and personal distress. However, such distinc-
tions have been shown to relate differently to altruistic behavior. More-
over, although the authors discussed the role of regulation in empathy, they
did not consider the possibility that sometimes empathy is not well-regu-
lated and likely leads to personal distress rather than sympathy.
Preston & de Waal’s (P&deW’s) article provides a very interesting
and useful interdisciplinary integration of theory and empirical lit-
erature on empathy. Although I agree with many of their points, I
disagree with their tendency to dismiss the importance of the dis-
tinctions among personal distress, sympathy, and empathy, and
their tendency to assume that empathy will be related to prosocial
rather than self-focused behavior.
P&deW state that “It is mistaken to argue whether help is given
for the benefit of the object or to terminate the object’s aversive
distress signal or the subject’s personal distress” (sect. 2.3). There
is much evidence contradicting this statement in research that dif-
ferentiates between two emotion-based reactions that often may
stem from empathy (Eisenberg et al. 1991) – sympathy (an emo-
tional response stemming from the apprehension or comprehen-
sion of another’s emotional state or condition, which is not the
same as what the other person is feeling or is expected to feel but
consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for the other; called “em-
pathy” by Batson 1991); and personal distress (a self-focused,
aversive affective reaction to the apprehension of another’s emo-
tion, e.g., discomfort, anxiety). Specifically, in situations in which
it is easy to avoid contact with a needy other and minimize the like-
lihood of a benefactor receiving social approval or concrete re-
wards for helping, children’s and adults’ sympathy has been posi-
tively related to prosocial behavior, whereas their levels of
personal distress have been unrelated or negatively related (Bat-
son 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes 1998). Thus, there seems to be fun-
damental differences between the motives and behaviors associ-
ated with sympathy and with personal distress, although P&deW
argue that the distinctions among definitions in their Table 2 “have
been overemphasized to the point of distraction” (sect. 1.1.2).
Moreover, sympathy and personal distress are differentially re-
lated to regulatory capacities. P&deW noted the role of the pre-
frontal cortex in regulation: “prefrontal size correlates with emo-
tional regulation skills in development and phylogeny, thus, the
prefrontal cortex is thought necessary for the ability to control the
extent of personal distress and remain focused on the object”
(sect. 3.3). Related to this point, the effortful control processes as-
sociated with the middle of the frontal lobe of the cortex (e.g., the
abilities to effortfully shift or focus attention and inhibit behavior
as needed) have increasingly been viewed as contributing to socio-
emotional and moral development, including empathy-related re-
sponding (Eisenberg 2000; Kochanska et al. 2000; Rothbart et al.
1994). For example, my colleagues and I (Eisenberg & Fabes
1999; Eisenberg et al. 1994) have argued that effortful, voluntary
regulation is associated with sympathy rather than personal dis-
tress, and that empathic overarousal in situations involving nega-
tive emotion results in an aversive emotional state, which leads to
a self-focus (i.e., personal distress). If individuals cannot maintain
their emotional reactions to others’ emotions within a tolerable
range of arousal, they would be expected to focus on their own
emotional needs. Conversely, individuals who can maintain their
vicariously induced emotional arousal at a moderate level, which
is arousing but not aversive, were hypothesized to experience sym-
pathy (Eisenberg et al. 1994). If these propositions are true, indi-
vidual differences in effortful emotion-related regulation would
be expected to be linked to differences in dispositional sympathy
and personal distress.
Consistent with the view that personal distress involves over-
arousal, we have found that children’s and adults’ heart rate and
skin conductance tend to be higher in experimental situations
likely to induce personal distress (in comparison with control or
sympathy-inducing contexts; see Eisenberg & Fabes 1999, for a
review). In addition, my colleagues and I (also see Rothbart et al.
1994) have found different relations between effortful regulation
and sympathy versus personal distress. In adults, we have found
positive relations between measures of effortful control and sym-
pathy (Eisenberg & Okun 1996), although sometimes only after
controlling for individual differences in negative emotional inten-
sity (see Eisenberg et al. 1994; Okun et al. 2000). In contrast, self-
reported dispositional personal distress has been related to low
levels of both self-reported regulation and friends’ reports of stu-
dents’ coping (Eisenberg et al. 1994; Okun et al. 2000). In addi-
tion, children’s effortful control has been positively related to their
dispositional sympathy at several ages and across time (Eisenberg
et al. 1996; 1998; Murphy et al. 1999). Although findings for situ-
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ational measures of sympathy are less clear (see Eisenberg &
Fabes 1999), in general the data support a positive relation be-
tween sympathy and regulatory capacities, and an inverse relation
between personal distress and regulation. Such findings are con-
sistent with P&deW’s contention that regulatory processes play a
central role in empathic processes; however, they also illustrate
the need to clearly differentiate among empathy, sympathy, and
personal distress (unless one equates empathy and sympathy,
which does not seem to be the case in Table 2). Indeed, it is un-
likely that all the types of responding that P&deW have included
in their construct of empathy are associated with high effortful
regulation.
In summary, although P&deW are probably correct in many of
their assumptions about the origins of empathy, it is important to
consider the differences between relatively rudimentary forms of
empathy (defined as an affective response that stems from the ap-
prehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or con-
dition, and which is similar to what the other person is feeling or
would be expected to feel), and sympathy or personal distress,
which probably often stem from empathy (see Eisenberg et al.
1991).When studying beings such as humans who sometimes can
regulate and modulate empathic arousal, the distinctions among
empathy, sympathy, and personal distress should not be ignored.
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Abstract: Within the perception-action framework, the underlying mech-
anisms of empathy and its related processes of moral behavior need to be
investigated. fMRI studies have shown different frontal cortex activation
patterns during automatic processing and judgment tasks when stimuli
have moral content. Clinical neuropsychological studies reveal different
patterns of empathic alterations after dorsolateral versus orbital frontal
cortex damage, related to deficient cognitive and emotional processing.
These processing streams represent different neural levels and mecha-
nisms underlying empathy.
Preston & de Waal’s (P&deW’s) effort to make order out of the
chaos that surrounds the concept of empathy is a laudable one. It
is in line with the pressing clinical and scientific needs for a deeper
understanding of the cerebral mechanisms that govern empathy
and how they fail in psychopathy, traumatic brain injury, schizo-
phrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, and related disorders.
The authors propose to apply the perception-action model as a
fundamental empirical framework for the study of empathy. Fur-
thermore, they emphasize empathy as a process rather than a re-
sponse, allowing for numerous and diverse subordinate mecha-
nisms such as emotional contagion, sympathy, and so on. In this
sense, the study of empathy and related emotional, cognitive, and
physiological processes can be aligned with scientific approaches
that have been fruitful in other domains of human adaptation such
as language, visuospatial memory, and executive functions. The
larger issues they allude to as the “ultimate bases of empathy” have
important implications not just for the reproductive success and
adaptive fitness of a species, but also for many other human social
and cultural phenomena, from family structures to legal-political
systems that govern masses of people. Though we agree that a uni-
fied working definition of empathy is needed, structuring the con-
cept of empathy as “perception-action” does not explain the multi-
dimensional features of empathy nor its mechanisms. However,
the perception-action analysis of empathy follows parallel devel-
opments in related fields. Further specification can come from
two approaches: fMRI studies and clinical neuropsychological
studies.
fMRI studies. Moral judgment is a higher order type of social
decision-making that draws heavily on cognitive and emotional
empathic processes. Accordingly, moral actions in the real world
are not simply a “cold” product of scholarly reflections, but result
from the covert interaction of social decision-making and deeply
rooted emotional dispositions, which are themselves strongly bi-
ased by individual empathic tendencies (Rozin et al. 1999). As sug-
gested by P&deW, social stimuli can elicit spontaneous brain re-
sponses in areas mediating emotional and decision-making
processes. We recently completed a functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging study of normal volunteers viewing pictures of
emotionally charged scenes with and without moral content, as
well as emotionally neutral pictures (all stimuli independently
rated and validated). By design, no responses were required of
subjects, so as to capture spontaneous, automatic processing. Re-
sults demonstrated that viewing moral and nonmoral visual stim-
uli activated a common network of brain areas that included the
amygdala, insula, thalamus, and upper brain stem. Importantly,
the medial orbitofrontal cortex, medial frontal gyrus, and poste-
rior superior temporal sulcus were additionally recruited during
spontaneous processing of moral stimuli, unrelated to emotional
valence and arousal. We interpret these findings as evidence that
one of the roles of the medial orbitofrontal and medial frontal cor-
tical regions involves the quick, automatic detection of salient 
social-emotional stimuli and events, in conjunction with corollary
effects in the superior temporal, limbic, and other subcortical
structures (Moll et al., 2001). Such a mechanism essentially per-
mits a more comprehensive perceptual apparatus than flight or
fight detection. It also extends the type of rapid, automatic pro-
cessing associated with the amygdala to related regions that have
cortical learning and memory capacities. Its activation can prepare
diverse cognitive processing systems for detailed perceptual
analysis, decision-making, and action. The automatic nature of the
processing suggests it is a pervasive feature of social-emotional
perception-action mechanisms.
A different pattern results when normal individuals are specif-
ically asked to judge sentences with explicit moral content (e.g.,
“we break the law when necessary”) versus factual statements de-
void of moral connotations (e.g., “stones are lighter than water”).
Subjects were instructed to silently judge each sentence as right
or wrong without previous knowledge that the experiment had
anything to do with morality. After the scanning session, each par-
ticipant rated the degree of moral content and the quality and
emotional valence of each sentence on Likert-like scales. In com-
parison to factual judgments, moral judgments strongly activated
the frontopolar cortex (FPC) and the medial frontal gyrus (MFG)
(see Fig. 1). The right anterior temporal cortex, lenticular nucleus,
and cerebellum were also significantly activated but differently
from the FPC and MFG. These brain regions were strongly influ-
enced by emotional experience, as revealed by covariance analy-
sis using hemodynamic modeling within an event-related fMRI
approach.
This task required more explicit reasoning and judgment and
showed a different pattern of brain activation than when auto-
matic responses are monitored (i.e., more polar frontal and less
orbitofrontal). Together with other studies (e.g., Baron-Cohen et
al. 1999; Jarvie 1954), the findings suggest that there are multiple
levels of neural activation, particularly within prefrontal regions,
for social events that engage empathic mechanisms through auto-
matic emotional and acquired cognitive processes.
Clinical neuropsychological studies. Complex social actions
requiring moral evaluations, empathy, theory of mind, and stable
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social bonds have been traditionally conceived to rely on two main
streams of processing (Eslinger 1998): one more cognitively ori-
ented and dependent on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and
the other more emotion-oriented and mediated by anterior tem-
poral, limbic, and orbitomedial frontal cortical systems. In a neu-
ropsychological study of humans with acquired lesions of the
frontal lobe (Grattan et al. 1994), comparisons between quantita-
tive measures of cognitive flexibility and empathy indicated that
left and right dorsolateral frontal lesions caused deficits in both
cognitive flexibility and empathy (with correlations ranging as high
as r 5 .81). In contrast, orbitofrontal lesions profoundly affected
empathy but did not alter cognitive flexibility, suggesting different
mechanisms of pathophysiology for empathic change that may
have its basis in deficient automatic tagging of salient stimuli or
evocation of autonomic-visceral states. The latter pattern has also
been reported in patients with lesions of the insula and deep white
matter of the frontal lobe, likely disconnecting orbitofrontal,
amygdala, and insula interconnections. Despite the lack of auto-
matic emotional responsiveness, these individuals can be trained
to use cognitive mechanisms for recognition of salient facial, vo-
cal, and body expressions, and for the verbal expression of their
concern. Thus, frontal regulation of social conduct favors the view
that the prefrontal cortex may need further functional fractiona-
tion, with polar, orbital, medial, dorsolateral, and deep white mat-
ter sectors mediating distinct, but complementary roles in the
emotional-cognitive regulation of social behavior. In our experi-
ence, early damage to polar, mesial, and dorsolateral regions dis-
rupts the developmental acquisition of automatic and learned em-
pathy, moral judgment, and interpersonal conduct (e.g., Eslinger
et al. 1992; 1997).
The cerebral correlates of specific dimensions of moral and em-
pathic behaviors need further study (Grattan & Eslinger 1989).
P&deW’s article offers a solid conceptual frame against which spe-
cific hypotheses and models can be put to empirical testing in nor-
mal individuals, as well as in patients with a variety of neuropsy-
chiatric disorders which express themselves as disorders of
empathy, social, and moral behavior.
The mirror matching system: A shared
manifold for intersubjectivity
Vittorio Gallese, Pier Francesco Ferrari, and
Maria Alessandra Umiltà
Istituto di Fisiologia Umana, Università di Parma, I-43100 Parma, Italy.
vittorio.gallese@unipr.it ferrari@biol.unipr.it maumilta@unipr.it
Abstract: Empathy is the phenomenal experience of mirroring ourselves
into others. It can be explained in terms of simulations of actions, sensa-
tions, and emotions which constitute a shared manifold for intersubjectiv-
ity. Simulation, in turn, can be sustained at the subpersonal level by a se-
ries of neural mirror matching systems.
The article by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) has the merit of rais-
ing the issue on how different and multifarious social behaviors
such as emotional contagion, helping behaviors, imitation, and
cognitive empathy may be reconciled within a unified explanatory
framework. Their proposal is that empathy can constitute such a
framework, provided that it is “construed broadly to include all
processes that rely on the perception-action mechanism” (see tar-
get article, sect. 1.1.3, Fig. 1 caption).
Unfortunately, the discussion of these interesting issues is, in
our view, most of the time too vague, and sometimes even con-
founding, so that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusion on the
validity of the proposed model.
The definition of empathy given by P&deW seems to oscillate
between a “superordinate category” of behaviors, and a process
underpinning the same different types of behavior. They intro-
duce the Perception-Action Model (PAM), which is presented as
a “superordinate class,” capable of including and subsuming dif-
ferent types of behaviors and effects, among which empathy is also
listed (see their Fig. 1). This makes it almost impossible to under-
stand whether in the authors’ view empathy and PAM are the
same thing or not. Furthermore, the term PAM is used inter-
changeably to denote either a model (as the acronym seems to
suggest) or a basic (neurophysiological?) level of description. Such
a use of the term makes several statements hard to understand.
How can a model possibly interact with specific brain functions?
(e.g., see the Abstract where it is stated that: “The interaction be-
tween the PAM [Perception Action Model] and prefrontal func-
tioning can also explain different levels of empathy.”) Models
should explain, or interpret functions, not interact with them.
The broad and general sense attributed by P&deW to the term
empathy fails to provide a coherent picture of the mechanism that
is at the basis of their model. There is confusion here – if not even
a category mistake – about the chosen level of explanation.
In our opinion, the term “empathy” makes sense only if used to
denote a phenomenological level of description: the one respon-
sible for the sense of similarity that we experience anytime we con-
front ourselves with other human beings, and sometimes even
with animals. Empathy is deeply grounded in the experience of
our lived-body, and it is this experience that enables us to directly
recognize others, not as bodies endowed with a mind, but as per-
sons like us. Actions, sensations, and emotions experienced by oth-
ers become meaningful to us because we can share them with oth-
ers. How can such a sharing of experiences be possible? We need
to introduce a second level of description, one pertaining to the
functional mechanism that enables such an experience to occur.
This functional mechanism may be constituted by simulation.
Simulation mechanisms are a possible way for a given organism to
control and model its performances. By modeling a given process,
our brain provides a simulated representation of the same process
that can be used to produce it, on the one hand, and to decode it
when performed by someone else, on the other. We suggest that
these “as if” simulation mechanisms may subsume a wide range of
processes as diverse as action perception and imitation (as simu-
lation of the observed action; see Gallese 2000a; 2000b; 2001; see
also Rizzolatti et al. 2001), emotion perception (as simulation of
the perceived emotion; see Adolphs 1999; Adolphs et al. 2000;
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Figure 1 (Eslinger et al.). Results of fMRI study of normal vol-
unteers making explicit moral judgments, showing activation pri-
marily of frontopolar cortex, medial frontal gyrus and related re-
gions
Gallese 2001), and mindreading. Simulation theory in fact holds
that we understand others’ thoughts by pretending to be in their
“mental shoes,” and by using our own mind/body as a model for
the minds of others (Gallese & Goldman 1998; Goldman 1989;
Gordon 1986; Harris 1989).
Is there a further level of description that can provide a com-
mon and coherent explanatory frame for all these different simu-
lation mechanisms? We propose, yes: such a level could be repre-
sented by the neural matching system constituted by mirror
neurons (Gallese et al. 1996; 2002; Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Umiltà
et al. 2001; see also Rizzolatti et al. 2001) – or by equivalent neural
systems described in the human brain (Fadiga et al. 1995; Iaco-
boni et al. 1999; Nishitani & Hari 2000). Mirror neurons could un-
derpin a direct, automatic, nonpredicative, and noninferential
simulation mechanism, by means of which the observer would be
able to recognize, understand, and imitate the behavior of others.
The authors maintain that “mirror neurons . . . provide concrete
cellular evidence for the shared representations of perception and
action” (see target article, sect. 3.1). They fail, nevertheless, to
draw the correct conclusions from such a statement. It is true, as
they argue, that mirror neurons do not produce per se any empa-
thy. However, if an action-perception matching is crucial for the
production of empathy, as the authors suggest, mirror neurons
represent the most parsimonious neural system so far described,
enabling such a matching to occur. The trick here is not to con-
found the phenomenal aspect of behavior, its functional level of
description, and the neural mechanism at its base.
Preliminary results suggest that a mirror matching system could
be at the basis of our capacity to perceive in a meaningful way, not
only the actions, but also the sensations and the emotions of oth-
ers (see Gallese 2001). Single neuron recording experiments in
humans have demonstrated that the same neurons become active
when the subject either feels pain or observes others feeling pain
(Hutchison et al. 1999). Furthermore, a recent fMRI study has
shown that the amygdala becomes active not only during the ob-
servation, but also during the active expression of facial emotions,
especially when imitation is involved (Carr et al. 2001).
In conclusion, these recent findings suggest that a neural
matching system is present also in a variety of apparently non-
motor-related human brain structures. Thus, different simulation
mechanisms are applied in different domains, being sustained by
a mirror-matching, dual-mode of operation (action-driven and
perception-driven) of given brain structures. We propose that
such simulation mechanisms may constitute altogether a shared
manifold of intersubjectivity (see Gallese 2001).
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Abstract: We argue that cognitive empathy and other instances of mental
state attribution are a byproduct of self-awareness. Evidence is brought to
bear on this proposition from comparative psychology, early child devel-
opment, neuropsychology, and abnormal behavior.
The subcategory of empathy that Preston & de Waal (P&deW)
identify as cognitive empathy represents an instance of a more
general phenomenon known as mental state attribution. Twenty
years ago a model was formulated that stipulates self-awareness as
a necessary condition for making inferences about mental states
in others (Gallup 1982). According to the model, inferential
knowledge of mental states in others builds on a knowledge of
mental states in oneself. Organisms that can become the object of
their own attention (i.e., recognize themselves in mirrors) can use
their experience to model/infer comparable experiences in others.
Because humans share similar receptor mechanisms and brains
that are organized in roughly the same way, there is bound to be
considerable overlap between their experiences. Moreover, peo-
ple that have access to their own mental states and take note of
their relationship to various external events, have a means of mak-
ing inferences about mental states in others. Knowledge of self, in
other words, paves the way for achieving an inferential knowledge
of cognitive states in others.
Since the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror varies as a func-
tion of species, age, neurological status, and mental illness (Gallup
et al. 2002), this model can be tested in each of these domains. Ac-
cording to the model, variation in mirror self-recognition ought to
predict comparable variation in the ability to take into account
how others feel, and variation in being able to accurately infer
what they want, know, or intend to do. In instances in which self-
recognition is deficient or absent, there should be a correspond-
ing deficiency or absence of mental state attribution.
Thus, whereas chimpanzees that recognize themselves in mir-
rors show evidence of cognitive empathy (Povinelli et al. 1992a),
rhesus monkeys, which fail tests of self-recognition, show no evi-
dence of cognitive empathy (Povinelli et al. 1992b). Monkeys
seem incapable of taking into account what other monkeys may or
may not know, want, or intend to do. Indeed, monkeys may not
even know what they know (Cheney & Seyfarth 1990).
The same holds for humans. People who are incapable of rec-
ognizing themselves in mirrors are typically unable to make infer-
ences about mental states in other people. For instance, it is only
after children learn to recognize themselves in mirrors (usually
between 18 and 24 months of age) that they begin to show evi-
dence of being able to take into account what other people are see-
ing or feeling (e.g., Carruthers & Smith 1996). Likewise, the
emergence of prosocial and altruistic behaviors in children is re-
lated to the age at which they show self-recognition (Johnson
1982).
There is a growing evidence that self-recognition is localized in
the brain. Patients who are incapable of identifying their own faces
often have damage to the right prefrontal cortex (e.g., Spangen-
berg et al. 1998). Breen (1999) described a patient with damage
restricted to the right prefrontal cortex that could recognize other
people in a mirror, but insisted that his own reflection was some-
one else. Keenan and Wheeler (in press) summarize a number of
neuropsychological studies which show both right hemispheric
lateralization and localization of self-recognition in the prefrontal
cortex. As support for the proposition that mirror self-recognition
is a valid index of self-awareness, it is important to note that self-
evaluation and autobiographical memories are also localized in the
right prefrontal cortex (see Keenan et al. 2000).
Consistent with the model, the same part of the brain that is im-
portant for self-recognition also appears to be crucial for mental
state attribution. In contrast to patients with brain damage else-
where, Stuss et al. (2001) found that those with lesions restricted
to the right frontal lobes showed deficits in visual perspective tak-
ing and detecting deception. Likewise, Happe et al. (1999) report
that patients with damage to the right hemisphere evidence an im-
paired ability to interpret mental state attribution narratives and
fail to appreciate instances of humor that require making mental
state attributions.
Deficits in mirror self-recognition are also characteristic of a
number of psychological disorders (Gallup et al., in press). Schiz-
ophrenics often react to themselves in mirrors as though they were
seeing other people (Harrington et al. 1989). Similarly, people
who score high on measures of schizotypal personality show im-
pairments in self-face recognition (Platek & Gallup 2002). There
is mounting evidence that schizophrenia is associated with frontal
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lobe pathology (e.g., Frith 1997) and schizophrenics show pro-
nounced mental state attribution deficits (e.g., Frith & Corcoran
1996). The same parallel holds true for autistic children. Mirror
self-recognition is developmentally delayed and sometimes even
absent in children suffering from autism (Spiker & Ricks 1984),
and autistic children are impaired in their ability to take into ac-
count what other people are thinking (Baron-Cohen 2000).
Thus, the model that stipulates self-awareness as a necessary
condition for mental state attribution has been subject to consid-
erable convergent validation. The underlying network that inte-
grates these processes would also appear to be responsible for cog-
nitive empathy.
Empathy, simulation, and PAM
Robert M. Gordon
Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, MO 63121.
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Abstract: The wealth of important and convergent evidence discussed in
the target article contrasts with the poorly conceived theory put forward
to explain it. The simulation theory does a better job of explaining how au-
tomatic “mirroring” mechanisms might work together with high-level cog-
nitive processes. It also explains what the authors’ PAM theory merely stip-
ulates.
The target article brings together a variety of interesting studies
the authors believe to be convergent. I agree that the studies con-
verge, but I do not find the account of what they converge on par-
ticularly helpful.
Preston & de Waal (P&deW) initially appear to be putting for-
ward the very bold empirical hypothesis that all the various phe-
nomena commonly considered species of empathy share a par-
ticular underlying mechanism, namely, the Perception-Action
Mechanism. Upon closer inspection, however, what the authors
are doing is defining the term “empathy” to include just those
“sub-classes of phenomena that share the [PAM] mechanism.”
This is an acceptable move, provided the definition offers clarifi-
cation and insight without deviating too far from our understand-
ing of the term. The burden of proof then shifts to the adequacy
of the definition. I find it inadequate. It seems arbitrary to exclude
from the scope of “empathy” empathetic responses induced by
memory, by imagination, or by perception of verbal narratives
such as newspaper reports and fiction. If “empathy” is to cover
these responses, then “perception” must be taken to include re-
membering, imagining, and reading or hearing about another’s be-
havior. Although the authors say they are taking “a broad view of
the perception-action model,” a view broad enough to count imag-
ination as perception does not really move the field forward. It
confers on the various perspectives on empathy only a specious
nominal unity.
Another problem is that the apparent simplicity of the PAM
model is blemished by what seem to be ad hoc amendments.1 For
example:
With the Perception-Action Model, whether or not a subject perceives
the state of the object depends crucially on their interdependence or
interrelationship. . . . The more interrelated the subject and object, . . .
the easier it is to process the state of the object and generate an appro-
priate response. (target article, sect. 1.1.3)
Let’s be clear that this generalization was not predicted by PAM;
rather, here as elsewhere, the authors tacked it on to PAM to ac-
commodate the evidence. An adequate account should help ex-
plain why interdependence/interrelationship is a factor. This
would have to be an account that shows how automatic percep-
tion-action mechanisms might be integrated with cognitive pro-
cesses.
The authors briefly discuss the simulation theory, noting that a
number of recent papers in neuroscience have presented evi-
dence in support of it (Adolphs 1999; Adolphs et al. 2000; Gallese
& Goldman 1998; Iacoboni et al. 1999; Motluck 2001; Williams et
al. 2001; Wolf et al. 2001; I would add Blakemore & Decety 2001;
Gallese 2000a). One of the reasons why the theory has been at-
tractive to neuroscientists is precisely that it sketches a plausible
way for automatic (perception-action and perception-emotion)
mechanisms to work together with high-level cognitive pro-
cesses.2 The automatic mechanisms allow us to mirror the other’s
emotions and motor plans; the relevant cognitive processes, ac-
cording to the simulation theory, marshal situational, biographical,
and behavioral information for such purposes as reasoning and de-
cision-making in the role of the other (Gordon 1996). For exam-
ple, suppose A has a mechanism that takes as input B’s facial ex-
pression of emotion and produces in A an emotion similar to B’s –
“off-line,” that is, not behavior-guiding but rather restricted to A’s
first-person “role-taking” representation of B. If “off-line” emo-
tions influence vicarious decision-making in the way that “on-line”
emotions influence real decision-making, then one can see how
automatic mechanisms for mirroring emotions would be comple-
mentary to the cognitive processes involved in “putting oneself in
the other’s place.”
Perhaps even more obviously, mirror neurons are likely to “talk”
to the cognitive processes that underlie vicarious decision-making.
Suppose A has a mechanism that takes as input B’s object-directed
action sequence (for example, B’s reaching for a cup, grasping it,
and removing it from the table) and produces in A an intention or
(at least) a motor plan to perform the same sequence – an inten-
tion or plan that runs “off-line,” not to be acted on by A but rather
confined to A’s first-person “role-taking” representation of B.
Then A has in effect already made a decision in the role of B. The
decision must now be integrated with a broader simulation of B,
to generate possible reasons for grasping and removing the cup –
that is, reasons suitable to B at the time of action.
Unlike PAM, the simulation theory also helps explain why in-
terrelationships are likely to affect empathy. Consider vicarious
decision-making. It requires less of an imaginative stretch for an
agent A to take the role of another agent B in imagination (or
overtly, as in stage-acting) if B is similar to A, or in certain respects
closely related. It is not surprising, therefore, that in such cases it
is “easier . . . to process the state of the object and generate an ap-
propriate response” (target article, sect. 1.1.3). Here (and, I be-
lieve, elsewhere) the simulation theory explains what the PAM
theory merely stipulates.
NOTES
1. Further, the authors add some perplexing generalizations. For ex-
ample: All forms of empathy involve some level of emotional conta-
gion. . . . This would seem to rule out empathetic responses to memories,
fantasies, and verbal accounts, unless the concept of contagion extends to
these. All forms of empathy involve . . . personal distress (if only at the rep-
resentational level). So sharing another’s pain is empathy but sharing an-
other’s joy is not? Does PAM respond, then, only to “negative” emotions?
2. Here I follow the tradition in cognitive science of using the term
“cognitive” to cover states and processes that implement any person-level
intentional states and processes, be they conative, emotional, or cognitive
in a narrow sense.
Emotion: The relation between breadth of
definition and explanatory power
Robert A. Hinde
St. John’s College, Cambridge, CB2 1TP, United Kingdom.
rah15@hermes.cam.ac.uk
Abstract: Attempts to integrate diverse phenomena in terms of common
processes are much needed in psychology, but definitional precision is a
necessary preliminary to explanation. It is also preferable to use caution in
juxtaposing concepts from different realms of discourse.
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In this target article Preston & de Waal (P&deW) attempt to in-
tegrate in terms of a common process a number of psychological
phenomena that are usually regarded as distinct. This is an im-
portant task to undertake, for the identification of common
processes could lead to a more basic understanding of diverse psy-
chological phenomena. The authors survey a broad range of liter-
ature from psychology and the neurosciences. While the attempt
must elicit one’s admiration, repeated reading of the article left
this commentator concerned over definitional matters and over
the juxtaposition of behavioural, psychological, and neurophysio-
logical concepts.
Empathy is defined in terms of the object’s state generating a
related state in the subject. The “Perception-Action-Model”
(PAM) of empathy takes it one stage further, stating that the acti-
vation of the representations induced in the subject “automati-
cally primes or generates the associated autonomic and somatic re-
sponses, unless inhibited” (target article, sect. 1.1.3, author’s
emphasis). Thus, while the PAM of empathy includes action, em-
pathy does not. Empathy is seen (perhaps confusingly) as a “su-
perordinate category” “underlying” all phenomena sharing empa-
thy as a common process, such as emotional contagion and helping
behaviour. But it is not clear why the authors’ Figure 1 indicates
that imitation involves perception-action but helping behaviour
does not: surely both involve action? And if empathy induces a re-
lated state in the subject, but only with the PAM does the subject
act appropriately as a consequence, what does it mean when the
authors speculate that a perception-action organisation was an
evolutionary precursor to empathy? Is action necessary for empa-
thy? Does the perception-action hypothesis merely state that per-
ception can lead to action? If so, what is so new about that? More
explanation would have been welcome.
Definitional clarity is not enhanced by the juxtaposition of dis-
tinct levels of discourse. The explanation of the definition of the
PAM involves behavioural concepts (e.g., imitative actions), psy-
chological concepts (empathy, perception), and concepts from
neuroscience (connectivity of neurones). This mixture of lan-
guages pervades much of the discussion – as, for instance, when,
on the basis of behavioural data, experience is said to “fine tune
the circuits for responding.” In my opinion, an attempt to relate
the behavioural and psychological phenomena under discussion at
a neural level requires a clear definition of empathy in behavioural
terms, a proposed explanation in terms of (psychological) hypo-
thetical constructs, and demonstration of parallel neural mecha-
nisms. This may sound like regression to the bad old days of learn-
ing theories characterised by disciplined system-building, but
there is much to be said for definitional precision. If we construe
empathy “broadly,” take a “broad view of the perception-action
model,” and use a “flexible definition” of perception, we could ex-
plain almost anything.
As another instance of lack of definitional clarity, empathy is
said always to involve “some level of personal distress” (sect.
1.1.3), but a few paragraphs later the authors state that it can in-
volve matching “joy to joy.”
None of this implies that the behavioural phenomena are in-
significant. Babies do distort their faces to match the caregiver’s
expression, and anyone who has hand-reared nestling birds knows
how impossible it is not to open one’s own mouth when encour-
aging them to gape – an observation that incidentally is not in
keeping with the postulated role of similarity or relatedness be-
tween subject and object. The PAM does indeed seem to offer a
plausible explanation of many such observations. But this project
requires careful and accurate description. If a monkey, as the re-
sult of experience, ceases to give a response that causes another
monkey to emit signs of distress, is its act performed “to terminate
the object’s distress” or to terminate its own? The data show only
that ending the subject’s distress was a consequence of the change
in the object’s behaviour, not that it was a goal.
The reservation that the PAM generates associated responses in
the subject “unless inhibited” allows P&deW to include phenom-
ena where empathy seems not to occur. But precise explanation
of why it sometimes does and sometimes does not is lacking. A rat
may or may not act in a way that relieves the distress of a conspe-
cific. Humans do not always help others in distress, but to say that
in the latter case their behaviour is inhibited is hardly an explana-
tion.
The authors’ aim is to illustrate the range of phenomena that
could be explained by the PAM. This enables them to include
many cases that do not require it – such as the elicitation of es-
cape by a conspecific’s alarm call. We are a long way from being
able to show that the PAM explanation is needed. Particularly du-
bious is the inclusion of the experience of guilt. Guilt does not
need a subject and is surely better described in terms of a dis-
crepancy between an internalised moral code and perception of
one’s own actual or intended action. Many of the neuroscience
data and the characteristics of autism cited by the authors fit with
PAM but do not require it.
To integrate diverse phenomena in terms of a common process
is an important enterprise, but precision of definition is inevitably
inversely related to the range of phenomena that are explained,
and a clear distinction is required between those that require such
a process and those where it might operate.
How automatic and representational is
empathy, and why
Martin L. Hoffman
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003.
Hoff@psych.nyu.edu
Abstract: The claim that empathy is both automatic and representational
is criticized as follows: (a) five empathy-arousing processes ranging from
conditioning and mimicry to prospective-taking show that empathy can be
either automatic or representational, and only under certain circum-
stances, both; (b) although automaticity decreases, empathy increases with
age and cognitive development; (c) observers’ causal attributions can shift
rapidly and produce more complex empathic responses than the theory al-
lows.
Preston & de Waal’s (P&deW’s) empathy theory is: The percep-
tion of an object’s state automatically activates the subject’s corre-
sponding representations, which in turn automatically activate the
associated autonomic and somatic responses, unless inhibited.
Their paper covers a lot of ground, relating the theory to human
evolution and reproductive success, mother-infant responses in
animals and humans, and the effect of past experience, learning,
cue salience, and familiarity/similarity on empathy. They claim the
theory is uniquely process-focused, but do not explain the under-
lying processes except for a foray into neural substrates.
The idea that empathy is automatic and representational is not
new. It has been said before, and five processes underlying em-
pathy’s automatic and representational dimensions have been ad-
vanced; some of them explain empathy’s nonautomatic and non-
representational dimensions as well (Hoffman 1978a; 2000).
Three processes are preverbal and involuntary: (1) mimicry,
where one automatically imitates another’s facial, vocal, or pos-
tural expressions of feeling, and the resulting changes in one’s fa-
cial or bodily musculature trigger afferent feedback that produces
feelings resembling the other’s; (2) classical conditioning, where
empathic distress becomes a conditioned response to others’ dis-
tress by observing others’ distress while experiencing actual dis-
tress; (3) direct association of cues from others or their situation
with a similar past experience, which evokes the distress of that ex-
perience. Being preverbal, these processes enable infants and tod-
dlers to empathize. They also give empathy an automatic dimen-
sion through life (this is good for P&deW’s model), but they can
arouse empathy without representation (bad for the model).
Two higher order cognitive processes do the opposite; they are
representational but subject to voluntary control, hence not nec-
essarily automatic (very bad for the model); (4) mediated associa-
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tion, where language communicates the victim’s distress, and
through semantic interpretation we connect his situation to our
own painful past experience; (5) perspective-taking, where we feel
the victim’s distress by imagining how we would feel if the stimuli
impinging on him were impinging on us (self-focused) and/or
imagining how the victim feels based on what we know about him
(other-focused). Perspective-taking can be voluntary; it can also
be activated automatically by the automatic preverbal processes
but then one can decide whether to continue or terminate it. Per-
spective-taking can also initiate a preverbal process (one hears
about a familiar victim’s misfortune and imagines his facial ex-
pression, which triggers empathy).
Multiple processes are important because they assure an em-
pathic response regardless of age and available cues: facial, vocal,
or postural cues can be picked up by observers of any age through
mimicry; situational cues, through conditioning or association;
feelings expressed verbally or in writing can arouse empathy
through mediated association or perspective-taking. Automatic
preverbal processes can activate, or be activated by higher-order
cognitive processes. Empathy is thus a multi-determined, largely
though not entirely automatic and representational, highly reli-
able human response, which fits the argument that it survived nat-
ural selection and has a hereditary component (Hoffman 1981;
Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992b).
P&deW claim that empathy’s automaticity is high at birth and
decreases with age and experience due to increased prefrontal
functioning, segregation of self and other representations, and
learned display rules – all of which inhibit the automatic response.
This suggests empathy itself decreases with age and cognitive de-
velopment. Not so. Prefrontal development and self-other differ-
entiation allow the higher cognitive empathy-arousing processes
to kick in, enabling children to empathize with an increasing vari-
ety of emotional states and with unseen others (in newspapers,
television). By 8–10 years they empathize with another’s life con-
dition, which can override empathy based on immediate sit-
uational and personal cues: seeing a child happily playing, one au-
tomatically feels empathic joy, but remembering the child is
terminally ill changes to empathic sadness or sadness mixed with
joy (Hoffman 2000; Szporn 2001).
Another problem for P&deW’s theory is that people sponta-
neously attribute causes to events (Weiner 1985) and causal attri-
butions shape one’s empathic response to another’s state (Hoff-
man 2000). Furthermore, many events witnessed in life produce
a rapid shifting of causal attributions from moment to moment.
This creates a complex empathic response – a series of intercon-
nected sequences of attributions and rising and falling levels of
empathic distress (Hoffman 1978a; 2000). Here is an example. A
young man who didn’t witness the accident saw the driver of an
expensive sports car being wheeled away in a stretcher. He re-
ported an instant feeling of horror:
but I first thought it was probably a rich, smart-aleck kid driving while
drunk or on dope and I did not feel for him [blaming the victim possi-
bly to reduce the pain of empathic horror]. I then thought, this might
be unfair, maybe he was rushing because of some emergency, suppose
he was taking someone to the hospital, and then I felt for him. But then
I thought, that was no excuse, he should have been more careful even
if it was an emergency, and my feeling for him decreased. Then I real-
ized the guy might be dying and I really felt bad for him again.
This person’s empathic response to the accident victim wasn’t just
the initial automatic horror or the final empathic distress, but the
entire series of interconnected attribution-empathy sequences.
How would P&deW’s model handle this?
P&deW do tackle an important problem bearing on their view
that empathy is both automatic and representational. They report
that observing someone grasping an object, and imagining grasping
it have similar reaction times, and they seem to conclude the same
thing for perception-based and imagination-based empathy. But
grasping has little to do with empathy. We need a study of imagina-
tion-based and perception-based empathy reaction times. If imag-
ination-based took longer, which I predict, it could be the inevitable
result of cognitive appraisal taking longer than direct perception. Or
we might predict, as P&deW might, the reaction times would be
equal if measured from the moment cognitive appraisal is com-
pleted and the other’s state comprehended. Either way, this line of
research would raise our level of understanding of empathy.
Mirror neurons, the insula, and empathy
Marco Iacobonia and Gian Luigi Lenzib
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Abstract: Neurophysiological studies in monkeys and neuroimaging stud-
ies in humans support a model of empathy according to which there exists
a shared code between perception and production of emotion. The neural
circuitry critical to this mechanism is composed of frontal and parietal ar-
eas matching the observation and execution of action, and interacting
heavily with the superior temporal cortex. Further, this cortical system is
linked to the limbic system by means of an anterior sector of the human
insular lobe.
Preston & de Waal (P&deW) suggest that a simple mechanism for
empathy is provided by the Perception-Action Model (PAM), ac-
cording to which there exists a shared code between perception
and action. Recently, neurons with neurophysiologic properties
compatible with this mechanism have been described in the mon-
key inferior frontal cortex (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992). These neu-
rons, called “mirror” neurons, fire not only when the monkey ex-
ecutes an action but also when the monkey observes another
monkey, or a human, performing the same action (Gallese et al.
1996). Neurons with similar properties have also been found in
the posterior parietal cortex of the monkey (Rizzolatti et al. 2001).
Further, higher order visual neurons coding complex actions have
been described in the superior temporal sulcus of the monkey
brain (Perrett & Emery 1994). In a series of fMRI studies on hu-
man imitation, our group has reported a similar cortical circuitry
in the human brain (Iacoboni et al. 1999; 2001). What we call the
“minimal circuitry” for imitation and action understanding would
be composed as follows:
1. The superior temporal cortex provides an early visual de-
scription of the action to be imitated to specific parietal areas with
neurons that have the unique function of matching observation
and execution of action.
2. Parietal neurons with observation/execution matching prop-
erties add additional somatosensory information to the movement
to be imitated.
3. This more complex information is sent to the inferior frontal
cortex, which in turn codes the goal of the action to be imitated.
4. Sensory copies of the imitated actions are then sent back to
the superior temporal cortex for monitoring purposes (“my actions
are like the actions I have seen”).
If we want to apply these same neural and functional mecha-
nisms to the domain of emotion and empathy, then a problem
arises. The areas so far identified with mirror properties, in fact,
belong to a fronto-parietal circuit that is generally not associated
with emotions, but rather with “cold” sensorimotor paradigms.
However, actions have an emotional correlate, and observers of an
action participate empathically with the performer. Hence, the
question of interest here is as follows: How does the limbic system
get information from the fronto-parietal mirror system when em-
pathy takes place? If one looks at available anatomical connectiv-
ity data, a region of the primate insula – precisely, the dysgranu-
lar field – connects limbic areas with the inferior frontal, anterior
part of the posterior parietal and superior temporal cortex. Thus,
the dysgranular field of the insula has all the requisites for being
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the relay station between the “minimal circuitry” matching obser-
vation and execution of action with a system more directly rele-
vant to emotional processing.
We recently performed an fMRI study to test this hypothesis
(Iacoboni, in press). We asked subjects to either simply observe or
to observe-and-imitate emotional facial expressions. Our predic-
tion was that during imitation of facial expression the insula would
be activated on account of its hypothesized relay function from the
frontoparietal mirror system to the limbic system. As control con-
ditions, we asked our subjects to either simply observe or to ob-
serve-and-imitate only the eyes or only the mouth extracted from
the same faces expressing emotions that were used in the previ-
ous conditions. We did so because the single-unit data in the
macaque brain suggest that in frontoparietal mirror areas there
are representations of hand and mouth movements, but not of eye
movements. We hypothesized that the imitation of eye move-
ments with emotional valence may not invoke the activation of the
frontoparietal mirror system and, consequently, not require the
activation of the insula as relay station to the limbic system. This
is because, in the monkey, the inferior frontal cortex where mir-
ror neurons are found does not contain a cortical representation
for eye movements. The results we obtained clearly demonstrated
the activation of the insula during all imitation tasks. We interpret
this as in favor of our hypothesis about the insula having a key role
in affect generation and serving as a relay between frontal cortices
and limbic structures, thus representing a possible pathway for
empathic resonance. It is possible that in humans eye movements
have an emotional-empathic correlation stronger than in mon-
keys, but in our opinion, the activation of the insula even during
emotional eye movement imitation was probably due to the fact
that imitating a facial expression is a holistic act that can hardly be
decomposed. In fact, in all three imitation tasks, substantially
identical maps of activation were obtained. And when we com-
pared the activation obtained in each imitation task with that in
the other imitation task, no reliable differences were observed.
Moreover, when imitation and observation tasks were compared,
a complete spatial overlap of activation between imitation and ob-
servation of facial emotional expression was found. This overlap
supports the main claim of the Perception-Action Model and sug-
gests that the functional mechanism that this model advocates could
be applied to the realm of emotion and may be at the basis of em-
pathy, as P&deW suggest. The only difference in BOLD signal that
we observed between imitation and observation of facial expression
was in magnitude of response, with greater activity during motor ex-
ecution than during observation, a feature found also in mirror neu-
rons. Interestingly, even the amygdala was more active during imi-
tation than during observation of facial expressions.
All in all, we understand the emotion of others, and empathize
with them, by invoking the very same neural activity associated
with our own emotions. A functional or an anatomical lesion in the
circuitry we have described here may impair our capabilities for
empathy.
Elucidation of the brain correlates of
cognitive empathy and self-awareness
Julian Paul Keenana and Mark A. Wheelerb
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Abstract: Self-awareness is thought to be tied to processes of higher-order
perspective taking including empathy. These abilities appear to be re-
served for humans, great apes, and possibly, dolphins. Recent examina-
tions reveal that both self-awareness and empathy may have origins in the
right hemisphere. It is possible that, as in language, lateralization plays a
key role in the development of higher-order perspective taking and self-
awareness.
Cognitive empathy shares a strong family resemblance with other
neurocognitive abilities that can be broadly subsumed under the
umbrella of “self-awareness.” It is likely that lateralization plays a
prominent role in the development of many of the most sophisti-
cated neurocognitive abilities. While language processes are typi-
cally mediated by left-hemisphere structures, other available evi-
dence is consistent with the idea that self-awareness, perspective
taking, and, perhaps, cognitive empathy, are largely dependent
upon the right hemisphere.
When contemplating what regions of the brain are responsible
for any given cognitive ability, it has previously been suggested that
the brain be viewed as a mobile (Keenan 2001). While it is tempt-
ing to ascribe a particular module of the brain as being responsible
for a given behavior, one must realize that even subtle functional
changes in one region may affect distal regions. Thus, like a mo-
bile, even minor changes in one region may alter the entire balance
of the brain, or individual regions that are not directly connected.
It can be instructive to consider the neural correlates of cogni-
tive empathy in conjunction with similar, related functions. Cog-
nitive empathy, a complex phenomena, must be viewed with such
considerations. The ability to represent another’s thoughts (e.g.,
Theory of Mind; see Premack & Woodruff 1978) and represent-
ing one’s own thoughts may be intimately tied together and may
thus have similar origins within the brain. Tracing a more detailed
analysis of both self-awareness and empathy reveals that right
hemisphere function may be a further distinction between cogni-
tive empathy and more basic elements of a motor action planning
model. However, as with the mobile, regions not specifically im-
plicated in cognitive empathy or self-awareness are likely to have
a great bearing on the function.
As indicated, the capacity for self-face recognition appears to be
reserved for only a few primates and possibly dolphins. Patients
with disruptions of self-recognition appear to have either lesions
within the right hemisphere (Feinberg & Shapiro 1989; Spangen-
berg et al. 1998) or right hemisphere dysfunction (Breen et al.
2001). Inactivation of the right and not the left hemisphere ap-
pears to disrupt both self-face recognition (Keenan et al. 2001b)
and awareness of one’s own limbs (i.e., asomatognosia; Meador et
al. 2000; for a review on asomatognosia and the right hemisphere,
see Feinberg 2000). Functional imaging of the self-face indicates
the involvement of primarily right prefrontal regions (Keenan et
al. 2001a), in particular when the own-face is being actively rather
than passively viewed (Sugiura et al. 2000). Kircher et al. (2001)
found right anterior cingulate, right temporal regions and left pre-
frontal activity in a version of a self-face task.
Autonoetic awareness (see Wheeler et al. 1997) of the past com-
prises episodic memory, and damage to the right prefrontal and
temporal polar regions may induce disruptions in episodic recol-
lection (Markowitsch et al. 1993), while circumscribed left-hemi-
sphere damage may leave autobiographical processing intact
(Markowitsch et al. 1999). Employing PET, it has been found that
personal autobiographical memories activate a widespread region
of the right hemisphere as compared to little right hemisphere ac-
tivity for nonpersonal retrieval (Fink et al. 1996). Further, the
evaluation of self may also employ right prefrontal regions as well
(Craik et al. 1999). Self-related tasks have also been tied to medial
prefrontal regions, as determined by fMRI (Gusnard et al. 2001).
In terms of Theory of Mind, it has been found that right hemi-
sphere damaged patients are significantly more impaired than left
hemisphere damaged patients (Happe et al. 1999; Stuss et al.
2001), and anterior left hemisphere damage alone does not lead
to Theory of Mind deficits compared to anterior bilateral damage
(Stone et al. 1998). Interestingly, Stuss et al. (2001) found that in-
ferring deception, another indicator of higher-order perspective
taking, was impaired in right hemisphere patients. Imaging data
has been much less clear. Whereas some studies have found a right
prefrontal activation in terms of related Theory of Mind tasks
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1994), others have not (Fletcher et al. 1995;
Goel et al. 1995). These studies have, in part, also indicated the
possible importance of the cingulate gyrus.
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Vogeley and colleagues (see Vogeley et al. 2001) recently ad-
dressed the possibility that there may be both common and
unique elements involved in both the perspective taking of self
and of other by use of fMRI. Employing tasks that used perspec-
tive taking and stories, it was found that during Theory of Mind,
the anterior cingulate gyrus was involved, while during the self
task, in addition, right temporal-parietal regions were activated.
Further, the interaction of both the conditions (i.e., the regions
that significantly activate in the presence of Theory of Mind and
self) revealed significant right lateral prefrontal activation.
Greater hemispheric lateralization has been found in animals
that are considered capable of performing tasks related to cogni-
tive empathy and self-awareness (Yeni-Komshian & Benson 1976).
For example, regions of the brain implicated in language (e.g.,
planum temporal) are found to have a high degree of lateralization
in humans (Galaburda et al. 1978) and the great apes (Gannon et
al. 1998; Hopkins et al. 1998). As in language, it is possible that lat-
eralization of other brain structures may be involved in cognitive
empathy, Theory of Mind, self-awareness, and similar abilities.
With findings that indicate that humans and the great apes are also
similar in functional asymmetries (e.g., Hopkins 1997)), right
hemisphere involvement in self and other perspective-taking may
be an indicator of the brain origins of these abilities.
Similarity versus familiarity: When empathy
becomes selfish
Elias L. Khalil
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Abstract: Preston & de Waal conflate familiarity with similarity in their
attempt to account for empathy. If distinguished, we may have at hand two
different kinds of empathy: egocentric empathy and empathy proper.
Preston & de Waal (P&deW) observe that similarity facilitates em-
pathy. Then, without argument, they treat similarity as analytically
indistinguishable from familiarity. Obviously, ceteris paribus, fa-
miliarity matters. As Adam Smith (1976, pp. 136–37) notes, a Eu-
ropean man would, justifiably, be more disturbed over losing his
finger than over earthquake victims in China. Smith criticizes the
moralists and argues that human sentiments are based on famil-
iarity. Familiarity is the vehicle that allows the subject to perceive
the object. Familiarity permits the subject to transport himself
from his own station to the object’s station.
Concerning similarity, why, ceteris paribus, should conspecifics
empathize with each other more than with dissimilar actors? Why
should a male subject empathize more with male than female ob-
jects? Or, why should a human subject empathize more with an
object that shares the same culture than with a foreign object, or
with a monkey than a dog? P&deW note that juveniles prefer to
play with others of similar age and gender. However, if boys pre-
fer to play, for example, basketball with other boys, does it mean
they are more empathetic towards boys than girls? Actors, it
seems to me, seek similar play partners to maximize the fun. Sim-
ilarity does not enhance empathy if, to start with, play is not em-
pathy.
While familiarity allows the subject to have a richer represen-
tation of the object, how does similarity work? Maybe similarity
acts like a common language, allowing the subject to understand
particular signals. If so, once a man learns the “language” of dogs,
for example, the man should empathize with a dog’s pain with the
same intensity as he would empathize with the pain of a conspe-
cific. Once a man is educated about how females signal pain, such
as in labor, the similarity issue should not matter.
Nonetheless, P&deW marshal evidence that shows that simi-
larity matters. But this does not necessarily entail that similarity
and familiarity are analytically indistinguishable. There is an al-
ternative: The empathy prompted by familiarity may differ from
the one prompted by similarity. Smith (1976) suggested this al-
ternative over two centuries ago (see Khalil 1990; 2001; 2002). He
chided the exemplar of the egocentric explanation of empathy of
his time, Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes regarded empathy as merely
vicarious pleasure. He maintained that altruism is aimed at en-
hancing the donor’s pleasure by imagining the conditions of the
recipient as happening to the donor’s own station. As told by John
Aubrey:
One time, I remember, goeing in the Strand, a poor and infirme old man
craved his [Hobbes’] almes. He, beholding him with eies of pitty and
compassion, putt his hand in his pocket, and gave him 6d. Sayd a divine
(scil. Dr. Jaspar Mayne) that stood by – “Would you have donne this, if
it had not been Christ’s command?” – “Yea,” sayd he. – “Why?” quoth
the other. – “Because,” sayd he, “I was in paine to consider the miser-
able condition of the old man; and now my almes, giving him some re-
liefe, doth also ease me” (Aubrey 1898, p. 352)
Modern economic theorists basically follow Hobbes. Gary Becker
(1981), for example, argues that benefactors donate for the reason
that, by imagining how recipients are enjoying the goods, they can
increase their own utility.
In response to the egocentric view of empathy, Smith stressed
that altruism promoted by empathy, which he called sympathy, in-
volves putting one’s self in the other’s station rather than judging
the other’s pleasure from one’s own station. Sympathy would be a
“selfish sympathy” if it entails imagining the other’s conditions as
happening to one’s station, that is, one’s “own person and charac-
ter”:
Sympathy . . . cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle.
When I sympathize with your sorrow or your indignation, it may be pre-
tended, indeed, that my emotion is founded in self-love, because it
arises from bringing your case home to myself, from putting myself in
your situation, and hence conceiving what I should feel in the like cir-
cumstances. But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from
imaginary change of situations with the person principally concerned,
yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own
person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize.
When I condole with you for the loss of your son, in order to enter into
your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such character and pro-
fession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son was unfortunately
to die: but I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not
only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and charac-
ters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the
least upon my own. It is not, therefore, in the least selfish. How can that
be regarded as a selfish passion, which does not arise even from the
imagination of any thing that has befallen, or that relates to myself, in
my own proper person and character, but which is entirely occupied
about what relates to you? A man may sympathize with a woman in
child-bed; though it is impossible that he should conceive himself as suf-
fering her pains in his own proper person and character. (Smith 1976,
p. 317)
For Smith, it cannot be similarity, but rather familiarity, that
prompts men to empathize with women in labor. P&deW come
close to distinguishing familiarity and similarity when they note
that empathy differs from projection: Empathy involves the map-
ping from object to subject, projection vice versa. In light of the
above, projection is crude egocentric empathy: the object is not
even experiencing any pain that reminds the subject of his misery.
In projection, the subject uses similarity, the only thing available,
in order for the subject to “empathize” with himself. It is difficult
to operationalize the proposed difference between egocentric em-
pathy and empathy. But this is not different from the difficulty of
operationalizing the distinction between projection and empathy.
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Empathy requires the development of the self
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Abstract: Two major problems exist in studying development: Similar be-
haviors do not need to reflect the same underlying process, different be-
haviors can reflect the same process; earlier behaviors do not necessarily
lead to later behaviors. Empathy, rather than social contagion, is supported
by different processes; contagion supported by prewired species behavior,
empathy by cognitions, in particular, the cognitions about the self – a
meta-representation.
Newborn infants exhibit behaviors that appear empathic. These
behaviors are predicated on social contagion rather than on cog-
nitions, in particular, the cognitions that make inferences about
the other by utilizing the knowledge of the self. This develop-
mental sequence, going from social reflexes, such as contagion, to
cognitions, such as self-representation, constitutes an important
shift in the human child’s development.
In this target article, the authors give only passing attention to
the issue of self-development. Yet, in development we have evi-
dence for two processes: one, an immediate prewired and species-
specific process requiring little learning; the other, a delayed
process requiring experience and higher mental functions (Lewis
1999) that impact on behavior. LeDoux (1989), for one, has shown
a direct emotional response mediated by the amygdala, hardwired
and having an evolutionary history, which allows for action with-
out thought. The indirect system, which goes through the cortex,
allows for learning, or unlearning, of responses and is very much
influenced by experience and culture (see also, Gilbert 1991). For
example, it has been claimed, although the phenomena are cer-
tainly not robust, that newborn infants imitate; also that infants
show empathy – if we accept empathic distress responses as em-
pathy – in response to another’s distress. A newborn’s responses
are not supported by the same process that supports behaviors for
similar responses in adults. When I imitate someone’s behavior I
do so intentionally and with planning. Likewise, my empathic dis-
tress upon seeing starving children is caused by my ability to imag-
ine what I would feel if I were like them or in their position.
In these examples, the role of the self in adult human behavior
is obvious, while no self need be postulated for the newborn. A
central milestone in human development takes place somewhere
between 15- and 18-months when toddlers show three behaviors
indicative of the emergence of consciousness and the meta-rep-
resentation of the self. This emergence allows for cognitions such
as, the child “knows it knows.” Only later, somewhere toward the
third year, does this meta-representation lead to knowledge that
they “know something that another does not know”; the classical
theory of mind paradigm. The emergence of self also allows for
the self-conscious emotions. Simultaneously with the emergence
of self-representation there is embarrassment and also empathy –
to be discussed below; and within a short time, another year, the
emergence of the self-conscious, moral or social emotions, such as
shame, guilt, and pride. In social development, this meta-repre-
sentation gives rise to relationships. Although we see complex so-
cial interactive behavior in infancy, social relationships appear un-
likely to be possible without a self as part of that representation of
“we” (see Lewis 1992).
What behaviors support the idea of this meta-representation?
My colleagues and I have been able to demonstrate that infants
come to recognize themselves in mirrors, using the nose-directed
technique (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn 1979). Another example is chil-
dren’s use of personal pronouns, “me” and “mine,” in conjunction
with moving objects toward themselves in time-space and pretend
play. The rise of the self meta-representation is connected with a
variety of cognitive and social emotional behavior (Lewis 1992;
Lewis & Michalson 1983). Notable in this discussion is 
the work of Bischof-Kohler (e.g., Bischof-Kohler 1988). What
Bischof-Kohler demonstrated was that the distress expressions
and motor actions designed to alleviate the stress of another ap-
pear coordinated only after the emergence of mirror-recognition.
The emergence of a self-representation is vital for the emergence
of an empathic response. After all, how can it be that I have an em-
pathic response without there being a cognitive representation of
myself? As Preston & de Waal (P&deW) have pointed out, there
are certainly elaborate, empathic-like responses seen earlier; how-
ever, the actual adult human form of the behavior is unlikely to
emerge until the emergence of a self-representation. From a de-
velopmental point of view, we are often confronted with the co-
nundrum of the same behavior or similar behaviors being sup-
ported by very different processes, and we should be very careful
to make sure that we do not commit the error whereby we con-
clude that just because behaviors appear similar in similar situa-
tions, they are supported by the same underlying process. In-
deed, one of the difficulties in the study of development is that
the same process may result in very different behaviors during
the developmental sequence, while, on the other hand, the same
behavior at different points in time may be supported by very dif-
ferent processes. I think it is safe to conclude that any theory of
the development of empathy needs to incorporate the emer-
gence of a self-representation. The distress of the newborn to the
cries of other newborns, and the generous charitable donations
given by U.S. citizens to others distressed by the World Trade dis-
aster, to take two examples, should not be considered as having
similar underlying processes; nor does one necessarily lead to the
other.
This last point is especially important since a second develop-
mental error has to do with the proposition that something which
occurs before something else is, in fact, the cause of it. The analy-
sis presented in support of this, although scholarly and knowl-
edgeable, needs to be tempered by our understanding that there
are behaviors that are served by potentially very different
processes and that behaviors which occur earlier do not necessar-
ily lead to, nor are related to, behaviors which occur later in on-
togeny. The emergence of self-cognitions deserves more atten-
tion.
The Perception-Action Model of empathy and
psychopathic “cold-heartedness”
Linda Mealeya,b and Stuart Kinnerb
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Abstract: The Perception-Action Model of empathy (PAM) is both suf-
ficiently broad and sufficiently detailed to be able to describe and ac-
commodate a wide range of phenomena – including the apparent “cold-
heartedness” or lack of empathy of psychopaths. We show how the
physiological, cognitive, and emotional elements of the PAM map onto
known and hypothesized attributes of the psychopathic personality.
According to Preston & de Waal (P&deW), empathy is based on
simulation or mimicry of another’s “embodied representation”
(see Humphrey 1992; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Their Figure 1 dis-
tinguishes between identification, emotional contagion, and
“true” empathy, by emphasizing that physical “identification” is a
prerequisite for psychological identification. If true, then similar-
ity of body is a key factor in the extent to which two parties can
empathize with one another. Thus, a failure to empathize (or to
regenerate another’s “embodied representation”) altogether, may
be not unlike the inability of a person to fully empathize with an-
other kind of animal, the inability of a person of one sex to fully
empathize with a person of the opposite sex, the inability of a
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younger person to fully empathize with an older person, or in fact,
the inability of anyone (subject) to fully empathize with anyone
else (object) who has experienced an event that the subject has
never experienced (e.g., disease, rape, loss of a loved one, being
caught in a fire, etc.). Reinforcing this point, paragraph 9 of sec-
tion 4.1.1 of the target article states that: “The more similar or fa-
miliar the subject and object, the more their representations will
be similar, which in turn produces more state-matching, better ac-
curacy, and less ‘projection’.” Conversely, the more dissimilar or
unfamiliar the subject and object, the less complete and/or accu-
rate the subject’s representation of the object’s state will be.
According to P&deW, the PAM “specifically states that attended
perception of the object’s state automatically activates the subject’s
representations of the state, situation, and object, and that activa-
tion of these representations automatically primes or generates the
associated autonomic and somatic responses, unless inhibited”
(sect. 1.1.3, para 3, emphasis in original). We would add “or un-
less the subject does not have any such representations, or the sub-
ject does not normally generate autonomic or somatic responses to
such representations.” This, we would claim, is the case for psy-
chopaths, who do not exhibit typical autonomic or somatic re-
sponses to situations and stimuli which elicit such responses in
“normals” (e.g., Hare 1998; Lykken 1957; Newman 1998; New-
man & Wallace 1993; Patrick 1994; Patrick et al. 1994).
Personal, phenomenological experience of emotion is crucial to
the development of empathy. P&deW acknowledge this in the
second para. of sect. 3.1 of the target article, where they refer to
the comments of Brothers (1990) that “understanding the emo-
tion of others entails to some degree experiencing the emotion ob-
served,” and Gallup (1998b) that “information about the self is
used to model the states of others.” Following from these obser-
vations, in the single paragraph of the target article that discusses
psychopaths (para. 3 of sect. 3.4.5), they claim that “without the
ability to be aroused by the distress of others, [psychopaths] can-
not understand and learn about the state of others through their
own substrates.” We fully agree. The psychopath’s low sensitivity,
particularly to aversive stimuli, manifests in a state of relative emo-
tional poverty: psychopaths, therefore, cannot experience “true
empathy” with others, because they do not produce the same bod-
ily representations as others.
If “true” empathy is the embodied representation of another’s
perspective, we should consider that the psychopath’s deficit is not
in “perspective taking” per se, but in the ability to embody or rep-
resent certain feelings at all. That is, we suggest that psychopaths
do not have a “deficit” of their mind-reading mechanism (Blair et
al. 1995; 1996), but rather, have a “deficit” in their own personal
experience (phenomenology) of certain emotions (Mealey & Kin-
ner, in press). The “representations” and “simulations” therefore,
that feed into the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (ToMM) of a psy-
chopath, are limited: the psychopath simply cannot project onto
others what he cannot experience himself (Mealey 1997). Take,
for example, the following quote from a psychopathic rapist, com-
menting on his victims: “They are frightened, right? But, you see,
I don’t really understand it. I’ve been frightened myself, and it
wasn’t unpleasant” (Hare 1993, p. 44).
Nevertheless, as P&deW note, “individuals with . . . psychopa-
thy may use . . . alternative strategies to compensate for an im-
pairment in empathy” (para. 1 of sect. 4.1.3). More specifically, we
would argue that although psychopaths cannot “feel what another
feels” (idiographically), their “alternative strategy” is that they can
learn how to “read minds” nomothetically (Mealey 1992). In other
words, since the psychopath cannot “simulate” emotions he can-
not experience, he must rely almost exclusively on cognitive inputs
to his ToMM.
Use of this alternative strategy would explain the curious abil-
ity of the adult psychopath to accurately “push all the right but-
tons” despite the inability to “get into another’s skin.” Further, it
would explain the difficulty of socializing a psychopathic child and
the consequent increased probability of antisocial behavior –
which, note, is not a necessary outcome of lack of empathy (Kin-
ner 2002). As P&deW claim (final para. of sect. 2.2.1 of the target
article) “if an infant is aroused by the display of emotion in the par-
ent (especially fear or distress), then the infant can use the
mother’s reaction as an unconditioned stimulus to learn about
danger.” Yet an infant with a psychopath’s “different” nervous sys-
tem will not be aroused by a parent’s (or anyone else’s) displays of
emotion, and will thus fail to learn from aversive experience and
remain relatively unsocialized (Eysenck 1983; Hoffman 1978a;
1982; Kochanska 1991; 1993; Lykken 1995; Magid & McKelvie
1987; Mealey 1995). With their “diminished ability to experience
anxiety and to form conditioned associations between antisocial
behavior and the consequent punishment, [they] will be unable to
progress through the normal stages of moral development” (Mea-
ley 1995).
We agree with P&deW that “simulation theory” and “theory
theory” are not incompatible, and suggest that psychopaths tend
to employ the latter strategy – as exemplified in the “paint-by-
numbers” approach of one psychopathic offender who “read self-
help psychology books to learn the appropriate emotional re-
sponses to everyday events” (Hare 1993, p. 54). We further believe
that it is the failure of the psychopath’s emotional simulations, and
consequent forced reliance on theory, which allows the intelligent
psychopath to be functionally and successfully Machiavellian
while demonstrating a marked lack of empathy and apparent
“cold-heartedness.”
Empathy and the action-perception
resonances of basic socio-emotional
systems of the brain
Jaak Panksepp, Nakia Gordon, and Jeff Burgdorf
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Abstract: Mammalian brains contain a variety of self-centered socio-emo-
tional systems. An understanding of how they interact with more recent
cognitive structures may be essential for understanding empathy. Preston
& de Waal have neglected this vast territory of proximal brain issues in
their analysis.
Preston & de Waal (P&deW) provide a compelling analysis of
empathy. Progress on such important emotional/cognitive topics
requires us to “dock” effectively between intrinsically fuzzy psy-
chological concepts (best operationalized behaviorally) and emerg-
ing neuroscientific knowledge. Here we will bring related issues
of positive emotional resonance into focus, and supplement
P&deW’s impressive effort with several critical concerns, the fore-
most being the need for a neurobiological understanding of social
attachments in order to understand how empathy is created in the
brain-mind.
In addition to the perception-action schema emphasized by the
authors, equal weight should be given to long neglected action-
perception approaches to understanding the mind. Self-initiated
actions markedly modulate sensory and perceptual fields (Held
& Hein 1963; Sparks 1988), and evolutionary emotional-action
systems of the brain may be especially important in the genera-
tion of empathic perceptual tendencies. Along with the show-
cased “mirror neuron” work of Rizzolatti et al. (2001), motor-in-
tentionality modulates how perceptual world appreciation is
created in the brain (Iriki et al. 1996). The degree of perceptual
neglect following right parietal damage is modulated by how in-
dividuals respond to the neglect (with visually distal actions re-
ducing the neglect, and proximal ones restoring it: see Berti &
Frassinetti 2000).
Empathy may be critically linked, especially developmentally,
to genetically-ingrained instinctual emotional-motor systems, which
focus perceptual-attentional resources (MacDonell & Flynn 1966).
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Basic emotional-action systems may project feelings onto objects
in the world, creating mood-congruent experience-expectant cog-
nitions essential for empathetic responses.
Consideration of core emotional systems might have coaxed
P&deW to emphasize the relevance of various subcortical socio-
emotional systems (Panksepp 1998). Although they in passing
mention amygdaloid-based fear research, emotional systems de-
serving attention are the separation-distress (Panksepp et al. 1988)
and social attachment (Nelson & Panksepp 1998) circuitries of the
brain. All basic emotional systems are built around instinctual ac-
tion processes, which are not as unconscious as many investigators
assume. Such circuits generate “intentions in action” that may cre-
ate a primitive affective consciousness (Panksepp 2000a) essential
for empathy. Without such social response systems, which facili-
tate social attachments, we doubt if empathy could exist.
As noted, a time-honored hypotheses is that empathy reflects
some type of emotional contagion. Because we now know where
the separation-distress systems are situated in the brain, we can
inquire whether “the activation of distress circuits in young and
relatively helpless animals generate ‘resonant’ activity in the same
circuits of nearby adults who could provide care?” (Panksepp 1989/
1999, p. 56). Such straightforward views provide clear neuro-
analytic strategies for probing the nature of empathy, in ways com-
patible with human brain imaging (Lorberbaum et al. 1999).
The positive side of emotions also deserves more attention.
Surely the interanimal resonances of several positive emotions,
from sexual reward to maternal nurturance, sustain empathic ten-
dencies. Surely the basic play/joy systems of the mammalian
brain, engaged through vigorous “ticklish” touch, operate through
a reciprocating neural “dance” in similar brain regions of inter-
acting animals (Gordon et al. 2002). Such action-perception brain
dynamics may promote joint-attentional pragmatics that are dis-
turbed in autism spectrum disorders (Panksepp & Sahley 1987).
Ludic circuits can be detailed through the study of play vocal-
izations, and such tickle-induced play chirps in rats may have evo-
lutionary relations to the infectious, joyous laughter that charac-
terizes the youthful play of our own species (Panksepp & Burgdorf
2000). One endearing finding is that young rats seek the company
of adult males who “chirp/laugh” much more than those that do
not (Fig. 1). Might the capacity for empathy be preconditioned by
such basic early social interactions and bondings? Tickling-
induced, chirping-laughter is highly heritable in rats, and we an-
ticipate that genetic profiling of such basic neuro-emotional ten-
dencies with modern microarray and suppressive subtractive
hybridization technologies will reveal candidate genes that pro-
mote neuro-empathic responsivity.
Even as P&deW share a provocative vision of empathy, they
have neglected approaches that allow investigators to interrelate
basic psychological and proximal neurological processes that
could yield useful therapeutic interventions for the abundant em-
pathy deficit disorders of our species. Can we really understand
the concept of empathy without dwelling on the ancient recesses
of the animal brain-mind that are essential for creating basic so-
cial emotions such as separation distress and joy? Were such sys-
tems to suddenly disappear from human brains, the concept of
empathy may have little meaning for our species. Might neuro-
chemical modifications of these ancient socio-emotional circuits
modulate our cognitive capacities for empathy? We suspect such
ancestral sources of love, created during deep evolutionary time,
remain essential for creating feelings from which compassion
emerges via interactions with recently evolved cortico-cognitive
abilities. Subcortical emotional action-perception processes may
regulate the cortico-cognitive, perception-action schema upon
which P&deW rivet their attentions.
Understanding other’s emotions: From
affective resonance to empathic action
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Abstract: Empathy is a developmental process whereby individuals come
to understand the emotional states of others. While the exact nature of this
process remains unknown, PAM’s utility is that it establishes empathy
along a continuum of behavior ranging from emotional contagion to cog-
nitive forms, a very useful distinction for understanding the phylogeny and
ontogeny of this important process. The model will undoubtedly fuel fu-
ture research, especially from comparative domains where data are most
problematic.
. . . every “intuitive” percept and every “empathic” relationship is de-
pendent upon some nonverbal communication of affect. Although the
precise nature of this form of communication is still obscure, it un-
doubtedly plays a significant role in the social relations among men,
among animals, and between man and animals. (Miller et al. 1959b)
Preston & de Waal (P&deW) provide a comprehensive model to
explain the evolution of empathic behavior by adapting the Per-
ception as Action model (PAM), originally proposed by Prinz
(1997). PAM allows for proximate and ultimate level explanations,
an important feature since emotion, as a critical factor involved in
the central regulation of behavior, is garnering increased scientific
attention across multiple disciplines. The need for putative mod-
els and testable hypotheses that go beyond anecdotal descriptions
is long overdue.
The basic tenet, however, that perception leads to action, is
such a general feature of animal behavior, social or nonsocial, that
the model’s specificity is often lost in its scope. PAM, for example,
appears capable of explaining almost every aspect of emotional be-
havior, from mother-infant attachment to altruism, rather than
specifying how empathy differs from general emotional processes
or environmentally contingent behavior. But perhaps this criti-
cism is not so much a flaw of the model, as it is a prominent state-
ment about emotion itself. Emotional processes have such an ex-
tended impact on daily life that it is difficult to think of a situation
in which their involvement could not be invoked, making opera-
tional definitions elusive. This is undoubtedly one reason why re-
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Figure 1 (Panksepp et al.). Mean 6 SEM time spent by an ado-
lescent animal with either an adult animal that shows low versus
high levels of 50-kHz ultrasonic vocalizations in response to man-
ual tickling by an experimenter. Adolescent rats were given free
access to 3 chambers containing a low tickle adult, high tickle
adult, and middle empty chamber. The three chambers were con-
nected in series by two, 4 cm in diameter, tunnels which only per-
mitted the adolescents to shuttle between the chambers. Ado-
lescent rats spent more time with the high tickle adult rats as
compared with the low tickle animals (F(1, 12) 5 26.62, P ,
.0005).
searchers are only just beginning to speculate about the role of
emotion as a factor capable of influencing animal behavior, from
individuals, to groups, and even societies (Flack & de Waal 2000).
In this regard, PAM provides a serviceable and refreshing clas-
sification of empathic behavior, ranging from affective resonance
to cognitive empathy (see Table 2 of target article). This is criti-
cally important for comparative and developmental research, as
empathy emerges slowly in conjunction with the developing ner-
vous system and social competence (Hoffman 1978b). Previous
studies on primates, for example, have relied on cognitive defini-
tions of empathy, such as mental perspective taking, providing lit-
tle insight into the relationship between empathy and emotion, or
how empathy may fit into an evolutionary scheme (Povinelli
1998). Without a basic and progressive model, comparative re-
search on emotion will remain on the fringe of contemporary dis-
ciplines.
How the PAM will be supported by empirical studies in non-
humans remains to be demonstrated. The reviewed studies fail to
provide convincing support for even the most basic levels of em-
pathy, like physiological linkage. This is particularly true of condi-
tioning studies in which a distressed conspecific serves as the con-
ditioned stimulus (CS) for the subject’s own distress/shock (Miller
et al. 1963; Watanabe & Ono 1986). The authors cite Miller and
colleagues’ cooperative avoidance paradigm as providing evidence
of physiological linkage between monkeys, but these results are
questionably interpreted (Miller et al. 1967; readers are referred
to the target article for a description of this intriguing paradigm).
In the study, similar changes in cardiac response were observed in
two animals. Both animals, however, were wired to receive shock.
Thus, their cardiac responses would not be expected to differ, but
rather show similar changes based on similarly perceived personal
threat, that is, a CS that predicts shock. A more detailed examina-
tion of the data, however, shows that the cardiac responses were,
in fact, not identical. While both monkeys showed cardiac accel-
eration, the heart rate of the stimulus animals had significantly
greater acceleratory slopes. This is particularly interesting with re-
gard to psychophysiology, as the stimulus monkeys were helpless
to avoid the shock, perhaps contributing to greater anxiety during
the CS presentation. Additionally, the numerous anecdotes for
empathic responding within animal groups, such as tolerance of
handicapped, aged, or retarded individuals, do little to advance
the model since alternative explanations are not considered. The
literature is full of examples of brutality and intolerance within
species, and any anecdotes should be tempered as such (de Waal
1986b; Goodall 1986a; Wrangham & Peterson 1996).
It should be noted that most emotion theories, PAM included,
are biased towards predicting responses to negative events. Miller,
for example, trained monkeys to avoid shock (avoid) or obtain food
(reward) and then presented their facial responses to other mon-
keys to indicate avoidance or reward trials. Significantly reduced
responses and modest cardiac acceleration occurred in the reward
versus avoidance trials (Miller 1967). These findings, in addition
to recent neuroimaging data, suggests that the way in which in-
formation about positive events is communicated and represented
at the behavioral and neural level is much less clear than for neg-
ative events (Canli et al. 1998; Davidson 1992; Lane et al. 1997).
Interesting support for empathy in animals is covered only
briefly. In the pioneering work of Miller and colleagues, an extin-
guished avoidance response was not only reinstated when the CS
was changed to a conspecific’s fear expression, but spontaneously
more responses were maintained in the absence of the uncondi-
tioned stimulus (US) (Miller et al. 1959a). These data suggest that
the perception of facial expressions in primates may involve a ba-
sic understanding of their emotional significance, a finding re-
cently demonstrated in chimpanzees and one that has guided
much of the contemporary research on human emotion (Ekman
1972; Parr 2001). Studies are underway at the Yerkes Primate
Center to document physiological responses to the perception of
pleasure and distress in monkeys and apes. Preliminary results
suggest that changes in peripheral skin temperature differ de-
pending on the emotional valence of video scenes: temperature
increases in response to positive scenes, like play or greetings, and
decreases in response to negative scenes, like aggression and
threats (Parr, unpublished data). Understanding the extent to
which nonhuman animals resonate to the perceived emotion of
conspecifics may be the most fruitful starting point for compara-
tive studies of empathy.
In summary, although understanding emotion in others is a crit-
ical feature of social organization, researchers are still searching
for viable models to explain this basic process. One starting point
is to examine the extent to which different species are able to res-
onate to emotion perceived in others. This unconscious and non-
verbal process would not only provide comparable data across dif-
ferent species and developing age groups, but it stands as the most
causal link to empathic action.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to the staff at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center and
Philippe Rochat. Funding has been provided by RR-00165 from the NIH/
NCRR to YRPRC and NSF-IBN 9801464 to Lisa A. Parr.
Various kinds of empathy as revealed by the
developing child, not the monkey’s brain
Philippe Rochat
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Abstract: The comparative study of empathy should be based on the de-
velopmental taxonomy of vicarious experiences offered by the abundant
literature on infants and children’s cognitive, social, and emotional devel-
opment. Comparative research on the topic should refer to the various
kinds of empathy emerging in an orderly fashion early in human develop-
ment.
A major function of today’s brain research is to substantiate well-
known psychological phenomena by giving them, literally, mo-
lecular flesh. For better or for worse, psychologists seem to gain
intellectual comfort by increasingly seeking neuroscience’s molec-
ular and mechanistic “high-tech” stamp of approval. As a case in
point, the recent discovery of mirror neurons in the monkey’s
brain provides some molecular and mechanistic credence to the
old idea of a common code between perception and action sys-
tems. Long before this discovery, the idea was already driving ma-
jor psychological theories on visual perception (Gibson 1979; Gib-
son & Pick 2001), emotions (Levenson 1996), speech perception
(Liberman & Mattingly 1985), early imitation (Meltzoff 1990),
and the origins of social cognition and intersubjectivity (Gergely
& Watson 1999; Rochat 2001a; 2001b; Trevarthen 1979).
The evidence of mirror neurons in the monkey’s brain give Pre-
ston & de Waal (P&deW) mechanistic backup for their idea of a
biological continuity in the evolution of empathetic feelings. To
put it simply, if the monkey’s brain possesses nerve cells that fire
equally when performing an action or perceiving the same action
performed by a conspecific, then even nonhuman species possess
the biological potential to experience the world vicariously. If this
is a legitimate and interesting proposition that substantiates evo-
lutionary continuity in empathetic feelings (i.e., that sharing feel-
ings is not the monopoly of humans), it eludes the more difficult
question of what it means to share feelings with others, whether
human or not.
Here, I contend that patterns of firing in the monkey’s brain do
not, and will probably never decisively illuminate the question.
Rather, the levels and multifaceted aspects of vicarious experience
are probably best captured by looking at how infants and young
children develop in relation to others.
My dictionary defines empathy as “the intellectual identifica-
tion or vicarious experiencing of feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of
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another” (Random House Unabridged Dictionary). This defini-
tion calls for a distinction of psychological levels and meanings. In
its modern acceptance, empathy covers all aspects of the process
by which individuals can vicariously experience the world,
whether at a sensory, perceptual, or higher cognitive level. Es-
pousing this broad construal of empathy does not help in specify-
ing what is covered by the concept in terms of psychological
processes and mental involvement.
We can sort this conceptual mishmash by looking at how chil-
dren express different kinds of vicarious experience with others as
a function of their development (see Goldie 1999 for a taxonomy
of adults’ empathy). Between birth and 4 to 5 years of age the va-
riety of vicarious experiences expressed by children increase dra-
matically and in an orderly fashion. The developmental literature
points to at least 6 levels of empathy emerging in succession, each
expanding and adding to the repertoire of empathic potential.
These might correspond to 6 basic levels of empathy that are nat-
urally unfolding in early development and forming good concep-
tual anchorage for future comparative research. These levels can
be summarized as follows:
1. At birth, infants manifest passive and obligatory emotional
resonance. This first kind of empathy is automatically triggered
and biologically determined (e.g., Sagi & Hoffman 1976).
2. By the second month, numerous studies demonstrate the
emergence of active reciprocation via social smiling and complex
dialogical engagement as well as regulation with caretakers in
face-to-face exchanges. At this level, and in addition to emotional
contagion, infants begin to manifest a new (conversational) stance
towards others, actively co-constructing shared experience via im-
itation and reciprocal games (e.g., Rochat et al. 1999).
3. Starting approximately at 9 months of age, infants expand
their repertoire of vicarious experience by attempting to share
their attention with others in relation to objects and events in the
environment, actively involved in developing so-called secondary
intersubjectivity (e.g., Carpenter et al. 1998). At this level, infants’
context of empathy expands beyond face-to-face exchanges.
4. By 14 months, infants are shown to identify themselves as
unique entities, beginning, for example, to recognize themselves
in mirrors. Presumably, from this point on, they can also begin to
identify with or project themselves into others. This provides
ground for a new kind of empathy (projective empathy). For ex-
ample, research suggests that it is at around this age that children
start discriminating social partners who are imitating them (e.g.,
Meltzoff 1990; Agnetta & Rochat 2001).
5. By 24 months, children begin to manifest self-conscious
emotions including embarrassment (e.g., Kagan 1984; Lewis
2000). At this level, children begin to engage in systematic com-
parison, categorization, and eventually conceptualization of the
self in relation to others. They start construing how they should
feel based on how others might feel about them. Embarrassment
is presumably the direct expression of such process.
6. Finally, by 48 months, children develop the unambiguous
ability to theorize about others’ mind, capable of construing false
beliefs and beginning to distinguish objective from subjective
thoughts, as well as to construe feelings and emotions held by self
and by others that are more or less congruent (see Perner 1991).
From this point on, children become capable of adopting a theo-
retical stance towards others, able to conjecture about the emo-
tional state of others in relation to their own.
In short, developmental research indicates that children de-
velop new ways of sharing experiences with others, hence new
ways of empathizing, from automatic emotional contagion to re-
ciprocal exchanges and affective resonance via protoconversation,
to joint attention, identification, norm formation, and eventually
theories of mind. In fact, all of these kinds of empathy are ex-
pressed and present all through the life span, developing (at least
in humans) in an orderly fashion over the first 4–5 years of life.
Because of their orderly emergence, these kinds of empathy are
basic, with qualitatively different levels of psychological complex-
ity, namely, with different degrees of higher cognitive involve-
ment. From a comparative and evolutionary perspective, the
question is not whether nonhuman species have or have not a ca-
pacity for vicarious (empathic) experience. Most probably they do,
as suggested by P&deW. Rather, the question is what kinds of em-
pathic capacity are other species capable of, and more impor-
tantly, how does this capacity develop?
It is reasonable to posit that because of their highly scaffolded
and actively instructed symbolic environment, human children
develop more ways to empathize compared to other species. But
that remains to be empirically demonstrated. We need more com-
parative works on this issue, works that should be inspired by the
abundant behavioral literature on infant and child development,
and not predominantly by recent research pointing to develop-
mental changes in brain functioning, such as the relative involve-
ment of frontal regions. The development of the frontal cortex is
just a gross developmental and comparative index. It is void of
meaning regarding children’s developing multi-level potential for
empathy, hence it is not a suitable basis for comparison across
species.
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Abstract: Empathy represents one of the basic forms of human expres-
sion. Empathy evolved to facilitate social behavior. The perception action
model, extended to empathy, is an exciting paradigm in which to under-
take contemporary cognitive and comparative neuroscience. It renders the
perception of events as an active affair, both when watching others, and
when performing actions.
The article by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) on the biological ba-
sis of empathy is interesting. They hypothesize that empathic sys-
tems are embodied in the brain. These systems are tied to per-
ceptual/action programs that organize intentional action.
P&deW build their hypothesis on the findings that similar mo-
tor programs in the cortex are activated both when one performs
an action, and when one observes another perform an intentional
action. First and third person perspectives are obviously different,
but they share part of the same neural substrates and this has been
an important scientific finding.
The perceptual action model that P&deW endorse envisions
representational capacity to be importantly linked to the organi-
zation of action. But cognition does not mean more control; nor
does it mean cortex or consciousness. The evolution of the central
nervous system has been linked to greater accessibility and greater
use of subsystems in the organization of behavior, but cognition is
endemic to brain function.
Two investigators set the intellectual context for the discussion
of the empathy: Adam Smith and Charles Darwin. Smith ex-
pressed the ideas of a number of his contemporaries by asserting
that moral sentiments are an important part of our responses to
the experiences of others; I see you in pain, I act (though not al-
ways, and to varying degrees) to comfort you. The other, Charles
Darwin, links the moral sentiments to the origins of social behav-
ior.
Disagreement exists about whether to attribute empathy to any
primate other than humans. Is empathic distress found in other
species? The authors suggest the possibility; several species look
as if they are orienting their response in relation to the experiences
of others, specifically the detection of the discomfort of con-
specifics and ameliorative behavioral responses toward the con-
specifics. But what would it take to persuade those who could ex-
plain such behavior without invoking the concept of empathy?
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I would not separate cognitive empathy from other forms of
empathy, as the authors do. Empathy is, in part, an appraisal of an
event. The authors embrace the appraisal model of emotion. And,
as they note, some senses of empathy are perhaps less complicated
than others. I would suggest that a difference in degree of sophis-
tication is a better way of explaining different kinds of empathy,
rather than that one kind is cognitive and the other is not.
After all, a number of cognitive systems are reflexive, rapid, and
impenetrable. To undercut misleading connotations, I would
again suggest that one talk about multiple appraisal systems, de-
grees of empathy. The fact that the response can be fast and re-
flexive is not the issue – surely the perception of syntactical com-
petence is reflexive and rapid. The fact that the response is
automatic does not make it noncognitive. The empathic reflexes
of the mother/infant reflect appraisal systems that are rapid and
reflexive, but also cognitive.
Degrees of perspective taking exist. The perception-action
model is a nice way in which to couch the organization of action
and the organization of perception, without having to revert, I
would suggest, to the cognitive versus noncognitive distinction
with regard to empathy.
The authors make the point that similarity affects empathic re-
sponses to others; they suggest that the less similar, the less likely
a response. The Nazis rendered those chosen to be exterminated
as “different” and unlike the “average” German at the time. It was
perhaps more easy to destroy those who were different – to act
barbarically, to show little empathy. The result was little sympathy,
and a greater tendency to do damage.
Perception-action links and the evolution of
human speech exchange
Thomas P. Wilsona and Margaret Wilsonb
aDepartment of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106;
bDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064.
wilson@soc.ucsb.edu mlwilson@cats.ucsc.edu
http://psych.ucsc.edu/Faculty/mWilson.shtml
Abstract: A perception-action system may underlie the mechanisms by
which human speech exchange in social interaction is managed, as well as
the evolutionary precursors of these mechanisms in closely related species.
Some phenomena of interaction well-studied by sociologists are suggested
as a point of departure for further research.
The proposal advanced by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) that a
wide range of phenomena related to imitation and empathy can
be accounted for by a perception-action system is not new. Nor is
it clear that their formulation has enough precision to be consid-
ered a model. However, their treatment of this issue departs from
previous reviews in two important respects. The first is that they
focus on emotion and empathy, whereas previous authors have fo-
cused on the information processing events involved in perception
and imitation of conspecifics (e.g., Decety & Grèzes 1999; Melt-
zoff & Moore 1997; Miklósi, 1999; Prinz 1997; Rizzolatti & Arbib
1998; 1999; Wilson 2001). The second is the review of data from
comparative ethology, integrating phenomena from humans, pri-
mates, and other mammals into a single framework, and suggest-
ing an evolutionary continuum that can usefully illuminate the
human case. This, we propose, can provide an explanatory frame-
work for a range of social phenomena identified by sociologists but
heretofore neglected by psychologists and cognitive neuroscien-
tists. We refer specifically to the findings of conversation analysis
(for reviews, see Heritage 1984, Ch. 8; Levinson 1983, Ch. 6; ten
Have 1999).
Studies of human talk in naturally occurring situations reveal an
extremely robust system of practices by which participants orga-
nize their interaction turn-by-turn. The domain of this speech-
exchange system is “conversation,” defined as talk in interaction
where the order, size, and content of turns are not structured by
the speech-exchange system itself (in contrast to conventional
arrangements such as ceremonies, court-room proceedings, and
debates). The conversational speech-exchange system provides
for turn taking, sequencing (connecting a current turn to prior and
next turns), and repair of troubles in hearing and understanding.
This speech-exchange system is apparently universal across cul-
tures and languages, is what talk reverts to when conventional
arrangements break down, and is the form of talk infants first en-
counter in language acquisition. Moreover, because the conversa-
tional speech-exchange system accommodates an extremely di-
verse range of content and social contexts, it may provide a
mechanism by which a species as biologically uniform as Homo
sapiens can produce the startling variety of cultures found across
human populations.
To illustrate, turn-taking is a central organizational feature on
which much else in conversation depends (Sacks et al. 1974; Sche-
gloff 2000; Wilson et al. 1984). Roughly, a turn is a period during
which just one participant has both the “right” and “obligation” to
act, in the sense that failure to act is a noticeable occurrence. For
example, silence following a question is treated by participants as
a noticeable nonaction by the recipient rather than as part of the
questioner’s turn. Further, turn transitions frequently occur with
no hearable gap between speakers (Jefferson 1973), despite the
measurable amount of time required for the second speaker to
“prime” the vocal apparatus for speech. The timing of this turn-
taking mechanism appears to be extremely precise and fine-tuned,
and its functioning relies on a shared orientation to that timing by
both participants.
Two issues immediately arise. First, what are the cognitive
mechanisms by which this speech-exchange system functions?
Second, what were the evolutionary precursors that allowed this
system to emerge?
With regard to the latter, we can ask whether related phenom-
ena can be observed in situations that do not involve language.
Clearly, some human nonverbal activities involve taking turns, and
some activities of other species, such as grooming, may do so as
well. This of course is an empirical issue, and the extensive primate
data collected by de Waal and others might provide evidence. The
questions then would be how nonverbal turn taking is managed so
that the normal state of affairs is smooth transition from one par-
ticipant to another, and how episodes of simultaneity and failure to
act are dealt with. Obviously, one should not expect that the spe-
cific details of human speech-exchange practices will be found
more generally, but rather that these are specializations of more ba-
sic phenomena which may be found in other species.
With regard to the cognitive mechanisms underlying speech ex-
change (and more broadly, underlying management of the timing
of interaction), it is possible that these are closely tied to the per-
ception-action system discussed by P&deW. To make this link, we
must note that mechanisms for imitation and empathy need not
be limited to the production of overt behavior but could also be
used for internally simulating others’ behavior and mental states.
Such simulations could be used to track the course of the speaker’s
turn, predict when that turn will end, and so on.
This raises the question of whether broader and more abstract
phenomena in the speech exchange system can be integrated into
a perception-action perspective. One example is the phenomenon
of turn-completion by another: one person starts a turn and a sec-
ond picks up and finishes it off with the first person treating the
completion as adequate by simply going on with the flow of the
conversation and not protesting against an interruption or cor-
recting the second speaker for misrepresenting (Lerner 1991). A
second example is the importance of the participants’ orientation
to context (Arminen 2000; Wilson 1991; Zimmerman 1992). For
example, the utterance (taken from a tape recorded telephone
conversation), “somebody jus’ vandalized my car,” could be any of
a number of things, such as an excuse for being delayed. In fact,
it was treated by speaker and recipient alike as a request for help,
based not on the utterance itself, but on the context: a phone call
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to an emergency dispatching agency. Context turns out to be piv-
otal for how the speech-exchange system itself functions – for ex-
ample, a request sets up the relevance of granting or denial, but
an excuse does not. In order for this to function effectively, both
participants must be able to simulate and predict not only the
other’s behavior, but more broadly the other’s intentions and ori-
entation to the larger context. Whether the kind of simulation sup-
ported by a perception-action system is sufficient to explain these
broader abilities, remains an open question.
Caregiving, emotion, and concern for others
Carolyn Zahn-Waxler
Section on Developmental Psychopathology, National Institute of Mental
Health, MSC 2606, Bethesda, MD 20892-2606. waxlerc@irp.nimh.nih.gov
Abstract: Few individuals are constitutionally incapable of showing con-
cern for others at an early age, and malleability is possible. Individual vari-
ations will be best understood through study of the representational pre-
requisites of empathy in close conjunction with caregiving environments
and affective underpinnings.
The concept of empathy has been questioned, even maligned,
throughout time. Galileo classified sympathy with antipathy, oc-
cult properties, and other terms thought to masquerade as scien-
tific explanations (Sobel 1999). Early philosophers, theologians,
and moralists often viewed individuals as solely motivated by self-
serving interests and needs. These beliefs made their way into
twentieth century psychoanalytic, psychological, and sociobiolog-
ical theories opposed to the idea that concern for others could be
a central goal of human behavior. Recent theoretical, method-
ological and empirical advances reveal a rich, rigorous knowledge
base about genuine concern for the well-being of others. The
PAM model of Preston & de Waal (P&deW) builds upon and ex-
tends these discoveries. Particularly encouraging is the emphasis
on the mother-infant relationship as the core context within which
empathy is first learned. This generalization is now buttressed by
solid empirical data (Zahn-Waxler 2000). It represents a departure
from most earlier evolutionary theories where, with a notable ex-
ception (MacLean 1985), altruism expressed by the young toward
family members was seen as impossible. Caring behaviors by the
young were discounted as ultimately self-serving.
MacLean’s ideas provide an important backdrop to the concep-
tual framework of P&deW. He viewed empathy as rooted in our bi-
ological, evolutionary heritage, a capacity that emerged in conjunc-
tion with the evolution of mammals. Mammals as warm-blooded
creatures that nurture, nourish, and protect their young, engaged in
a “family way of life.” This set the stage for exposure (and respon-
siveness) to distress experiences of pain, separation, and suffering
in others. Such stimuli are also the elicitors of empathy.
MacLean proposed interconnections of the limbic system with
the prefrontal cortex, in the mammalian triune brain. Linked orig-
inally to parental concern for the young, a broader sense of re-
sponsibility for others emerged as reflexive reactions of concern
were transformed into purposeful patterns.
P&deW develop a plausible argument that the same central
nervous system link between perception and action guiding ac-
tions in the physical environment also organizes social-psycholog-
ical processes pertaining to empathic concern. Whether percep-
tion-action processes are accordingly the driving force is open to
question. The authors wisely avoid the rancorous, unproductive
debate about the “true” nature of concern for others (i.e., selfish
vs. selfless). In their view, definitions of empathy have been
overemphasized to the point of distraction. However, conceptual
and empirical advances depend upon identification of different
forms of empathy, as well as the reasons and motives for different
forms of expression. This requires clear definitions.
The focus on the CNS and brain circuitry gives further cre-
dence to ideas once deemed inherently unscientific. The success-
ful integration of diverse literatures, theories, and disciplines
bodes well for the utility of the PAM model. Now it will be nec-
essary to develop specific empirical tests, to determine what it can
and cannot explain. The model is presented in broad terms. To
what extent do generalizations and integration of ideas oversim-
plify the issues? How well can individual differences in both nat-
uralistic and experimental contexts be predicted? Neural distur-
bances and brain damage may contribute to empathic deficits,
explaining variations at the extreme. However, relatively few indi-
viduals are constitutionally incapable of caring in the early years
of life and malleability is possible. While recognized in many mod-
els, these issues are less actively pursued in empirical tests. Both
genetics and environment contribute to early individual differ-
ences (Zahn-Waxler et al. 2001). Clarity is needed on empathy as
a neurologically distributed process, and how interactions of na-
ture and nurture can be examined.
Empathy disorders (e.g., autism, psychopathy) and factors con-
tributing to them (e.g., parental depression) are considered here in
the context of a deficit model. Parental depression and other con-
ditions also can heighten empathy, sometimes creating surfeits
(Zahn-Waxler 2000). In contrast to basic emotions (anger, fear, and
joy), higher-order emotions like empathy and guilt are derivations
of primary emotions. Empathy can only occur in response to an-
other’s emotion. Taking on the emotions of distressed others can
create risk for depression, a mood disorder defined by sadness.
Whether empathy is expressed as adaptive concern or in a way that
drains and demoralizes the self, its first form of expression is af-
fective in nature. Correspondingly, the PAM cognitive neuro-
science perspective requires integration with an affective neuro-
science approach (Davidson & Sutton 1995) from the outset.
In the PAM theory, emotional contagion is distinguished from,
but also part of, a broader category of empathy including other
subtypes. Further conceptual and empirical work is needed to
clarify the distinctions and commonalities. For example, physio-
logical reactivity to the distress of others (an index of contagion) is
viewed as interpersonal connectivity essential to empathy. It is also
viewed as personal distress that can turn the potential empathizer
away or even against the victim on account of fear. Physiological
arousal activated in a caregiver by a crying infant can elicit em-
pathic concern, avoidance, or even abuse. The authors state that
emotional contagion proximately guides the parent-offspring re-
lationship, increasing the success of the offspring by eliciting tai-
lored or proper care. Further information is needed on how the
PAM theory can be used to generate predictions about (a) the na-
ture of tailored or proper care, (b) when and how it is provided,
(c) anticipated outcomes, and (d) interactions with child tem-
perament. Most predictions generated focus on experimental
tests of unclear relevance to real life. An exception is the proposed
relationship between scope of life experience and scope of situa-
tions in which the subject responds appropriately. Defining and
testing the constructs of “life experience” and “appropriate re-
sponse,” however, will be a major undertaking.
P&deW cite research by Cummings et al. (1985) where 2-year-
olds show increased aggression toward peers following exposure
to adult conflict as evidence for how representation changes with
experience. This was true, however, only for a subgroup of chil-
dren, mainly boys, who were already highly aggressive. Moreover,
girls mainly showed distress. Generalizations from research can
mask important exceptions that, if left unexamined, create risk for
the models established. This is why the study of individual differ-
ences must accompany research on universals.
The emphasis on the caregiver-infant relationship in progres-
sive, evolutionary models is relevant to the fact that females are
more likely than males to show empathic, prosocial behaviors,
(Zahn-Waxler 2000). In most species the caregiver typically is the
mother. Biological factors as well as socialization experiences un-
doubtedly contribute to heightened empathy in females seen even
in the first years of life. The study of groups who differ in their ex-
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pressions of concern for others may help sort out the roles of na-
ture and nurture that contribute to individual differences.
Authors’ Response
Empathy: Each is in the right – hopefully, not
all in the wrong
Stephanie D. Prestona and Frans B. M. de Waalb
aUniversity of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, 2RCP – Neurology Clinic, Iowa
City, IA 52242; bLiving Links, Yerkes Primate Center and Psychology
Department, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322.
stephanie-d-preston@uiowa.edu dewaal@rmy.emory.edu
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Abstract: Only a broad theory that looks across levels of analysis
can encompass the many perspectives on the phenomenon of em-
pathy. We address the major points of our commentators by em-
phasizing that the basic perception-action process, while auto-
matic, is subject to control and modulation, and is greatly affected
by experience and context because of the role of representations.
The model can explain why empathy seems phenomenologically
more effortful than reflexive, and why there are different levels of
empathy across individuals, ages, and species.
And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!
–from John Godfrey Saxe’s version of “The Blind
Men and the Elephant” (Saxe 1963)
R1. The big picture
Making an analogy to the ancient parable, empathy, like the
elephant, has been studied from many different perspec-
tives, yielding different and seemingly contradictory de-
scriptions of the phenomenon. The thirty-one expert com-
mentaries on our article echo the cacophony of opinions in
the field of empathy research, with reports of empathy as a
prosocial response to the needs of others that develops in
childhood (Bard, Brownell et al., Commons & Wolf-
sont, Eisenberg, Hoffman, Lewis), as an innate ability for
emotional resonance that exists across species (Aureli &
Schaffner, Bard, Bekoff, Gallup & Platek, Parr), as a
conditioned response that develops through experience
(Davis), and as a high-level, cognitive process that relies on
perspective-taking abilities reserved for a certain level of hu-
man development and a limited taxonomic group of animals
(Bandura, Constantino, Lewis). In our target article, we
tried to unite the empathy literature by taking a broad per-
spective that incorporates and validates all of these per-
spectives, working across all levels of analysis to determine
how to mesh the perspectives into a unified model. We be-
lieve that “each was partly in the right” and do not exclude
the possibility that we may be among those “in the wrong”;
we do hope that our response further demonstrates the need
to look at the whole beast as we explain how our model ac-
commodates issues raised by our commentators.
We read the commentaries as generally supportive of the
approach we have chosen. In fact, it is truly remarkable that
empathy has now attracted so many expert opinions in a re-
spectable journal, given that only in recent history has it
been considered a serious object of scientific study (see
Zahn-Waxler’s commentary). Most of the commentators
agree in principle that it is time to integrate various levels
of empathy into a single model and to elucidate its core
mechanisms; this is a common theme throughout this re-
sponse. Our response follows the structure of the target ar-
ticle, with large divisions on the ultimate (sect. R3) and
proximate levels (sect. R4). We will focus on issues that
were raised by multiple commentators, and clarify issues
that may have been confusing (see Table R1).
R2. General features of our model
R2.1. The meaning of multiple levels
In biology, phenomena exist at several simultaneous levels.
Nico Tinbergen fleshed out four levels of analysis: evolu-
tion, adaptation, development, and mechanism, each with
its own questions and explanations of the same phenome-
non (Tinbergen 1963). Ernst Mayr similarly divided analy-
sis into proximate and ultimate causation (Mayr 1961). Ac-
cording to both schemes, all levels are necessary for a full
understanding of a phenomenon, and the accounts of each
level complement rather than conflict with one another.
For example, one might say that birds have feathers to
keep warm, while another may disagree and say they facili-
tate flight. This is an issue of adaptation by natural selection,
and both proposed functions are considered valid. There is a
separable question of evolution that deals with how selection
of certain genes and changes in gene frequencies produced
feathers, and of phylogeny, which asks in which kind of ani-
mals feathers first appeared (an area with many recent fossil
discoveries). Once feathers evolved, one needs to know
about their development in the individual. Still further, there
is the issue of how feathers work, the level of mechanism, of
how they trap heat, dispel water in water fowl, and aid flight.
In order to answer complex questions about behavior (why
some birds fly and not others), one needs to investigate across
all of these levels of analysis. More importantly, even these
four levels of analysis cannot be divided sharply because each
overlaps with and “informs” the others.
Our model of empathy touches on all four levels of analy-
sis, and also combines across them, proposing that the
mechanism itself is adaptive, evolved over time, and re-
quires particular developmental conditions for maximum
benefit in this environment. In fleshing out these levels of
empathy, we have touched on everything from group alarm
to the intersubjectivity problem. We do not think that this
results in a mixing of metaphors (Hinde, Gallese et al.) or
a definition that is too broad to be useful (Hinde, Gallese
et al., Parr). Instead, by combining across levels, our
model seeks to provide an adequate and accurate descrip-
tion of the phenomenon while supporting most of the ex-
isting perspectives.
A broad view covering everything from evolution to neu-
robiology cannot possibly do justice to the level of detail our
colleagues have achieved with many subtopics of empathy,
and as such, some commentators expressed a desire for the
model to place more emphasis on their particular perspec-
tive. This proved especially true of the developmental re-
searchers who thought that more emphasis should have
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been placed on the stages of empathic development (Bard,
Brownell et al., Commons & Wolfsont, Hoffman,
Lewis), the differences among types of empathy (Eisen-
berg, Hoffman), and individual differences (Zahn-
Waxler). We fully agree that these issues are important; in-
deed, they comprise the majority of existing empirical
research on empathy. We chose not to emphasize this re-
search in our review because it has been the topic of many
such reviews in the past (e.g., Eisenberg & Strayer 1987;
Hoffman 2000; Ungerer 1990; Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992),
and as such we felt that the space in our article was better
spent demonstrating how findings from this literature fit
with our model. We are grateful to the commentaries that
reviewed these findings, providing the reader with a more
complete picture.
R2.2. “Low” versus “high” levels of empathy
Some commentators described empathy as a cognitive
process, qualitatively different from lower-level versions of
empathy such as emotional contagion (e.g., Bandura,
Constantino, Lewis). We agree that cognitive abilities
augment basic perception-action processes in order to ac-
complish more complex forms of empathy (e.g., “true em-
pathy” or “cognitive empathy,” target article, sect. 4.2).
However, these higher-level processes rely on perception-
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Table R1. Major categories of topics addressed by commentators divided into four classifications: General issues, definitional issues, 
ultimate issues, and proximate issues
General Issues Definitional Issues
Positive vs. When you Prediction, A broad 
negative see empathy testability definition Representations Response Automatic
Ainslie & Monterosso, Bandura, Parr, Atkinston, Gallese Anderson & Hoffman Davis, Anderson Ainslie & Monterosso, 
Brownell et al., Rochat, et al., Hinde, Keltner,  & Keltner, Bandura, Bard, 
Anderson  Schulkin Parr, Panksepp, Gallese Hinde Blair, Brownell et al.,
& Keltner,  Zahn-Waxler et al., Constantino, 
Gordon, Hinde, Davis,
Panksepp, Parr Eisenberg, 
Parr Gordon, 
Hoffman, 
Lewis
R2.3. R4.2. R5. R1., R2.1.,  R4.1. R2.2. R4.1.1.
R2.3.
Ultimate Level Issues
Self, self-awareness, Adaptiveness of contagious 
Other species Interrelationship MSR Developmental change distress
Aureli & Anderson & Gallup & Platek, Bard, Brownell et al., Bandura, Eisenberg,
Schaffner, Bard, Keltner, Aureli Beckoff, Keenan Commons & Wolfsont, Constantino, 
Bekoff, Brownell & Schaffner, & Wheeler, Eisenberg, Gallup Mealey & 
et al., Gallup & Bandura, Gordon, Lewis & Platek, Hoffman, Kinner
Platek, Panksepp, Hoffman Lewis, Zahn-Waxler 
Parr 
R3.2. R3.1. R3.2. R2.1. R3., R5.
Proximate Level Issues
Need  Automatic Mirror Simulated Similarlity vs. Neurological Disorders of 
mechanism vs. cognitive neurons processes familiarity specifics Attention empathy
Bard, Atkinson, Bandura, Atkinson, Bandura, Atkinson,  Ainslie & Bandura, 
Rochat, Aureli Parr, Gallese, et al., Brownell Blair, Eslinger Monterosso, Blair & 
Davis & Schaffner, Charman, Gordon, et al., et al., Gallup Bandura Perschardt, 
Bandura, Davis, Kahil, Hinde, & Platek, Charman, 
Brownell et al., Eslinger et Keenan Khalil, Iacoboni & Constantino, 
Constantino, al., Gallese & Wheeler Mealey & Lenzi, Mealey & 
Hoffman, et al., Kinner, Kinner, 
Lewis Iacoboni Schulkin Wilson & 
& Lenzi, Keenan Wilson
Panksepp & Wheeler, 
et al., Rochat Panksepp
R2.3, R4 R2.2, R2.3, R4 R4.3 R2.3, R4 R4.2 R4.4 R2.3, R5 R4.5
action processes, even if their automatic quality causes
them to seem less significant. The fact that empathic pro-
cesses arise automatically does not preclude their implica-
tions and expressions from being “filtered” through experi-
ence and cognitive evaluation; automatic processes can and
do coexist with voluntary ones (contra Hoffman).
We agree with Atkinson that there are separable pat-
terns of central and peripheral activity for separate emo-
tions (cf. Damasio et al. 2000; Ekman et al. 1983), and that
there are emotion-general cognitive processes, such as
working memory. But, returning to our familiar theme, this
distinction should not be overemphasized because emo-
tion-specific contagion can be generated through emotion-
general cognitive processes (e.g., imagery), and cognitive
forms of empathy must activate representations of the spe-
cific emotion being simulated. Areas that code for shared
representations (like somatosensory; cf. Adolphs et al.
2000) are necessary for perception of one’s own feeling
states, as well as the feeling states of another, and they are
activated in both simple and complex forms of empathy, de-
pending on the task.
R2.3. Why a process-based model?
A few commentators did not see the need for a “process-
based model” of empathy (e.g., Anderson & Keltner,
Gordon, Hoffman). The emphasis on process is part of
what distinguishes our model from others, so we respond to
this in some detail. A process model is primarily useful be-
cause it does not require hard and fast divisions among
types of phenomena (as is the case with developmental and
comparative behavioral models). According to a process-
based model, empathic processes are always present to
some degree. If a normal subject has perceived the dis-
tressed state of an object, there will be some resulting ac-
tivation of the subject’s own distress circuits, even if the
activation is not strong enough to generate conscious aware-
ness of distress, an overt expression, or actions to terminate
the object’s distress. In addition, subjects may have their
own goals that conflict with and override the need to attend
to or respond to the object. Attention to the object is no mi-
nor issue because, as Bandura so aptly pointed out, one
major way in which subjects avoid resonant distress, or the
responsibility to offer help, is to avoid attending to the ob-
ject altogether. Moreover, empathy deficits such as autism
may be primarily due to attention deficits (e.g., Frith 1989;
Gillberg 1999).
Thus, we fully agree with Rochat that the question is not
whether or not nonhumans have a capacity for vicarious ex-
perience, but what kind of capacity they are capable of, and
how it develops. And we agree with Schulkin who goes fur-
ther and suggests that we should not separate empathy and
“cognitive empathy,” because the latter implies falsely that
the former is noncognitive (perhaps “perspective-taking”
can be used to describe cognitively effortful versions of em-
pathic process).
On the other hand, some commentators downplay the
possible continuity, mentioning the absence of empathy in
certain subjects or situations (e.g., Bandura for humans,
Parr for chimpanzees), or contrasting lower and higher lev-
els of empathy in human adults as compared with infants or
nonhuman animals (Bandura, Brownell et al., Constan-
tino, Lewis). These comments reflect the fact that while
we are placing empathy within a continuous, process-based
model, another established tradition places empathy within
a categorical model based on overt behavior or subjective
experience. The latter has generated intense disagreement
on the phenomenon and the placement of boundaries (e.g.,
Becker 1956; Cialdini et al. 1997; Eisenberg 1986; Hoffman
1978; Omdahl 1995; Shantz 1975; Wispé 1986).
Some theoretical models of empathy stipulate an overt
prosocial response because of the practicality that overt
states are often the only ones available for study (e.g., con-
ditioning, comparative behavior, prosocial development).
Because we think it is informative to know what is inside the
“black box,” we emphasize the ways in which perception ac-
tivates the neural substrates of visceral and somatic states,
which in turn activate the substrates of overt action. We
used the term “response” in the target article to refer to the
neural activation, which may have been mistaken by some
commentators to refer to overt acts of imitation or helping
(e.g., Davis, Anderson & Keltner, and Hinde).
Kim Bard presents data that advocate a process-based
model of empathy. In an experiment by Coles et al. (1999),
the response of 8-week-old infants to a social partner de-
pended on their prior experience (presence of prenatal
drugs and parental stability). This reaction was only evident
in the heart-rate physiology of the subjects, however, not in
their overt behavior. The heart rate response in question
was seen only for social stimuli. In the target article, we pre-
sented similar human neonate data (sect. 1.1.3). These data
demonstrate the importance of looking at physiological
data, and of including mechanism-level descriptions, dis-
cussed further below. Obviously, behavioral data remain es-
sential, because in the end we wish to know which model
best explains behavioral outcomes, and our process-based
model makes specific predictions for behavior, not all of
which are shared by other theories.
In opposition to the process-based aspect of our model,
Gordon emphasized his rather more cognitive model of
mental simulation. Applying the theme of multiple levels,
we believe that simulation theory, as well as its counterpart
theory-theory, are compatible both with each other and
with our model. Simulation theory is very similar to our per-
ception-action model in that it deals with the way individu-
als model the world, but it is largely metaphorical, or “dis-
embodied.” In our model, “mental simulations” would
derive from activating one’s own substrates for feeling and
action, but at a low enough level that there is no overt ac-
tion, and/or with added neural inhibition to prevent overt
action (perhaps like the “offline” processing of Atkinson
and Gordon). In situations that are ambiguous or require
overt action, concomitant executive processes can help
switch activation among multiple, stable representations in
order to determine the correct interpretation or the appro-
priate action (like Hoffman’s shifting of cognitive ap-
praisals). Theory-theory is also metaphorical, but is a
higher-level description of how individuals approach, and
learn about the world. With our model, theories would be
the stable representations created through experience with
the world that dictate what one predicts to find and per-
ceives. The shifting among these stable representations is
equivalent to theory testing, à la the scientist in the crib
(Gopnik et al. 1999). Moreover, since simulation theory and
theory-theory exist at different levels, simulation theory
could explain how theory-theory is instantiated (subjects
simulate the object’s behavior to test a theory).
Advocating a process-based model does expand the term
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empathy beyond the traditional, prosocial affective states or
actions (as used by Anderson & Keltner, Aureli &
Schaffner, Davis, Hinde), to include all affective forms of
the perception-action process, any state that resonates be-
tween the subject and object (as noted by Anderson &
Keltner). As such, the model includes the spread of both
positive and negative states (addressing Ainslie & Mon-
terosso, Brownell et al., Gordon, Panksepp et al.). Al-
though, we reiterate with Parr that positive emotions are
not just the inverse of negative because the two have differ-
ent neural substrates to a large extent.
Since it is problematic to alter the meaning of an existing
term, we suggest using the term “empathic processes” to re-
fer to affective forms of the perception-action mechanism,
and to reserve the term empathy per se for the traditional
definitions (which depend on the discipline). We believe it
is valuable to use the term “empathic processes” to charac-
terize even low-level versions of these perception-action
processes like emotional ideomotor actions and predator
alarm. We do not think that responses to grasping (Hoff-
man) or predator alarms (Aureli & Schaffner) are ex-
pressions of empathy, or that they feel or seem similar to
higher-level forms of empathy, but these phenomena be-
long in the same family of affective perception-action
mechanisms. Our characterization of seemingly nonem-
pathic states and behaviors as empathic processes may un-
settle those preferring a phenomenological description
(e.g., Gallese et al.). However, phenomenology ignores as-
pects of the underlying mechanism beyond conscious
thought and awareness, and thus discourages understand-
ing of the phenomenon in continuity with simpler phe-
nomena, some found in other species. In addition, not
everyone’s phenomenology is the same. Someone who per-
ceives empathy as a cognitive process will not resonate with
an affective characterization, explaining why these different
views have persisted in mutual isolation for over two cen-
turies. Only by fleshing out the phenomenon in a way that
includes all perspectives can one understand it.
R3. Ultimate bases
Empathy is founded on the basic perception-action nervous
system arrangement, which originated with the nervous
system itself and can be assumed to be adaptive since it fa-
cilitates responses to the environment. In addition to the
adaptiveness of perception-action processes in general, we
discussed in detail the role of the mother-infant bond for
developing socio-emotional concordance, which correlates
with many positive outcomes for the individual (we were re-
miss in not citing the extensive supportive research of Jaak
Panksepp on this topic in rodents).
Traditional models concerning the adaptation of empa-
thy emphasize the benefits to the subject for helping the
object, for example, inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism,
increased esteem within the group. Moreover, Anderson
& Keltner rightly emphasize the ability of empathy to in-
crease social bonding and cooperation. We do not disagree
that all of these are important adaptive functions of helping
behavior; but we focused on mother-infant interactions be-
cause these are of such direct relevance for the reproduc-
tive success of mammals, and were there from the begin-
ning of mammalian evolution, so that they may have served
as the evolutionary “engine” for empathic processes.
Significantly, from an evolutionary perspective, many of
the distress cues commonly used by mammals to arouse
helping responses are directly derived from the infantile
behavioral repertoire, as pointed out by Eibl-Eibesfeldt
(1971/1974); also MacLean (1985) – thanks to Zahn-
Waxler for this addition – and Panksepp (1998). A partic-
ular kind of distress cue evolved because of its effectiveness
in generating help from others. The aversiveness of the ob-
ject’s cue (to the degree that ending it is positively rein-
forcing), and the effect of the cue on the subject are inher-
ently intertwined in terms of function and evolution. We
agree with Eisenberg that these factors are partially sepa-
rable for individual events and that this separation is useful
for understanding individual differences in emotion. Eisen-
berg’s research (references in Table 1 of the target article)
demonstrates that some subjects exhibit more distress in re-
sponse to the object’s distress than others, and that help
given by distressed subjects may differ qualitatively from
that given by nondistressed subjects (such as, respectively,
forceful termination/avoidance versus tailored care). More-
over, some subjects and situations may be more sensitive to
social cues, such as audience effects and reciprocity. These
effects are important and instructive to the phenomenon.
We also agree with Bandura that contagious distress with-
out any control would not be adaptive; as such, we assume
the many factors modulating the intensity of perception-
action processes prevent distress from occurring in most
situations, and to disruptive degrees (salience, familiarity,
similarity, attention, inhibition, emotion regulation).
R3.1. How empathy relates to relationships and bonding
Interdependence between subject and object increases the
need for the subject to attend to, perceive, and do some-
thing about the object’s state. Anderson & Keltner’s
model of social bonding is highly relevant here even if we
doubt that the evolution of empathy started out in the con-
text of relationships with a relatively low degree of interde-
pendency (compared to the mother-infant bond), such as
among peers or unrelated adults. This use of empathy, al-
though highly relevant in the complex societies of most pri-
mates, seems to have been reached later on in evolution.
Bandura provides support for the emphasis on interde-
pendence citing experiments where subjects only have con-
cordant emotional reactions when they expect the object to
be from their group, or to be cooperative. Only an interde-
pendence hypothesis and not a social bonding hypothesis
would predict similar effects of attention and action to-
wards enemies as well as allies, and similar prosocial actions
towards strangers who are temporarily necessary to the sub-
ject. The empirical work of Aureli and colleagues attests to
the fact that relationship quality is equivalent to interde-
pendence. In separate studies, it has been shown that indi-
vidual primates with high relationship quality are more
likely to reconcile (van Schaik & Aureli 2000), and individ-
uals that must rely on each other for food are more likely to
reconcile (Cords & Thurnheer 1993).
Gordon felt that our emphasis on the interrelationship
of the subject and object was an “ad hoc amendment” to the
model. On the contrary, the effect of interrelationship on
the subject’s behavior is a direct result of the perception-
action arrangement of the brain, especially when you look
across levels of analysis. Brains evolved to respond quickly
and appropriately to the environment. Interrelationship
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and interdependence correlate very highly with the need
for a subject to respond to an object. Thus, the adaptive bias
towards friends and kin is a direct result of response-based
neural design. This underscores the interplay of the ulti-
mate and proximate levels of analysis since the brain mech-
anisms for response adaptively influence who the subject
attends to, which in turn influences tendencies for cooper-
ative and prosocial behavior.
R3.2. The inclusion of animal research
There were no objections to our emphasis on continuity of
empathic processes between humans and other animals, in
fact we perceived general support (e.g., Aureli & Schaff-
ner, Bard, Bekoff, Gallup & Platek, Panksepp et al.).
Bard emphasized the fact that chimpanzees and humans go
through similar stages of development in socio-emotional
abilities. Aureli & Schaffner provided an emotion-mediated
model of social decision-making in animals that is similar in
qualilty to the somatic marker hypothesis for human deci-
sion-making (Damasio et al. 1991). The research of Parr is
intriguing and instructive for our model, not only as a com-
parative approach, but because she combines behavioral
and physiological measures, accessing the processing as-
pect of empathy in a way that previous comparative studies
have failed to do.
Mark Bekoff points out the importance of including so-
cial carnivores in research on empathy and the self. If the
capacity evolved in relation to mutual dependency and
bonding between individuals, this taxonomic group is a log-
ical one to look for empathy. Possibly, attribution-based
forms of empathy require a self-other distinction. The mark
test with mirrors is thought to tap into this ability, and since,
until recently, only apes and humans were known to pass
this test, Gallup & Platek reiterate Gallup’s (Gallup 1982)
prediction that cognitive empathy will be found only in this
taxonomic group. This hypothesis was picked up by de Waal
& Aureli (1996) when they found that only apes, and not
monkeys, spontaneously provide consolation to victims of
aggression (see also, de Waal 1996). Recently, however, dol-
phins have been added to the select group of animals with
mirror self-recognition (Reiss & Marino 2001), an intrigu-
ing finding since dolphins have long been known for their
altruism towards each other. Killer whales, and perhaps
false killer whales (but not sea lions), also exhibited contin-
gency checking to a mark (Delfour & Marten 2001). These
findings seem to support the connection between higher
forms of empathy and self-awareness. We agree with
Bekoff, though, that the mirror test is unlikely to provide
the whole story on self-awareness (Cenami Spada et al.
1995), and that we should remain open-minded about ani-
mals that fail this test yet have highly evolved social lives.
The canid research of Bekoff futher provides a nice ani-
mal parallel to Brownell et al.’s observation that human
children “not only dynamically accommodate their behav-
ior to one another and share emotion expression and be-
havior during play, but they also share one another’s goals,
desires, and beliefs.” Bekoff ’s comparative research into 
the play behavior of social carnivores demonstrates that the
“play bow” is used to communicate play intentions. The
bow is used to initiate play (and according to a perception-
action model, instigates a feeling of play in the other), and
the frequency of play bows is higher after intense bites, and
higher in species more able to inflict pain, communicating
the absence of aggression in situations that could be misin-
terpreted (Bekoff 1995).
R4. Proximate bases
As said before, there is no hard wall dividing ultimate and
proximate levels of analysis; the two are always interrelated
in the sense that proximate mechanisms themselves must
evolve to serve their ultimate goals. The proximate level is
not identical to the neural substrate (it includes all imme-
diate causes of behavior), but it is especially our inclusion
of neural data that seemed unnecessary to some commen-
tators (e.g., Davis, Rochat). We will therefore first demon-
strate that neuroscience is an established and necessary
field. This is followed by our clarification of aspects of the
proximate model that may have been unclear, then by dis-
orders of empathy and our vision for future research.
Even if neuroscientific tools are currently en vogue and
probably overestimated, this is not to be held against them.
We do not agree that they represent some flash in the pan:
neuroscience has indeed been part of traditional psychol-
ogy for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. Since Hip-
pocrates (400 BC), we have been learning about the brain
using careful studies of behavior and postmortem analysis
(e.g., Galen in the second century BC; Gall, Broca, Wer-
nicke, and Meynert in the nineteenth century; see Long
1996/2002). But these indirect methods are often painstak-
ing and limited by time, patience, and the availability of pa-
tients with selective impairments. New tools such as brain
imaging can catalyse this knowledge with a few well-
designed studies. This level of knowledge is necessary to
distinguish among competing hypothesis, to select between
possible and actual psychological theories.
To illustrate, it has been suggested that empathy is
achieved in human adults by the subject’s effortful re-
flection on the object’s state and situation; this reflection
generates state matching between subject and object (Con-
stantino, Lewis, and Bandura). Alternatively, our model
predicts that the matching state is generated automatically
in the subject, but that the subject can use effort to attend
to and modulate this activation. The former theory seems
to imply that most, or all nonhuman animals lack the ca-
pacity for empathy, as they have limited executive skills and
hence cannot effortfully consider the object’s state. In con-
trast, our theory predicts that animals will have access to the
states of others, even if their executive skills limit the extent
to which they can manipulate this information. The demon-
stration of matching emotional states in young human in-
fants and animals supports our model.
Similarly, one might propose, as Kahlil did, that empa-
thy is achieved by “placing yourself in the shoes of” the ob-
ject, or by “trying on” the emotion of the object. These two
hypotheses may seem different theoretically, and this dif-
ference may be supported by data (see Bandura), but ac-
cording to our model, both require the perception-action
mechanism to generate access to the state of the object. It
is more successful to “try on” the object’s state than to imag-
ine being the object (cf. Hughes et al. 1981; Stotland 1969)
because “trying on” focuses on feeling states, whereas “in
the shoes” focuses on the object’s position and percept.
Careful consideration of the mechanism is the only way to
appreciate the similarities and differences between these
two options.
Most theories of empathy are based on phenomenology,
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thus designed to mesh with our subjective experience; yet
most are disembodied, and unable to explain how the sub-
ject places itself in the shoes of the other. This intersubjec-
tivity problem gave rise to conditioning models that sug-
gested subjects were conditioned to feel distress when their
own distress followed that of the object. Conditioning of
distress surely happens, as demonstrated by the animal ex-
periments discussed in section 3.4.1 of our target article.
But this does not account well for the contagious emotions
of newborn infants or for the fact that subjects exhibit dis-
tress to the object even when they have never experienced
the stressor (contra Hinde’s assumption). The weakness of
phenomenological models is that they do not instantiate
themselves across levels of analysis.
R4.1. The role of representations
The term “representation” in our account may be confusing
if taken to refer to symbolic entities that underlie voluntary
processes. If representations were to refer to this level of
functioning, they would indeed conflict with basic empathic
processes such as emotional contagion, as pointed out by
Hoffman. However, we are using the term, as is common
in cognitive science, to refer to the neuronal connections of
the brain that store information. As such, muscle move-
ments, feeling states, associations, conditioning, and so on,
are all mediated by representations, and they require no
special cognitive abilities beyond the plasticity that exists in
any central nervous system (cf. Damasio 1990; McClelland
& Rumelhart 1985; Merzenich & deCharms 1996).
R4.1.1. The meaning of “automatic.” Breathing is most of
the time an involuntary, automatic process. Imagine that we
would have to concentrate on it all of the time. Yet, we do
have control over it, can deliberately speed up breathing,
regulate it, and even temporarily stop it till we are blue in
the face. This goes to show that the term “automatic” should
not be confused with “uncontrollable,” as some of the
commentators seemed to do in their response to our de-
scription of empathy as an automatic process (Bandura,
Brownell et al., Constantino, Davis, Hoffman, Lewis).
What we meant is that neural representations are automat-
ically activated by perceptions associated with them. Thus,
we assume along with our commentators that perception-
action circuits will not always be engaged (e.g., if the sub-
ject is not motivated to attend to the object), and that if they
are engaged, many mediating factors will determine the
subject’s experience and behavioral output.
To give a more concrete picture, witnessing an expres-
sion of sadness could activate cortical and subcortical areas
(even peripheral muscles; cf. Fadiga et al. 1999) below a
threshold that would elicit a facial expression or change in
physiology. This lower level of activation would still give the
subject access to the state of the object, allowing the sub-
ject to understand the object, make inferences and plans,
without necessitating conscious awareness of the feelings or
overt changes (like “offline” processing, Atkinson and
Gordon). In some cases, however, we predict that the sub-
ject will actually exhibit/feel the mimicking movement/
feeling (high salience, attention, cognitive load). For exam-
ple, in the Dimberg studies we reviewed (target article,
sect. 3.4.4), subjects exhibit facial muscle activity and report
a subjective experience matching the depicted emotion
(pictures of facial expressions).
The automatic activation of neural representations by no
means conflicts with a more cognitive or an appraisal view
of empathy. Appraisals are themselves the product of acti-
vated, interconnected, neural representations associated
with the percept; thus, one can interchange our use of “rep-
resentations” with Hoffman’s use of “appraisals.” Similarly,
the cognitive and situational factors mentioned by Ban-
dura are accounted for, since experience determines the
subject’s activation via the effect of experience on attention
(target article, sect. 4.1.1, 4.2). Inhibition and attention re-
allocation can up- or down-regulate the activation of repre-
sentations (target article, sect. 4.2).
R4.2. Similarity versus familiarity
Familiarity and similarity explain the vast majority of effects
on empathy in the literature (see Table 1 of the target arti-
cle). Batson and colleagues have extensive data on the ef-
fect of even superficial, perceived similarity on the likeli-
hood to help (Batson et al.1977; Batson & Coke 1981;
Batson et al. 1988; Toi & Batson 1982). Brownell et al. also
cite a paper by Zahn-Waxler and colleagues showing that
preschool children direct prosocial behaviors more to peers
than adults (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1982).
Khalil brought up the differences between similarity
and familiarity, and we agree that they should not be
equated. Similarity is the extent to which subject and object
share any of a multitude of features (e.g., overlap in genes,
body structure, appearance, temperament, past experi-
ences, the way that they carry themselves). Familiarity, on
the other hand, is the extent to which the subject has had
past experience with the object, directly or indirectly. While
similarity often overlaps with familiarity, especially if time
is spent with similar individuals, one could be relatively sim-
ilar to someone one has not met, and one can be very dis-
similar to someone one knows well (as in the case of “dear
enemies,” and interspecies interactions). The two factors
differ, but their effects on empathy are similar because they
both increase the attention to and understanding of the ob-
ject – similarity through the representations that the sub-
ject and object share, familiarity through the representa-
tions created in the subject through experience with the
object. The representational overlap between subject and
object addresses the concerns of Bandura and Parr that
individuals do not always exhibit empathy for one another.
Empathy is prevalent within groups because the individu-
als are similar, and empathy is lacking during inter or intra-
group conflicts because the individuals are dissimilar (or
perceive themselves to be). Schulkin suggested a similar
interpretation for the behavior of the Nazi forces during
World War II.
There will always exist some similarities and some dif-
ferences between subject and object, and there will always
be an extent to which they will be familiar with one another
(addressing Bandura, Brownell et al., Hinde). Mealey
& Kinner described this well when they stated that some
insufficiencies in empathy will exist between people and
animals, females and males, young and old, and between
any subject and object with differing experiences. The ver-
nacular use of the word “empathy” in English actually re-
stricts the concept such that the word cannot be used (i.e.,
“I empathize with you”) unless the subject has had the same
experience. The same is true for the original German Ein-
fühlung. Without the same experience one may be able to
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“sympathize,” but not “empathize” (again reflecting a cate-
gorical, rather than a continuous model of empathy). Be-
cause similarity and familiarity are not discrete categories,
the subject and object can be compared on many different
dimensions. When the subject observes the object from a
distance, body type, posture, and carriage are the only cues
available, so these will be the representations of interest. In
an emotional, interpersonal conversation between spouses,
the outcome will depend more on their shared representa-
tions of each other and their relationship.
R4.3. Not just mirror neurons
Many commentators saw our proximate mechanism as ba-
sically a “mirror neuron” hypothesis (e.g., Charman, Da-
vis, Panksepp et al., Rochat), which is understandable,
given the enormous amount of recent press given to these
cells. According to our model, however, mirror neurons
alone cannot produce or give rise to empathy (as acknowl-
edged by Gallese et al.), and much more work on the in-
terconnected brain circuits and their connections to the vis-
cera would be necessary to explain the biological bases of
empathy (as done by Iacoboni & Lenzi). Importantly, ex-
periments in neuroscience using socio-emotional para-
digms (see target article, sect. 3.4.4) do not implicate mo-
tor mirror neuron areas, but rather areas where visceral
emotional states are represented in the cortex, and the
pathways between them. In a recent study, when presented
with pictures of faces, schizophrenic patients had increased
activation compared to normals in motor and pre-motor
cortex areas that control face movement. This indicates that
they compensate for their emotion processing deficits by
hyperactivating their own face movement substrates during
perception (Quintana et al. 2001). The F5 mirror neurons
described in monkeys may not be of primary importance for
empathic processes, but may play a bigger role in the per-
ception-action processes of language (Rizzolatti & Arbib
1998), where there is a preponderance of neuropsychogical
data to support their role.
Mirror neurons are interesting because they provide cel-
lular evidence for the perception-action mechanism re-
quired by our model, which is far from new (as emphasized
by Rochat). As reviewed in the target article, perception-
action processes were specifically postulated by Lipps
(1903) and Merleau-Ponty (1962/1970) long before the dis-
covery of mirror neurons. Also, Prinz and colleagues have
been demonstrating perception-action processes in motor
behavior for the past few decades (exemplifying that one
can infer the biological mechanism from well-designed be-
havioral experiments) (see, e.g., Prinz 1997). However, it is
important not to interpret the fact that we have mostly mo-
tor data for perception-action processes as an indication
that all perception-action processes are motoric in nature
(cf. Gallagher et al. 2002). One can apply perception-action
processes to social cognition without it necessarily being a
motor theory of social cognition (cf. Gallese & Goldman
1998; Wolpert et al. 2001).
R4.4. The search for neural mechanisms: Beyond
mirror neurons
As a circuit-based model, our description of the neural
pathways of empathy did not elaborate on the specific role
of each brain area. A few commentators came to our res-
cue, filling in details from recent empirical studies of brain
imaging. We are grateful for the imaging study reviews of
Atkinson (emotion-specific versus emotion general pro-
cessing), Blair & Perschardt (emotion recognition, espe-
cially angry vs. fearful faces, and theory of mind), Gallup
& Platek (self-recognition and mental state attribution),
and Keenan & Wheeler (lateralization of self-awareness,
theory of mind). There have also been other highly relevant
and supportive papers published since the call for com-
mentators. Our model accounts for the findings in these pa-
pers, but we caution against interpretations of data that lo-
calize a particular task to a particular brain area. The
commentaries of Eslinger et al. and of Iacoboni & Lenzi
exemplify a dynamic, integrated approach that studies abil-
ities, rather than tasks, and brain systems rather than brain
areas.
The substrates for self-awareness are particularly inter-
esting. Self-awareness was addressed by multiple commen-
tators (Bekoff, Blair & Perschardt, Gallup & Platek,
Keenan & Wheeler) and it is relevant to empathy, since
empathy correlates with mirror-self recognition (MSR; cf.
Gallup 1982). Self-awareness is also relevant to our model
because perception-action processes use the substrates of
the self to perceive others, begging the question, how does
one differentiate activation caused by one’s own actions
from that generated by the perception of action in another?
We suggested that activation is in general higher when
caused by actions in the self than in another, and that par-
ticular areas should show more activation for self-generated
action. General and area-specific activation could be used
to disambiguate self-action from other-action. Other au-
thors have suggested the involvement of reafferent motor
signals in the right parietal cortex (Georgieff & Jeannerod
1998; Iacoboni et al. 2001).
Two recent studies by Decety and colleagues found lat-
eralized effects in two PET imaging tasks that compared
self- and other-related conditions, but the interpretation of
these data is complicated (first- vs. third-person action im-
agery; Ruby & Decety 2001; imitating vs. being imitated in
a complex motor task, Decety et al. 2002). As expected by
a perception-action model, they found overlapping neural
substrates for self- and the other-oriented action condi-
tions, and there were areas that were only – or more – ac-
tive in one condition than another, demonstrating that you
can use the neural signals to differentiate self from other.
Lateralized activity in the inferior parietal cortex was par-
ticularly suggested to discriminate between self and other;
the right was active when the subject was being imitated by
another and when imagining another’s action, the left was
active when the subject was imitating another and when
imagining self-action. But studies reviewed by Keenan &
Wheeler suggest self-awareness is lateralized to the right
hemisphere: Does it make sense for self-action to activate
the opposite side of the brain as “self-recognition”? Decety
and colleagues suggest that subjects hyperactivate self-rep-
resentations while processing another’s action, to avoid con-
fusion (Ruby & Decety 2001; cf. Hurley 1997).
A more parsimonious model is suggested to explain these
data, that fits perfectly with recent applications of motor
theory to social cognition (cf. Blakemore & Decety 2001;
Wolpert et al. 2001). The left hemisphere may be needed
to attend to, or generate, self-action; this explains left later-
alization for apraxia, imitation of another, and imagining
self-action. Conversely, the right hemisphere is involved
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when you attend to the action of a person or body part “out-
side of yourself” (including pictures of yourself or your mir-
ror reflection), explaining right lateralization when the sub-
ject is being imitated by another, imagining the action of
another (but see Grafton et al. 1996), MSR, theory of mind,
and passivity phenomenon. The right parietal cortex is par-
ticularly involved when tasks require complex visuospatial
processing (Colby & Goldberg 1999; Goldenberg et al.
2001). Thus, one may need more right hemisphere activity
to generate complex, precise movements (Goldenberg
2001), to visually process the actions of another (Ruby &
Decety 2001; Decety et al. 2002), or to visually process
one’s own reflected actions (self-recognition studies).
A simple mechanism could explain how one differ-
entiates activity caused by looking at one’s self, another per-
son imitating you, or just another person. The cerebellum
is thought to activate or prime the sensory areas with the ex-
pected feedback from an intended action (a forward model,
cf. Wolpert et al. 1998). This predicted feedback can be
compared to the actual visual feedback from the person fac-
ing you (even if it is yourself ), and you can interpret the sit-
uation based on the results of this comparison. If the visual
feedback from the person facing you correlates precisely in
time and space with your expectations, you are looking at
your own movement; if the actions correlate, but less pre-
cisely in form and timing, you are looking at another person
imitating you; if the actions are not correlated with your
own, you are just looking at another person. It is known that
cerebellar response correlates with the delay between the
expected and observed feedback (Blakemore et al. 2001);
usually this signals an error, but when the feedback is from
another person (you have many cues that it is), you can in-
terpret the increased cerebellar activity as a sign that you
are being imitated. When one is conscious that there is a
disconnection between what is predicted and observed,
there is increased activity in the prefrontal cortex (Fink et
al. 1999); this may explain the impression that MSR re-
quires conscious awareness, and the fact that the prefrontal
cortex is active during self-recognition tasks. But, it is still
conceivable that individuals with less self-awareness or less
prefrontal cortex can distinguish self from other using the
cerebellar signals.
Iacoboni & Lenzi describe their own work on the
neural substrates of empathy in a task where individuals ei-
ther passively perceived emotional expressions, or per-
ceived expressions while imitating them (the “empathy”
condition). This experiment found that completely over-
lapping areas were recruited for the two tasks, which was
interpreted as support for a perception-action model of em-
pathy. The only difference between the conditions was in
the magnitude of the response, with more activation for the
imitation condition, presumably because the subjects were
actually moving. This fits with our assumption that percep-
tion activates representations, but at a lower level than for
overt actions. Iacoboni & Lenzi discussed how the insula
was uniquely situated to communicate information from
the mirror neuron system to the limbic system, generating
the emotional sequelae necessary for an affective version of
perception-action processing. They found insular activity in
the imitation conditions as suspected, but there seems not
to have been significantly more activation in imitation than
passive viewing.
Similar to the aforementioned findings, in a PET study
of emotional imagery by Bechara, Preston, and colleagues
at the University of Iowa, there was almost complete over-
lap between the areas recruited for imagining an emotion
event from your own life, versus imagining an emotional
event from the life of another person. These data support a
perception-action model of empathy since you understand
the experiences of another through your own emotion sub-
strates (see Preston et al. 2002).
In their commentary, Eslinger et al. have summarized
the areas of the brain stem and cortex that are active dur-
ing moral judgment. Since these areas (amygdala, thala-
mus, insula, upper brainstem) are important for both per-
ceiving and feeling emotion, they are in line with our model
and the hypothesis of Iacoboni & Lenzi. Eslinger also
cites data from lesion analysis demonstrating that empathy
requires intact brain areas that evoke and interpret visceral
states, and places these areas in an interconnected circuit
between the frontal lobe and anterior temporal lobe (in-
cluding the amygdala and the insular cortex) with “distinct
but complementary roles” for each of the areas. In line with
our suggestion of a significant role for the cerebellum in the
ability to predict and attend to emotional stimuli, there was
activation of this area during moral judgments.
R4.5. Instructive pathologies
Some commentaries augmented our description of impair-
ments in empathic perception-action processes in disorders
like autism and psychopathy. Constantino gave an accu-
rate and eloquent summary of our model and went on to
support our review with data from clinical findings on em-
pathy disorders. We fully agree with Constantino that these
disorders represent extremes on continua of social and cog-
nitive functioning (see Gillberg 1999). Contstantino also
points out that mild social deficits may have been preserved
over the course of evolution because they are adaptive. This
is actually a theme of a BBS target article by Linda Mealey
(another commentator), who discusses this possibility in
depth for psychopathy (Mealey 1995).
Mealey & Kinner support the idea that individuals with
psychopathy lack the ability to affectively respond to the
state of another, stating that these individuals may not have
the necessary socio-emotional representations, or that these
representations are not linked to the physiological responses
that give them substance. We agree with these commenta-
tors’ assumption that individuals with psychopathy may not
have a theory of mind deficit per se (contra Blair & Per-
schardt), but rather that their personal experience of cer-
tain emotions is different, and thus their experience does
not resonate with objects of distress. Their deficit could be
due to many different central nervous system problems,
and the genesis of psychopathy is not known. Prefrontal
dysfunction is not unlikely, but there is probably a more
complex problem that disrupts the connections between
the prefrontal cortex (especially area 25), the amygdala, and
brain stem autonomic structures.
Our hypothesis for the impairment of individuals with
autism is different from psychopathy, but similar in the
sense that it is also a disruption in the perception-action cir-
cuit (which is not “unitary”; cf. Blair & Perschardt). Be-
cause both are considered “empathy disorders” there are
indeed qualitative similarities between them (see Gillberg
1992), but the way in which empathy is impaired, and the
types of social deficits that these populations show are dif-
ferent, thus requiring a different explanation (as noted by
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Bandura, and by Blair & Perschardt). We provided evi-
dence to suggest that autism is not a problem with the pre-
frontal lobes in particular (as interpreted by Bandura), but
rather by an impairment of basic imitation and attention,
likely linked to cerebellar damage. Cerebellar damage
would cause problems in predicting and attending to the
appropriate emotional cues in stimuli, precluding low-level
imitative behaviors and proper social development. New
data support the importance of early imitative and resonat-
ing behaviors in development. Children with autism ex-
posed repeatedly to an adult that imitated them showed in-
creased sociality after the first session (Field et al. 2001).
Mothers apparently use imitation in the earliest months of
a babies life, but gradually increase the proportion of affect
attunement beginning at two to three months; by six
months, attunement predominates (Jonsson et al. 2001).
However, assuming an early developmental problem in the
cerebellum, the extensive cerebellar-frontal connections
would not develop properly, resulting in ostensive pre-
frontal dysfunction. As underscored by Charman, abnor-
malities have been found in basically all lobes of the autis-
tic brain (e.g., frontal [Casanova et al. 2002], parietal
[Townsend et al. 2001]; temporal [Casanova et al. 2002;
Saitoh et al. 2001]), but there is currently a lack of integra-
tion of these various findings.
The imitation deficit viewpoint was supported by Char-
man; he added that there are many possible hypotheses
about the cause of this impairment. He suggests that indi-
viduals with autism could be impaired at (1) perceiving 
the state of the object (emotional or motor), (2) mapping
the object’s states onto one’s own states, (3) identifying with
the object (Hobson 1993), or, (4) they could have a non-
functioning mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti et al. 1996).
We think that perception is not different from mapping, as
perception is the same stage as activating your own repre-
sentations (equalizing options 1 and 2). Identification is a
psychological construct, which we would operationalize as
the result of perceiving that state in the object (which autis-
tics may not do), and having similar representations as the
object (which psychopaths and dissimilar normal individu-
als may not have). Again, we are dealing with the ability to
attend to the object and the presence of overlapping rep-
resentations with the object. Individuals with autism have
impaired language skills and motor imitation (implicating
the mirror neuron system), as well as impaired emotion im-
itation (implicating empathy processes); this suggests the
impairment is “upstream” of both the mirror neuron system
and empathy specific processes (Williams et al. 2001). This
is again why we emphasize a deficit in these individuals in
attending to appropriate stimuli, related to their cerebellar
damage.
One could test for the early versus late impairments
across populations as suggested by Atkinson. Dimberg’s
facial EMG data (referenced in target article, sect. 2.4.4)
represents automatic activation of muscles from emotional
expression, and thus an effect of early, low-level processing;
but this effect is hard to replicate. Preston and colleagues
at the University of Iowa are in the process of developing
an alternative protocol to be used with impaired popula-
tions that directly compares automatic/covert with con-
scious/overt processing of emotional states.
An interesting application of the cerebellar hypothesis
came from Wilson & Wilson’s commentary on perception-
action effects in social turn-taking. Recent data suggests
that the cerebellum represents temporal relationships
among events, even outside the domain of motor behavior,
and even when there is no overt response (Ivry 2000). The
cerebellum may be responsible for the attention-shifting
aspects of behavior (especially response reassignment),
while the basal ganglia coordinate successive responses
(Ravizza & Ivry 2001). Extensive data on the spatial-atten-
tion deficits of individuals with autism mimic the deficits of
individuals with lesions in the cerebellum, and correlate
with the amount of damage to the vermis of the cerebellum
(see Townsend et al. 2001). Turn-taking relies heavily on
these cerebellar processes because one interprets the
other’s goals from the content, timing, and cadence of their
speech, in order to predict and time interruptions; this al-
lows for smooth conversation without large pauses or inap-
propriate overlaps. Most social interactions depend on tight
timing of one individual’s actions with another’s (e.g., greet-
ing rituals, romantic encounters), and our interpretation of
others’ behavior likely relies on these cues (e.g., Heider &
Simmel 1944). This research reminds us, as did Panksepp
et al., that the search for deficits in individuals with im-
paired social behavior needs to include noncortical areas
(cerebellum, basal ganglia, other brainstem structures).
R5. The future of empathy
In the target article, we offered specific experimental ideas
for testing our model. Some commentators questioned the
predictability (Hinde, Parr), but we believe that our
model is predictive and generates hypotheses because of
the way interdependence, familiarity, similarity, and
salience affect the extent to which the subject processes the
object’s state, and is motivated to act. The importance of
most of these factors has already been proven in the exist-
ing literature (see Table 1 of the target article), and the
merit of any new hypothesis is to generate new predictions.
Interdependence has been less explicitly looked at, and was
controversial to some commentators (Anderson & Kelt-
ner, Bandura, Gordon). We emphasize interdependence
because the nervous system in general, and a perception-
action system in particular, evolved to generate responses
to the environment. Since objects that are intertwined with
the subject require a response, they will attract the atten-
tion of the subject and activate perception-action processes.
There is a great need to experimentally separate the sub-
ject’s ability to attend to the object from the ability to
process the object’s state. In agreement with Bandura, we
predict that the allocation of attention is the primary way in
which people control and modulate the extent of their res-
onant emotion with another. There will be impairments in
empathy that are correlated with attention deficits (e.g.,
autism). The role of attention suggests a number of differ-
ent experimental tests, including the early versus late pro-
cessing experiments in the previous section. The role of at-
tention also suggests that we need to look more closely at
the role of the cerebellum and basal ganglia in the produc-
tion and interpretation of socially appropriate behavior
(e.g., with stroke patients or Parkinson’s patients, respec-
tively), and that we need to include measures of attention
in behavioral paradigms (such as using a video of the sub-
ject, an eye tracker, and/or memory tests of similar non-
emotional details).
Possibly, perception-action processes are less evident in
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existing human laboratory experiments because the stimuli
are not salient enough to generate automatic processing
(static instead of dynamic, pictures instead of live, faces
only instead of whole body). We are sympathetic to the con-
ditions that prevent naturalistic research (e.g., human sub-
jects’ approval, time to collect and analyse data, number of
technicians needed), but the exceptions to these constraints
on research prove that it is possible, and for the testing of
our model it may be necessary.
Developmental research has been particularly innovative
in studying real-life socio-emotional responses, while re-
taining experimental rigor (e.g., the home tests of empathy
by Zahn-Waxler; imitation experiments of Melzoff and
colleagues, social referencing studies of Campos and col-
leagues). This example needs to be followed more directly
in research with adult humans because, although these in-
dividuals are capable of reporting on their own state and
filling out questionnaires, these kinds of data are subject to
bias and error and cannot be compared directly to research
in animals, infants, and impaired populations. Animal re-
search by necessity has to forego questionnaires, which may
be the reason why there are now far more studies on spon-
taneous reconciliation and consolation in nonhuman pri-
mates than in humans, young or old (Aureli & de Waal
2000).
One could use the diffusion of responsibility paradigm
from social psychology to investigate empathy, controlling
the relevant factors between the subject and a confederate
object of distress (familiarity: whether they met in a prior
session or did not; similarity: whether they are the same age
and class or not; salience: whether the subject is in mild dis-
comfort or is unconscious; interdependence: whether the
object is the partner in the experiment or not; other goals:
whether the study is “cancelled” or the subject is en route
to a goal). All of these factors should positively affect the
subject’s response (salience should have an inverted-U ef-
fect), and different designs could combine factors to look at
their relative influence. We predict that the subject’s goals
will override the other effects at lower levels, but that high
levels of familiarity and interdependence will override even
important goals of the subject (short of reproductive suc-
cess itself ). To look at empathic processes more generally,
one should assess the subject’s internal reactions to the ob-
ject, and attention to the object, as well as the overt re-
sponse.
Zahn-Waxler requested that future research flesh out
the interactions of nature and nurture and the precise role
of “tailored care,” and she suggested that individual differ-
ences are a good way to do so. We believe this research is
best done with animal models, because one can control
many of the relevant factors. We reviewed early studies of
helping behavior in rodents and birds, and hope that this in-
novative research can be revived. One can use very similar
paradigms to those conditioning paradigms, but increase
the number of factors well beyond conditioning and
salience to include all of the factors mentioned in the dif-
fusion of responsibility study (familiarity, similarity, inter-
dependence, other goals) as well as conditions that cannot
be controlled with humans (past experience, rearing condi-
tions, genetics, species differences). One can also look at
psychophysiology, endocrinology, and neural substrates rel-
atively easily in animals, especially rodents (see the emotion
and memory research of McGaugh and colleagues, e.g.,
Guzowski et al. 2001; Roozendaal et al. 2001), but these ap-
proaches have yet to be turned on the topic of empathy per
se. Albeit more difficult, a psychophysiological approach
has proven to be successful for studying emotional pro-
cessing in primates (Aureli et al. 1999; Berntson et al. 1989;
Miller et al. 1966; Parr 2001; Parr & Hopkins 2000).
Individual and species differences are benchmarks for
genetic differences, especially when rearing conditions can
be partially controlled, so one can use breeding techniques
to isolate the genetic differences between responders and
nonresponders. This is especially interesting with small-an-
imal models since one can look at multiple generations and
control the parentage. In this regard, the rodent research
of Panksepp is well-equipped to deal with these issues; his
suggestion to using genetic profiling techniques has be-
come very feasible and should be among planned studies on
empathy.
It is more difficult to study nature/nurture issues in hu-
man populations because there are so many factors in-
volved and one cannot control them; this results in very
small effect sizes, requiring vast numbers of subjects for
just correlational results. For human populations, it is best
to look at extreme ends of the continua in order to increase
effect sizes, which means studying impaired populations.
The work of Tiffany Field exemplifies this research, look-
ing at the emotional concordance and responsivity of nor-
mal infants compared to infants at risk for developing an ac-
quired disorder, for example, due to premature birth (Field
1979), respiratory problems (Field et al. 1979), or a mood
disorder in the mother (Field et al. 1990). In general, re-
search on impaired populations will continue to give insight
into the necessary components for normal empathic re-
sponses, and into the mechanisms underlying them. This
research is hard to interpret without corresponding re-
search into animal models and the substrates of normal 
humans (using functional imaging, TMS, EEG, endo-
crinology, etc.). Normal human populations are especially
amenable to psychophysiological recording that can look at
perception-action effects in the autonomic nervous system
online. These processes, only in combination, will clarify
the important interaction of nature and nurture, as well as
the central and peripheral circuits involved in each stage of
the processing.
R6. Conclusion
The commentators agreed overall that it is useful to extend
the concept of empathy into ultimate and proximate do-
mains, and to try to link empathy in humans and nonhu-
mans. Recent data support many aspects of the model, and
we can start to be more specific about the neural substrates
of emotional perception-action processes. Future research,
directed more at the role of interdependence, attention,
and the interaction between cerebellum and subcortical
structures should prove useful in further elucidating the
mechanism and the reason for impairments of empathy. We
thank the editors of BBS, the original reviewers, and the
commentators for their thoughtful suggestions and com-
ments. We hope the process of empathy has begun to
emerge from its state as “a riddle in social psychology” (All-
port 1968), as we begin to understand the ultimate and
proximate mechanisms.
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